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ABSTRACT
In the context of demographic, economic, and cultural perepectives 
of marriage, this dissertation attempts to identify causes of the black 
and white divergence in marriage propensity. The findings show a strong 
linkage between the social context and the marriage behavior of that 
person. This linkage provides a new angle from which the racial 
differences in marriage behavior are better understood.
For females, the lower rate of marrying among black females, 
compared to white females, is due to poor marriage markets that black 
females are facing. The centrality of marriage in a social context, 
indicated by marriage rates and average age of first marriage, also 
plays a role in creating racial differences in the likelihood of 
marriage, although to a lesser degree.
For maleB, the racial gap in marriage propensity is due to racial 
differentials in labor force participation and income at the individual 
level and to the differences in exposure to contextual influences.
Since blacks are more likely than whites to live in a social context 
where the divorce rate is high but marriage and remarriage rates are 
low, and where the occurrence of female-headed households and 
illegitimacy are frequent, their attachment of marriage as an 
institution is weaker than whites. However, black males have more 
favorable marriage markets than white males. When this differential is 
adjusted, black males would have even lower odds for marriage than white 
males do.
x
In Bum, the social context pertaining to the importance of 
marriage and local availability for marriage are two important 
structural mechanisms that operate in the dynamic process of the racial 
divergence in the propensity for marriage. However, the way in which 
the two structural factors operate in the process is different for males 
and females. By adjusting for both factors, one observes a racial 
convergence in likelihood of marriage for females. By controlling for 
the same factors, however, one observes a mixed picture among males 
because the two factors counter-balance each other.
Generally, the findings lend support to the notion that economic, 
demographic, and cultural factors have contributed to a declining 
propensity for marriage among black Americans.
xi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Dramatic changes have taken place in the American family structure 
during the past few decades. The most salient change is a very rapid 
increase in the proportion of American families headed by women: from 
7.4 percent in 1960 to 23.2 percent in 1985 (Wojtkiewicz, McLanahan, and 
Garfinkel 1989: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1964, 1986)1. In 1960 only 
one of every twelve children lived in a family headed by a woman. By 
1983 more than one of five children lived in such a family (Garfinkel 
and McLanahan 1986: 1). Projections by Bumpass (1984) suggest that this 
trend will continue throughout this century. Data for 1988 indicate 
that all families headed by women have increased to 25.2 percent, which 
suggests that one out of every four children born today will live in a 
female—headed family or sub-family^.
Between 1940 and 1985, the proportion of husband-wife black 
families declined steadily from 77 to 51 percent, while that proportion 
for white families essentially remained at 85 percent (Farley 1988). 
Estimates suggest that about 42 percent of all white children and about 
86 percent of all black offspring born in the late 1970s will live in a 
female—headed family before they reach age eighteen (Bumpass 1984).
Although the consequences of growing up in a mother-only family 
are generally similar for both whites and blacks, in that both black and 
white offspring from mother-only families fare less well in 
socioeconomic well-being than those growing up in intact families, the
1
rate and demographic components of the growth of mother-only families 
are quite different for whites than for blacks.
For whites, the major source of growth in mother-only families has 
been the increase in the proportion of formerly married mothers as a 
result of higher rateB of divorce and, more recently, lower rates of 
remarriage. For blacks, the picture iB quite different. WhereaB more 
than 45 percent of the increases in families headed by Bingle black 
women during the 1950s were due to increases in the proportion of 
formerly married mothers, this component accounted for less than 30 
percent of the growth in the 1960s and less than 3 percent in the 1970s 
(Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986: 53). On the other hand, the increase in 
never-married mothers accounted for about 9 percent of the growth in the 
1950s, 20 percent in the 1960s, and 23 percent in the 1970s. This trend 
is not a function of increases in out-of-wedlock birth rates, since 
after 1970, Buch birth rates declined for all age groups among blacks. 
While most of the growth in single parenthood is due to changes in 
marital behavior for both whites and blacks, the difference is that 
whites marry and divorce, whereas blacks are increasingly likely to 
never marry at all (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986: 54). Whereas marital 
disruption haB dominated all other components in accounting for growth 
in white female-headed families since 1960, non-marriage and the 
presence of children among non-married women have become increasingly 
important in accounting for the growth in black female headship 
(Wojtkiewicz et al. 1989). O'Hare (1985b) also noted that during the 
first half of the 1980s nearly all of the increases in black female­
headed families were due to births to never-married women.
These findings indicate a recent and an important change in 
marriage behavior of black men and women: the increasing propensity to 
never marry. Numerous other studies also document strong evidence for 
the change in the propensity to marry among blacks. Espenshade (1985) 
noted that, at leaBt since 1960, a weakening of marriage has been under 
way in the United States. This fading centrality of marriage in the 
lives of American men and women is more noticeable for blacks than for 
whites. Within the black population, black females have the weakest 
attachment to marriage.
Michael and Tuma (1985) reported that, compared to whites, blacks 
enter marriage much later than they enter parenthood, while Hispanics 
enter both marriage and parenthood at an earlier age. Farley and 
Bianchi (1987) showed that since 1960, major changes have taken place in 
the marital status and family structure of both blacks and whites, but 
the shift away from marriage and two-parent families has been much 
greater among blacks. Moreover, this racial dissimilarity continued to 
grow after 1970.
Schoen and Kluegel (1988) found consistent evidence for the racial 
gap in marriage rates in North Carolina and Virginia: the general 
decline in marriage propensities between 1969-1971 and 1979-1981 was 
greater for blacks than for whites in fifteen of the sixteen educational 
categories shown. For black females, the largest declines were in the 
lowest and the highest educational categories. For black males, the 
largest declines were among those with some college education and those 
who have less than four years of high school. College graduates showed 
the smallest decline.
4Bennett, Bloom, and Craig (1989) found the proportion of women who 
ever marry haa declined Bubatantially across cohorts for blacks but only 
modestly across cohorts for whites. Norton and Moorman (1987) noted a 
widening differential between blacks and whites in the overall 
likelihood of ever marrying from 1975 to 1985. In particular, black 
women ages 30 to 34 and 35 to 39 experienced much more dramatic declines 
between 1975 to 1985 in the proportion ever married than their white 
counterparts. In 1975, white women aged 30-35 years had a proportion of 
ever being married of 93.7, but for black women of the same cohort the 
proportion was only 87.1. By 1985, thiB difference more than doubled; 
the proportion of ever being married was 88.1 for whites, but it was 
only 70.9 for blacks. A similar trend occurred for those aged 35-39 
years. Bloom and Bennett (1990) found that race has become an 
increasingly important correlate of a woman's propensity to marry. For 
instance, 80 percent of black women aged 35-39 in 1985 who had not 
graduated from high school could be expected to ever marry, as compared 
with 92 percent of their white counterparts.
The sociological concern with the decreasing propensity for 
marriage arises from the fact that "marriage is still the main 
institutional relation through which societies license and encourage 
childbearing and child-care " (Davis 1985: 17). One can think of 
several possible paths that a woman can take in her life course: (1) 
remain single without children; (2) have children and establish a 
household without marriage; (3) marry and have children; (4) marry but 
remain childless; (5) marry and have children but later divorce and then 
remarry; (6) divorce with children but do not remarry and have more
children while divorced. The declining propensity to ever marry leads 
to two important consequences. First, it enlarges the number o£ women 
potentially at risk of forming female-headed households with dependent 
children. Second, children growing up in female-headed households tend 
to be handicapped in their socioeconomic achievement relative to 
offspring from both-parent families.
Many studies (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986: Chapters 1-4; Li and 
Wojtkiewicz 1992) document the serious consequences of living in female­
headed households for single-parents themselves and for their offspring. 
About half of these families are poor and live on welfare incomes. 
Children from single-parent families, particularly mother-only families, 
fare less well when they enter adulthood and they are more likely to 
drop out of school, to have out-of-wedlock birth, to have unstable 
families, and become single-parents themselves and dependent on welfare 
(Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986: 1-2).
Although both black and white children are more likely to live 
with never-married mothers today than in the past, the growing racial 
differences in marriage and family patterns will translate into 
increasingly different family experiences for black and white offspring 
(Farley and Bianchi 1987). The increasing difference in family 
background can further translate into a widening racial gap in 
socioeconomic well-being between black and white children when they 
enter adulthood. "Should the downward trend in marriage propensities 
continue unabated, we face the daunting prospect of larger percentages 
of black children reared in poverty and a reversal of the modest yet
hard-earned recent gains in racial economic equity" (Schoen and Kluegel 
1989: 905).
It is the concern about these important consequences of a 
decreasing propensity to marry and of the growing racial differences in 
the declining centrality of marriage that motivates and inspires this 
dissertation research. Generally, there are two bodies of literature 
that either documents or explains black and white differences in 
marriage patterns: micro-level and macro-level research perspectives.
Micro-Level Research. Based on Becker's economic theory (1973, 
1974, 1981, 1991) and on social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Homans 1974; 
Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Nye 1978), researchers with the micro 
orientation tend to focus on family background variables (family 
structure and parental socioeconomic status at childhood) and individual 
characteristics such as education, employment, and concurrent roles 
(Havens 1973; Hogan 1978; Waite 1981; Waite and Spitze 1981; Michael and 
Tuma 1985; Kobrin and Waite 1984; Marini 1985; Goldscheider and Waite 
1986; Teachman and Polonko 1984; Teachman, Polonko, and Leigh 1987; 
Testa, Astone, Krogh, and Neckerman 1989; Tucker and Taylor 1989).
While individual attributes and concurrent roles reflect the competitive 
advantage of individuals in a marital relationship and hence influence 
their perceived gains to marriage, family structure and socioeconomic 
background reflect the preferences and timetable of individuals for 
marriage.
Research at the micro-level has consistently revealed an apparent 
divergence between blacks and whites in the likelihood of marriage net 
of the race differences in family background and individual
socioeconomic status, but has failed to identify sources for this 
divergence. Michael and Tuma (1985) found that blacks differ from
whites in teenage entry into marriage and parenthood. While family
i
background variables had a significant impact on the likelihood of both 
early marriage and parenthood for whites, these variables had no 
explanatory power for the likelihood of marriage for blacks. Unable to 
identify reasons for these differences, they strongly called for further 
studies of the "puzzle" (1985: 540):
"We are struck by our lack of success in identifying reasons for
black-white differences in teenage entry into marriage......  We resist
calling our ignorance about the factors influencing marriage of black 
youths 'discrimination' or 'cultural differences'. Still, the long­
standing challenge of explaining marital patterns of young black 
Americans remain".
Macro-Level Research. Studies based on the macro-framework have 
focused on recent structural developments and their consequences for the 
opportunity of individuals to marry and their perceptions about gains to 
marriage. Specifically, the macro perspective has been pointing to 
factors such as a recent structural rise in male unemployment rate 
(Wilson 1987; Wilson and Neckerman 1986; Bennett et al. 1989; Lichter, 
LeClere, and McLaughlin 1990), increasing female economic independence 
(Preston and RichardB 1974; White 1981; Ermiech 1981; Farley and Bianchi 
1987; Farley 1988; Walker 1988), availability of welfare (Murray 1984), 
and sex ratio imbalances (Cox 1940; Akers 1967; Carter and Glick 1976; 
Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 1979; Grossbard-Shechtman 1980, 1984; 
Spanier and Glick 1980; Guttentag and Secord 1983; Schoen 1983; Schoen 
and Kluegel 1989; Goldman, Hammerslaugh, and Westoff 1984; Veevers 1988; 
South 1988; South and Trent 1988; Darity and Myers 1983b, 1984; Kiecolt
and Foaset 1989; Fosset and Kiecolt 1990). While changes in male 
unemployment and sex ratio imbalances tend to constrain the ability of 
individuals to marry and establish families, increasing female 
socioeconomic independence and the provision of welfare might have 
altered individuals' perceptions about marriage. It could be that 
blacks are more vulnerable to these changes and hence the impact on 
marriage behavior may be larger for blacks than for whites.
Generally, studies have provided evidence for the importance of 
these factors in understanding the black/white divergence in the 
propensity for marriage. However, the question still remains: why do 
racial differences in marriage propensity persist after the structural 
factors are taken into account? Lichter et al. (1990) found that the 
marriage rates for black females remained significantly lower than the 
rates for white females after female independence, male unemployment and 
earnings, and sex ratios in the labor market area were controlled.
Schoen and Kluegel (1988) found that compositional effects played only a 
minor role, compared with the effects of marriage propensity (or mutual 
attraction for marriage), in explaining the racial differences in 
marriage rates in North Carolina and Virginia. These authors suggest 
that new research efforts be directed to identifying sources of these 
differences.
Much of the inconclusive findings in the literature may be due to 
the lack of a linkage between individual variables and contextual 
factors in the analysis and due to inadequate measures of structural 
factors (most notably, local marriage markets) in addressing the 
black/white divergence in marriage. To marry or not to marry iB an
individual decision. Its occurrence is a function of both individual 
choice and the structural forces which can be either conducive or 
unfavorable for the event to happen, given that an individual chooses to 
do so. In addition, contextual factors, such as marriage and divorce 
rates in a locale, may also influence individual preferences for 
marriage.
The major problem with the micro-level approach is that structural 
conditions important to the occurrence of marriage are generally 
ignored. Hence, we know nothing from this type of research about how 
contextual forces influence the eventual outcome of individual decisions 
about marriage. As a matter of fact, most micro-level studies fail to 
explain persistent racial differences in propensity for marriage after 
individual characteristics are controlled for.
The pitfall of macro-level studies, on the other hand, is that 
factors that reflect individual choice are overlooked. Hence these 
studies present still only part of the whole picture. The fact that 
black/white differences in marriage propensity are not explained by 
micro models does not justify a total omission of individual variables 
in addressing the problem. Neither does it follow that structural 
forces such as the male unemployment rate, increasing female 
independence, and marriage market conditions are Bolely responsible for 
the divergence in black-white marriage patterns.
In light of both perspectives and of previous findings, I propose 
an integration of both individual and contextual variables. To ignore 
contextual factors amounts to an assumption that all people live in the 
same Bocial environment. ThiB is clearly incorrect. Under this
10
aBBumption, researchers would end up with erroneously specified models 
which in turn generate misleading results. On the other hand, to omit 
individual demographic and socioeconomic attributes leads to another 
invalid assumption: that the social structure exerts a uniform impact on 
diversified socio-demographic groups.
The integration of both levels of variables is crucial because 
racial differences in access to structural resources and contextual 
influences may lead to a corresponding differential in the individual 
outcomes such as marriage. While reduced access to structural resources 
restricts individual ability to marry, the cultural climate about 
marriage at the contextual level can influence individual preferences 
for marriage.
Previous studies also suffer from other weaknesses which in turn 
limit our understanding of the causes of the racial divergence in 
marriage. First, although the four structural factors (female 
independence, male unemployment, welfare dependence, and sex ratio 
imbalances 1 have been commonly cited as the causes for the declining 
marriage propensity among black population, virtually no studies have 
directly addressed how these factors affect blacks and whites 
differently. The essence of the existing theories about the racial 
differentials in marriage propensity suggests that the impacts of these 
factors may differ by race and by sex. By empirically testing the race 
and sex differences, I will provide an evaluation of the strength of the 
above-mentioned theories, and hence a better understanding of the 
problem.
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Second, the black/white divergence in marriage at the aggregate 
level has been well documented in the existing literature. However, 
less is known about this divergence by socioeconomic class. The 
questions remain: is a declining marriage propensity a phenomenon of the 
entire black population or is it a phenomenon of the black underclaBs? 
What are the causal factors? Answers to these questions will not only 
address general sociological concerns but also the concerns of policy 
makers working on these issues.
Third, sex ratio imbalances have long been considered as an 
important factor on marriage rates. In particular, racial differences 
in the sex ratio compositions are assumed to have caused substantial 
black-white differences in marriage patterns (Jacobson 1959; Cox 1940; 
Akers 1967; Carter and Glick 1976; Guttentag and Secord 1983; Heer and 
Grossbard-Shechtman 1979; Grossbard-Shechtman 1980, 1984). However, 
there has not been an adequate (realistic) measure of the marriage 
market in previous investigations of marriage patterns due to four major 
limitations.
First, these measures either do not control for the age factor or 
have a very limited range of age differences between the bride and the 
groom. Second, these measures exclude aspects other than age, such as 
marital status and education. On average, black females tend to have 
higher educational attainment than black males and this gender 
difference is more pronounced among blacks than among whites (Farley 
1988; Espenshade 1985; Matney and Johnson 1983). This racial 
differential is an important ingredient for the female independence 
argument and the sex ratio imbalances thesiB. The female independence
12
argument: posits that well-educated females have a weaker desire to marry 
because perceived gains to marriage are less for them than for females 
with lower education. A shortage of males with comparable education 
will further reduce the gains to marriage for well-educated females. 
Therefore, if black females find far fewer black males with comparable 
schooling than white females do, female marriage rates will be lower 
among blacks than among whites. On the other hand, the sex ratio 
theorists argue that low sex ratios at a given educational level will 
limit the opportunity females to marry because there are barriers for 
people to marry across educational boundaries. Third, researchers often 
apply these measures to aggregate data and ignore the spatial dimension 
of the mate selection process. Farley and Bianchi (1987) did take into 
account the educational aspect of mate selection in their construction 
of marital availability, but their measure was based on national-level 
data, thus overlooking the spatial dimension of marriage markets.
Lichter et al. (1991) used labor market areas as marriage markets, thus 
taking care of the propinquity problem. However, age, marital status, 
and education were omitted from their measure of local marriage markets. 
Essentially, their marriage market was simply the total number of males 
divided by total number of females in a labor market area. The fact 
that their marriage market variable did not have a significant effect on 
local marriage rates may well be due to the crude measurement of 
marriage markets.
Indeed, previous tests for the effect of sex ratio imbalances on 
marriage have been handicapped by the crudeness of the marriage market 
measure. It would be erroneous to discard a theory before adequately
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testing It. There is every reason to expect that a realistic measure of 
marriage markets will play an important role in the process of marriage 
formation. Previous studies have missed several crucial dimensions of 
mate selection. By applying crude age constraints in their measures, 
these studies have missed the age dimension of assortative mating. By 
ignoring racial and educational aspects of the marriage market, previous 
studies have missed two essential factors in homogamy in marriage.
There is strong evidence that the marriage market is segregated for 
blacks and whites (Goldman et al. 1984) and that the barriers to 
marriage between persons with unequal amounts of formal schooling are
increasing (Mare 1991). By ignoring the spatial dimension of the
marriage market, the existing measures lead to an unrealistic assumption 
that an immobile poor person, e.g., living in a small town in
Mississippi, has the same opportunity as someone who lives in New York
City to meet a potential partner in New York City.
This research intends to address these weaknesses of previous 
studies and hence to enhance our understanding of the black/white 
divergence in marriage. The research is accomplished in four 
procedures: (1) to examine how individual characteristics and contextual 
forces together affect the propensity for individuals to marry and how 
the linkage between individuals and the social context helps explain why 
blacks have lower rates of marriage than whites; (2) to address race and 
sex differences in the effect of individual and contextual variables;
(3) to examine racial differences by socioeconomic groups; (4) to employ 
an adequate measure for marriage markets in the analysis.
The analysis is accomplished by using a merged file from the 
Public Use Microdata Sample-D (PUMS-D) and the County Statistical File 3 
(CO-STAT 3). The PUMS-D is a large and unique data Bet from the 1980 
decennial U.S. census. It identifies 382 labor market areas in the 
United States based on commuting patterns (Tolbert and Killian 1987).
The labor market areas are treated as local marriage markets in the 
analysis. The CO-STAT 3 is a compilation of several data sources, 
including census data, national health statistics, and labor statistics.
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Notes for Chapter One
1. The families include family households, related and unrelated 
subfamilies.
2. Again, the families are defined as all families including all family 
households, related and unrelated sub-families.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In this chapter, I present two approaches to entry into marriage 
and black and white differences in marriage propensity. The discussion 
of the theoretical arguments is followed by discussions of previous 
empirical findings.
Part One: A Micro-Level Approach
In the micro-level model, research on marriage timing and 
occurrence tend to focus on two sets of factors: (1) family structure 
and background, (2) individuals' socioeconomic characteristics, and 
concurrent roles. The importance of these variables arises from several 
kinds of theoretical reasoning. From the point of view of social 
exchange theory individual demographic and socioeconomic attributes 
reflect a person's marriageability and perceived gains to marriage.
From a socialization perspective, family background and family structure 
reflect a person's preferences for marriage because Bocial origins, to a 
significant degree, helps shape his/her values about marriage. From the 
perspective of life course transitions, variations in the timing of 
marriage among individuals are determined by their demographic, social 
and economic characteristics. Put in a different way, individuals' 
position in the social structure affects the temporal organization of 
their life events (Hogan 1986). Moreover, like the socialization
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perspective, the life course transitions perspective holds that the 
socialization activities of parents affect personal transitional 
timetables for the offspring, net of individual social position in the 
social structure (Hogan 1986).
Family Background
There are two theoretical arguments for the effect of family 
background variables on the transition to marriage and parenthood. From 
the perspective of social exchange theory, factors such as experiences 
of family disruptions, limited parental socioeconomic resources, and a 
large number of siblings, push individuals into early marriage which 
serves as an alternative to staying in the unpleasant parental family. 
This is b o  because the factors associated with an unpleasant family tend 
to lower the absolute advantage of remaining single and raise the 
relative advantage of becoming married (Michael and Tuma 1985: 516). 
Conversely, intact families with high socioeconomic status and financial 
resources provide attractive alternatives to early marriage (Waite and 
Spitze 1981: 683; Teachman et al. 1987: 242-243).
However, from the perspective of socialization theory, a non­
intact family background may have a negative impact on the likelihood of 
marriage. Kobrin and Waite (1984) argued that painful experiences of 
parental marital disruptions in childhood may lead to a retreat from 
marriage among those who experienced the disruptions. Children who grew 
up in less traditional family forms are more hesitant about committing 
themselves to a traditional family schedule. "They also might defer 
marriage, because of less expertise in the marriage market, or avoid it
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altogether, since the experience of pain might make them more careful 
not to risk repeating the process" (Kobrin and Waite 1984: 808). 
Likewise, Blechman (1982) argued that a parental marital disruption 
would lead to both personal apprehensions about marital success and more 
negative attitudes toward marriage as an institution.
The hypothesis of a more negative attitude toward marriage among 
children from disrupted families has been supported by previous 
empirical research (Thornton and Freedman 1982). The evidence suggests 
a linkage between childhood experience of family disruptions and a 
reduced likelihood of marriage. Kobrin and Waite (1984) found that 
children from non-intact families are lesB likely to be married. 
Goldscheider and Waite (1986) showed that coming from a broken family 
reduced the likelihood of marriage for women but not for men. McLanahan 
(1985), based on an analysis of the Michigan Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, showed that young adults who spent some of their adolescence 
in a single-parent family were more likely to be single parents 
themselves. Thornton (1991) showed that the experience of parental 
marital dissolution increases children's non-marital cohabitation but 
haB no positive effect on marriage. Thornton (1991) suggested that the 
strong effect of family disruptions on cohabitation could lead to a 
relative shift from marriage to cohabitation. Li (1991) showed that the 
longer offspring live in mother-only families, the less likely they will 
be ever married. These findings lend support to the notion of inter- 
generational transmission of values about family formation.
The socialization argument seems to be an appealing explanation 
for the low rates of marrying among blacks. Based on this argument, one
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can argue that a greater proportion of black children from female-headed 
households may account for a large portion of the black-white 
differential in marriage propensity.
However, the evidence has been mixed for this supposition.
Previous findings show that black-white differences persisted after 
childhood family experiences were controlled for (Kobrin and Waite 1984; 
Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Teachman et al. 1987; Michael and Tuma 
1985; Mclanahan and Bumpass 1988; Li 1991). Michael and Tuma (1985) 
found that family structure and parental socioeconomic status had no 
significant impact on entry into marriage for blacks but these variables 
did have a significant impact on the entry of blacks into parenthood. 
That is blacks who grew up in non-intact families tended to enter into 
parenthood earlier than those who came from intact families. Kobrin and 
Waite (1984) found that racial differentials in family structure during 
childhood did not explain racial differences in probability of marriage 
In a further analysis, Kobrin and Waite (1984) did find that growing up 
in an intact family affected black males and white females in their 
propensity for marriage in a positive way. For black males, the 
positive effect of the intact family structure is strong and consistent 
for the younger age groups.
McLanahan and Bumpass (1988) showed that white women who spent 
part of their childhood in one-parent families were more likely to marry 
and bear children early, but for blacks, early marriage was unrelated to 
family background. In a similar study, McLanahan (1988) found that 
female offspring who lived in single-parent families at some point 
between the ages of 12 and 16 were more likely to establish single-
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mother households In early adulthood than their counterparts from two- 
parent families. ThiB relationship holds for both blacks and whites.
For blacks the impact of family structure at age 16 was found greater 
than the impact during earlier adolescence (before age 15).
Individuals* Socioeconomic Characteristics
In the micro framework, a person's socioeconomic characteristics 
are viewed as important predictors of timing and likelihood of marriage 
because these attributes reflect one's competitive advantage in a 
marital relationship and determine different alternatives to marriage, 
thus influencing an individual's perceived gains to marriage.
According to exchange theory, certain kinds of family structures 
exist only when there is an exchange of rewards; on the other hand, 
family arrangements that are costly to one or both partners are not very 
likely to continue (Blau 1964; Homans 1961: cited in Staples 1985:
1005). Thus "exchange theory suggests that a person will not remain in 
a relationship where the services provided seem relatively meager 
compared with what the person knowB about other relationships" (Staples 
1985: 1005).
"It is useful to think of marriages as market transactions. 
Potential mates enter the market with a set of attributes that they 
would bring to a marriage and with some preferences for attributes they 
would like in a mate...." (Walker 1988: 104-105). These attributes 
include educational attainment, school enrollment, market work, income, 
and career.
a. Education. Completed education reflecte two positive 
attributes that one brings to the market. One is that educational 
attainment indicates potential earnings or human capital. The other is 
the Bocial prestige of attaining a high education. Above age 18, 
educational attainment can serve as a resource that increases a young 
woman's attractiveness as a marriage partner. However, "a consistent 
finding in the literature is that education delays marriage...
Moreover, the advantages to obtaining an education make college 
attendance a rewarding alternative to marriage, especially when colleges 
provide an arena for an active social life" (Teachman, Polonko, and 
Leigh 1987: 243). Since most people leave school before entering the 
adult roles of workers, spouse, and parent, the amount of education 
attained is a key factor on the timing of entry into marriage. The 
previous research has furnished consistent evidence for this statement 
(Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan 1972; Mare and WinBhip 1985; Marini 
1978, 1984b; Trussell and Bloom 1983).
Similarly, current full-time enrollment should reduce the chances 
of an individual marrying because of the conflict between two roles. 
Waite and Spitze (1981) pointed out that full-time school enrollment is 
most incompatible with marriage during high school and still somewhat so 
during college, particularly for those whose parental financial support 
is contingent upon their single status. Waite and Spitze (1981) found 
support for this hypothesis. Similarly, Goldscheider and Waite (1986) 
showed that enrollment reduced the likelihood of first marriage for men 
aged 18-21 and for women aged 17-24.
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b. Market work. Oppenheimer (1988: 573) pointed out: "An 
individual's current labor market position affects his or her current 
ability to marry because it affects the ability to set up an independent 
household. Hence, economic independence enables already-formed matches 
to proceed to the marital stage". Teachman et al. (1987) presented a 
strong argument about the effect of male work status on likelihood of 
marriage. They hypothesized that working men are more likely to marry 
than men who do not have a job. Employed men have the ability to marry 
and at once receive rewards from marriage, since their employment allows 
them to support a wife who can free them from performing time-consuming 
chores in the household (Becker 1973, 1974; Hogan 1978). Teachman et 
al. (1987) further argued that male employment should have an effect on 
marriage net of the effect of level of wages. Even at relatively low 
levels of income, working men may be more likely to marry if thiB income 
is predictable. Ross and Sawhill (1975) showed that economic 
instability, reflected in unemployment of the man, is positively related 
to marital dissolution and that even families headed by low income men 
were less likely to experience a marital dissolution if the man is 
employed than if the man is unemployed. Wilson (1987: 81-92) strongly 
confirmed the argument by Teachman et al. (1987). Wilson attributed the 
growth in female-headed families in black community to the continued 
deterioration of economic positions of black young men. Facing 
unemployment and underemployment black men are unable to financially 
support a family.
For women, there are two expectations for the effect of work 
status on the likelihood of marriage. On one hand, market work may
provide an alternative to marriage for women, allowing them to support 
themselves without a husband. On the other hand, employed women may be 
more likely to marry than women enrolled in school (Teachman, Polonko, 
and Leigh 1987: 244). One important reason is the growing necessity for 
young women to work to help support the families (Teachman, Polonko and 
Scanzoni 1986). Oppenheimer (1982,1988) argues that this is the case, 
particularly in recent cohorts where young men are relatively 
disadvantaged economically. This is even more so among middle- and 
upper-middle households where dual incomes are required to maintain 
their standard of living and life styles. The results presented by 
Waite and Spitze (1981) supported the argument for a positive effect of 
female employment on the likelihood of marriage.
c. Income. The same argument can be made for income. Despite the 
continued labor force participation by women, women still tend to earn 
far less than men do. "In most marriageB, males are still expected to 
provide a sufficient flow of income to Bupport the family. Thus, it is 
expected that males with better paying jobs will be the most likely to 
marry" (Teachman, Polonko, and Leigh 1987: 245). Previous research 
indicated a positive impact of wages on the marital timing of men 
(Keeley 1977; MacDonald and Rindfuss 1981). O'Hare (1988: 187) showed a 
monotonically increasing relationship between a male's income and his 
likelihood of being married. Specifically, black men with yearly 
incomes of $50,000 or more are three times as likely to be married as 
those who earn less than $5,000 a year.
White women with high income tend to delay marriage longer than 
white females with lower income (Keeley 1977; Preston and Richards
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1975). In a study of the relationship between socioeconomic achievement 
and the proportion of white women married by age 22-24, Preston and 
Richards (1975) found that higher wages tended to be associated with 
delayed marriage. In a similar study, White (1986) found the same 
delaying effect of wages for white women but an opposite effect for 
black women. In areas with higher wages for black women, black women 
were found to be more likely to marry.
d. Career. Oppenheimer (1988), in her theoretical essay on the 
timing of marriage, proposes a model of searching in marriage markets 
based on the economic theory of job search. Individual's transitions to 
work were emphasized in this framework because work is so important that 
it structures people's life in many ways and it is the major source of 
socioeconomic Btatus (Oppenheimer 1988: 574). Consequently, career 
uncertainties will have an important effect on attitudes and the 
"ensuing marriage-formation behavior". Oppenheimer (1988: 580) further 
argues that marriage ‘formation is highly dependent not only on the young 
man'B current socioeconomic characteristics but also on his estimated 
long-run socioeconomic prospects since marriages are planned to last.
Because young men's current and future socioeconomic 
characteristics are sensitive to many exogenous factors, marriage-timing 
behavior will be variable. One factor is the type of career a man 
pursues (Oppenheimer 1982: 147-62; Furstenberg 1974; Rapaport 1964: 
cited in Oppenheimer 1988: 580). Higher-level careers often involve 
more extensive training and early career uncertainties that make it 
difficult for young men to support families. Hen going into stable 
blue-collar careers, however, may establish themselves at relatively
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early ages. Occupational differences in marriage timing among men have 
been observed by Oppenheimer (1982: Chapter Four). Hogan (1978) 
presented data consistent with this argument, showing that white men 
with higher SEI jobs are more likely to delay marriage than white men 
with lower SEI jobs.
Oppenheimer (1988: 583) made a similar argument for women involved 
in their careers. Mueller and Campbell (1977) showed that women with 
high SEI jobs are less likely to be married than women with lower SEI 
jobs but the SEI effect is weaker for blacks than for whites. This 
indicates that the impact of job-related factors on the marital process 
is different for black women than for white women.
The theoretical arguments presented in this section provide a 
framework for an investigation of the effect of individuals' childhood 
family structure and their adulthood socioeconomic attributes on the 
occurrence of marriage. The previous literature reviewed thus far 
indicates that variables reflecting individuals' decision about marriage 
interact with race, which calls for further research effortB in order to 
understand the sources of racial differences in the process of life 
course transitions.
Informative as they are, micro-level studies on marriage have 
mostly documented subgroup differentials (e.g., racial groups) in the 
transitions to adulthood1, but have provided little information on the 
sources for racial variations in the transition process. Hogan (1986) 
Btrongly called for the inclusion of contextual and institutional 
effects in both theory and analyses of the individual life course. A 
contextual perspective on the transition into marriage will lead to a
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better understanding of the transition process in two ways. First, an 
analysis from the contextual level of the transition to adulthood will 
clarify the role institutional factors play in shaping people's lives, 
because the institutional arrangements exert a crucial impact on choices 
people make (Hogan 1986: 110). Secondly and more importantly, 
population-level (so called by Hogan 1986) analysis may allow 
researchers to identify sources that create and maintain variations in 
entry into life course events (such as marriage and family formation) by 
social class and by racial groups. "Historical events and change, 
cultural, and socioeconomic resources all affect the transition to 
adulthood directly; they also create circumstances in which the salience 
of transitions differs for different groups, and levels of 
intentionality about transitions vary" (Hogan 1986: 120). Race and 
social class play an important role in determining access to valued 
social resources which are institutionally controlled (Hogan 1986: 121). 
However, to identify these differentials in cultural and economic 
resources a population-level approach has to be taken. The effects of 
contextual variables on individual outcomes may differ significantly by 
socio-demographic groups because access to structural resources and 
influences also differ by these groups.
Part Two: A Macro-Level Approach
While the micro-level approach emphasizes the attributes that 
individuals bring into the marital relationship, the macro-level 
approach focuses on structural developments in the larger society which
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cause a corresponding change in individuals' incentives and 
socioeconomic ability to marry and establish families.
An Economic Perspective
Within the economic framework there are three major theoretical 
arguments2 that have been directing studies of the black-white 
divergence in marriage trends at a macro level in the past. They are 
female economic independence, the welfare effect, and the male 
unemployment. All these arguments are derived from Becker's theory of 
the gains to marriage. The gains to marriage argument is based on 
Becker's theory of household division of labor (1981,1991). I provide a 
discussion on this theory for a better understanding of why there are 
gains to marriage.
Essentially, Becker (1991) argues that the household division of 
labor is necessary because it makes the household production efficient. 
Moreover, with this division of labor, members of the household can 
better maximize gains from their input into the household production 
(Becker 1991: 30-16). First, if all members of an efficient household 
have different comparative advantages, no more than one member would 
allocate time to both the market and household sector. Members with a 
greater comparative advantage in the market would specialize completely 
in the market, and every member with a greater comparative advantage in 
the household would specialize completely there. Second, 
members specializing in the market sector would invest only in market 
capital and members specializing in the household sector would invest 
only in household capital. Third, if commodity production functions
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have constant or increasing returns to scale, all members of efficient 
households would specialize completely in the market or household 
sectors and would invest only in either market or household capital. 
Therefore, division of time, effort, and investment in either household 
or market sector, but not both, leadB to a specialization in either 
sector, which in turn results not only in the efficiency of the 
household production but also in the maximization of the gains for each 
member of the household.
"Although the sharp sexual division of labor in all societies 
between the market and household sectors is partly due to the gains from 
specialized investments, it is also partly due to intrinsic differences 
between the sexes" (Becker 1991: 37). These differences include female 
and male differences in the biological contribution to the production of 
children. For instance, women have a greater biological commitment to 
the bearing and rearing of children than men. Because of this 
comparative advantage that women have over men in the household sector, 
an efficient household would allocate the time of women mainly to the 
household sector and the time of men mainly to the market sector. 
Households with only men or only women are less efficient because they 
are unable to profit from the sexual differences in comparative 
advantages.
Becker further argues that over time female and male differences 
in human capital investments in turn reinforce a sexual division of 
labor based on biological differences between men and women.
Division of labor between men and women implies a dependence on others 
for certain tasks. "Women have traditionally relied on men for
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provision of food, shelter, and protection, and men have traditionally 
relied on women for the bearing and rearing of children and the 
maintenance of the home. Consequently, both men and women have been 
made better off by a 'marriage', the term for a written, oral, or 
customary long-term contract between a man and woman to produce 
children, food, and other commodities in a common household" (Becker 
1991: 43).
The recent rapid increase in female participation in market work 
poses a challenge to Becker's theory of the sexual division of labor 
which dictates the necessity of marriage. Thus, the gains to marriage 
are reduced and the attractiveness of divorce is raised by higher 
earnings and labor force participation of married women, because the 
sexual division of labor within households becomes less advantageous. 
However, Becker (1991: 56-63) maintains that two factors still exist 
that preserve the utility of sexual division of labor in the household. 
First, due to sex differences in the accumulation of human capital in 
market work (skills and experiences), women are largely segregated from 
men in the labor market. They tend to concentrate in jobs that have 
lower pay and less occupational preBtige than jobs that men tend to 
occupy. Second, married women who are working still shoulder the main 
responsibilities of child care and houseworc chores. "Childcare and 
other housework chores are tiring and limit access to jobs requiring 
travel or odd hours” (Becker 1991: 56). The Becond factor reinforces 
the first and together they perpetuate the necessity of the sexual 
division of labor in the household and ultimately women's reliance on 
men for the provision of income3.
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Becker (1991: 78-79) further argues that even if the process 
continued until married women no longer had primary responsibility for 
child care and other housework, married households would still gain 
considerably from a division of labor in the allocation of time and 
investments if specialized households and market human capital remained 
important. But this division would no longer be based on sex: husbands 
would be more specialized in housework and wives in market activities. 
However, it is unclear how likely Western societies would be to move in 
this direction.
The gains to marriage. Becker (1971, 1974: 310) identified three 
motivations to marry: (1) the desire to have one's own children; (2) the 
efficiency in sharing resources4; and (3) the efficiency associated with 
the specialization of male and female time within marriage. Becker 
(1971, 1974) compared marriage to a two-person firm in which one member 
hires the other and receives residual profits. Sawhill (1977: 115-125) 
explains the exchange relationship of the two-person firm as following:
"Men 'hire' women to bear and rear children and to do housework 
because they are physically incapable of the first and because their 
time is too valuable to devote to the second and the third. Women 
'hire' men to be bread-winners and to earn the wages which they 
generally are not able to command. Thus, each marriage partner gains by 
teaming up with other."
In his later work Becker (1981) applied to marriage the principle 
of comparative advantage derived from international trade. Espenshade 
(1985: 222) explains this application by Becker as follows:
"Single men and women represent potential trading partners. They 
will marry and trade their surplus with each other only if the gains to 
marriage are positive, that is, only if each partner perceives that he 
or she will be better off (or at least not worse off) by being married
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than by remaining single. Typically, in the past when a man and a woman 
married, the husband specialized in market work and the wife in home 
production, and then they traded. The wife traded part of her domestic 
services (including childbearing and child-rearing) to husband in 
exchange for part of the husband's income.”
Following this economic argument, Espenshade (1985: 222) raised an 
important question: "Are there fundamental economic and social changes 
under way that are undermining the Bexual division of labor and the 
comparative advantage that men and women were historically believed to 
have in market activity and home production respectively?". According 
to Becker (1981), the major cause of these economic and social changes 
has been the increase in the earning power of women as the American 
economy developed. This in turn motivated female labor force 
participation by raising the foregone value of time spent in non-market 
activities. The rise in female earnings and labor force participation, 
coupled with a decline in fertility, reduces the gains to marriage for 
women because a sexual division of labor becomes less advantageous.
Sawhill (1977: 115-125) noted that one of the most dramatic and 
consistent findings has been a strong correlation between a low level of 
female labor force participation and a greater prevalence of marriage. 
PreBton and Richards (1975) tested the influence of women's work 
opportunities on marriage rates in the 100 largest standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSA'b ) in the United States in the 1960s. The 
findings show that areas of attractive female employment opportunities 
had low proportions of women ever married among those ages 22-24 and 
that improvements in female employment opportunities appeared to be 
influential in producing declines in proportions married for the 22-24 
age groups between 1960 and 1970. Ermisch (1981) found that recent
32
declines in marriage rates in England and Hales were due to the growing 
economic opportunities for women. More importantly, rises in women's 
wages relative to those of men decreased the gains to marriage for 
females and diminished their incentives to marry. In sum, economic 
independence affects women's decision to "supply" marriage to the 
marriage market (Grossbard-Shechtman 1984). A more pertinent question 
to the present research, however, is: do the increases in female labor 
force participation and hence female socio-economic independence affect 
black and white marriage patterns differently? If so, how do these 
differentials come about?
a. Female economic independence. "Over time, because of the rise 
in female education and the growth of a service economy, women have 
become more like men in terms of market skills and activity" (Espenshade 
1985: 222). This suggests a narrowing of the comparative advantage of 
men over women in market work. Becker (1981), Farley (1988), and Walker 
(1988) suggest that this development is much more pronounced among 
blackB than whites. Black women have been gaining on black men in the 
labor market at a quicker pace than white women are gaining on white 
men; hence a loss of comparative advantage of men over women in paid 
employment is occurring more rapidly for blacks than for whites.
Studies based on various sources have furnished evidence for the 
radical differences in this development. Espenshade (1985) noted that 
male labor force participation rates have generally declined since 1960, 
but those for females have risen sharply. For whites the ratio of the 
female to male labor force participation rate for persons 16 years of 
age and over rose from 0.44 in 1960 to 0.66 in 1980, and for blacks from
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0.58 in 1960 to 0.75 in 1980 (Espenshade 1985: U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1981).
The recent changes in the wage structure are also noteworthy. 
Walker (1988) noted that the wages paid to women and to black men 
entering the labor force have increased over the past 2 decades and that 
the relative improvement for black women has been greater than for 
either black men and white women. "As a consequence, there has been a 
greater reduction in the male to female disparity in wages among blacks 
than among whites” (Walker 1988: 106). Given a lower sex disparity in 
wages, black women would be less hesitant than whites to dissolve an 
existent marital union because the perceived costs of doing so is less 
for them than for their white counterparts (Walker 1988: 107)
Farley (1988: 489) noted that between 1960s and 1970s the earnings 
of black women have increased much more rapidly than those of black men, 
whereas wage rates have changed at similar rates for both sexes among 
whites. In 1959 an adult black woman with a high school education could 
expect to earn 62 percent as much as a prospective huBband with a 
comparable educational level. But in 1986 a high-school educated black 
woman would earn 76 percent as much as a comparable black male. The 
trends are different for white women, however. In 1959 a white woman 
with a high school education would have earned 60 percent as much as a 
similarly educated white man; by 1986, this percentage increased to only 
62. A similar racial difference was found in other pairings of 
prospective bridegrooms and wives. Farley (1988: 489) speculated that 
"black women are approaching economic equity with black men much more 
rapidly than white women are approaching equity with white men" and
34
hence the economic incentive to marry has declined more for black women 
than for white women.
Other studieB have also shown that occupational up-grading since 
1960 has occurred more for black women than for black men (Espenshade 
1985; Guttentag and Secord 1983; Reid 1981; Matney and Johnson 1983). 
Furthermore, evidence shows that black women are more likely than black 
men to finish high school and college (Espenshade 1985: Population 
Reference Bureau, 1982). In 1981 there were 628,000 black females 
enrolled in college, compared with 505,000 black males (Matney and 
Johnson 1983).
However, empirical evidence for the female independence argument 
has been mixed. While Ross and Sawhill (1975) found that black/white 
differences in income, earnings, and employment explained much of the 
difference in marital stability in recent years, Mueller and Campbell 
(1977) showed a positive relationship between occupational achievement 
and likelihood of remaining single among whites, but for black females, 
the relationship is much weaker. Lichter et al. (1991) found female 
employment and earnings had no significant effect on white female ever- 
marriage rates in labor market areas; but for blacks, these variables 
had a negative effect on current marriage rates. White (1981) found no 
relationship between marriage rates and female work opportunities among 
black Americans. Cherlin (1977) also reported an insignificant 
relationship between female labor force participation and marital 
dissolution. Testa et al. (1989) failed to support the argument of 
female economic independence as the major factor contributing to the 
lower propensity for marriage among black females.
More recently, Mare and Winshlp (1989: 4) found no support for the 
argument that improvements in black female labor market position explain 
observed declines in marriage. Mare and Hinship (1989) found that the 
employment of black women has remained relatively stable since world War 
II but that their earnings have increased both absolutely and relative 
to black men's earningB since the 1940. However, this increase had 
little effect on marriage rates. Mare and WinBhip (1989) concluded that 
increases in a woman's earnings make her more attractive in the marriage 
market but decreases the economic importance of marriage to her. Thus, 
the positive and negative effects of female economic independence cancel 
each other.
The weak empirical support for this argument could be due, in 
part, to the fact that female independence has not been adequately 
measured in the past. For instance, in most studies female labor force 
participation has been used as the only measure of female socioeconomic 
independence. Perhaps, a more accurate measure would be the male and 
female difference in earnings.
b. The welfare argument. In Losing Ground, Murray (1984) 
contended that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births has risen because 
welfare rewards low-income parents for avoiding marriage. Murray (1984) 
further argued that low-income parents have abandoned the traditional 
norms of family formation in order to maximize their joint income under 
existing welfare eligibility rules. As long as the couple lives 
together without marriage, the earnings of the fathers are not included 
in the calculation of the family's eligibility for aid to families with 
dependent children (FDC). The welfare argument maintains that economic
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inducements of welfare are felt more strongly among blacks than among 
whites because the income of blacks from other sources is relatively 
low, and there is a larger proportion of the black population eligible 
for public assistance.
In a comprehensive review of empirical studies of the effect of 
the increase in welfare benefits on the increase in the mother-only 
families, Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986: 45) conclude that the increase 
in welfare benefits can account for some of the growth in female-headed 
households. But the effect is small relative to other factors such as 
the black male unemployment rate, similar conclusions are reached by 
Lane (1981: 37; cited in Espenshade 1985: 228) and Bishop (1980).
O'Hare (1988) showed that the change in mean public assistance payments, 
compared to the male employment status, has only a marginal effect on 
the growth in black female-headed households between 1970 to 1980 in 47 
SMSA's. Ellwood and Summers (1986: 92-97) provided evidence 
inconsistent with the welfare argument. FirBt, between 1972 and 1980 
the number of black children in female-headed families rose nearly 20 
percent, but the number of black children on AFDC actually fell by 5 
percent. Second, they (1986: 95) showed that there was no obvious 
relationship between the fraction of children living in single-parent 
families and the AFDC benefit levels across Btates. The same findings 
held for other aspects of family structure, including divorce rates and 
out-of-wedlock birth rates.
c. The change in male unemployment. Moynihan (1965) argued in 
the early 1960s that unemployment among black men was causing a 
breakdown of the black family and that government should take a more
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active role in providing jobs for unemployed black men. Moynihan (1965) 
showed a positive correlation between nonwhite male unemployment and the 
percentage of nonwhite women who were separated from their husbands.
In The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson (1987) provided a more recent 
version of the male employment argument. An economic transformation has 
undertaken since 1960 in American urban centers where a very large 
proportion of blackB reside: a transformation from centers of production 
and distribution of material goods to centers of administration, 
information exchange, and higher-order service provision. Because 
goods-producing industries such as manufacturing, have been a major 
source of black male employment in the 20th century, the transformation 
has caused a much more severe shock on the employment of black males. 
Consequently, labor force participation of black men has declined 
substantially from 84 percent in 1940 to 67 percent in 1980 (Wilson 
1987: 81-83).
The increase in black male unemployment has an important 
consequence for family formation among blacks. Wilson, Aponte, and 
Neckerman (1987: 93-106) attributed the recent growth in single-mother 
families to the increasing joblessness among black men. Wilson and his 
associates (1987: 97) constructed a measure of "the pool of marriageable 
men" in the population, which is simply the number of the employed men 
per 100 women of similar age in the population, adjusting for the high 
incarceration and mortality rates of black men. Trends in the 
marriageable male pool index (MMPL) for the nation as a whole show that 
black women, especially younger black women, face a shrinking pool of 
economically stable men who can provide a steady income (Wilson et al.
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1987: 96). They further showed that declines In marriageable black men 
between 1960 and 1980 were greatest In the North Central and Northeast 
regions of the nation, which also displayed the greatest increase in the 
proportion of mother-only families.
Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986: 45) confirmed Wilson's argument. 
They concluded that the growth in female-headed households was mainly 
due to the decline in employment opportunities for black males, whereas 
for whites, it is largely due to the increase in women's labor force 
participation and the economic independence that accompanied it5.
O'Hare (1988) confirmed the conclusion reached by Garfinkel and 
McLanahan (1986). O'Hare (1988) found that changes in black male labor 
force status had a much stronger effect on the growth of female-headed 
families between 1970 and 1980 than changes in mean public assistance 
payments and in the sex ratio among blacks.
In a more recent study of inter-area and black/white differences 
in marriage rates, Lichter et al. (1991) furnished strong evidence for 
Wilson's hypothesis. The male unemployment rate and especially male 
earnings in the local labor market area have a significant negative 
effect on ever-marriage and current-marriage rates and the effect is 
much stronger for black marriage rates than for white rates6.
Mare and Winship (1989) hold a different view about the sharp 
declines in marriage rates among blacks. Mare and Winship (1989: 2-3) 
argue that the male unemployment argument "focuses narrowly on changes 
in blackB' labor market position and does not take into account other 
aspectB of change in the socioeconomic position of young blacks that may 
affect marriage patterns." There have been increases in rates of school
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enrollment and levelB of educational attainment during the past several 
decades.
Since students have lower marriage rates than non-students, 
increases in enrollment rates could be a cause of decreases in marriage 
rates and increases in the proportion of black females who are at risk 
of having non-marital births. Mare and Winship (1989) showed that the 
increase in school enrollment over the past decades had little effect on 
the declines of the marriage rate of young adults, although among black 
teenagers increased school enrollment explained about 12 percent of 
their drop in marriage rates since 1960. For women under age 24, 
increases in enrollment account for 13 to 29 percent of the declines in 
the marriage rate since 1960.
One inconsistency of the Mare and Winship argument (1989) is that 
increases in school enrollment and educational attainment for black 
young men would only delay their marriage but should increase their 
economic ability to marry at later ages. Thus, it is still only a weak 
explanation of the increase in the proportion of the black population 
who never marry. What their findings suggest, however, is that forces 
other than socioeconomic ones must have been operating to cause declines 
in marriage rates since 1960.
A Demographic Perspective
Sex Ratio Imbalances7. An alternative theory that explains the 
declining centrality of marriage is the theory of sex ratio imbalances, 
developed by Guttentag and Secord (1983). According to this theory, 
when male to female ratios are high, men are in excess supply and women
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in undersupply. When sex ratios are low, men are in scarce supply. The 
relationship between an imbalanced sex ratio and family formation can be 
understood in terms of dyadic power in interpersonal relationships 
between men and women. The members of the sex in short supply are lesB 
dependent on their partners because many alternatives are available to 
them. In contrast, members of the sex in oversupply are in a dependent 
position because there are fewer members of the opposite sex with whom 
to form a relationship. As a result, members of the sex in short supply 
have greater power than members of the sex in relative oversupply.
Under a low sex-ratio regime, "women would have a subjective sense of 
powerlessness and would feel personally devalued by the society... Men 
would not remain committed to the same woman through her childbearing 
years. The culture would not emphasize love and commitment, and a lower 
value would be placed on marriage and the family. Instead, transient 
relationships between men and women would become important" (Guttentag 
and Secord 1983: 20-21).
Guttentag and Secord (1983: 197) further argue that although sex 
ratios contribute to social conditions such as low marriage rateB, high 
divorce, and high illegitimacy rates in the society, the mechanism of 
sex ratios does not operate in a vacuum. An important background 
context is the unequal distribution of structural power between men and 
women. Since in most societies structural power is in the hands of men, 
"given the abundance of unattached women, men will shape to their 
advantage the form that relationships between men and women take" 
(Guttentag and Secord 1983: 197). Even under a high sex ratio, women 
have difficulty in using their dyadic power to gain freedom and
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Independence, because men u b b  their structural power over women to limit 
women's use of dyadic power. Therefore, sex ratio imbalances have a 
weaker effect on men's than on women's likelihood of marriage (Guttentag 
and Secord 1983: 165).
In summary, the sex-ratio argument proposes the following 
(Guttentag and Secord 1983: 190):
1. In relationships between men and women, men tend to be Ib b s  
committed, because they typically have more economic power and status, 
thus making women dependent on them.
2. Male commitment is strongest when sex ratios are high and 
unattached women scarce.
3. Male commitment is weakest when sex ratios are low and men are 
Bcarce. The structural power that men have is reinforced by their 
dyadic power, and they can negotiate changes that are most favorable to 
them. Under such circumstances, women feel "exploited" and the feeling 
of being exploited may force women to reduce their dependence on men by 
becoming more independent8.
National and local sex ratio imbalances are a function of several 
variables; they reflect sex ratio imbalances at birth, changes in 
fertility rates, sex differences in mortality and migration. The 
postwar baby boom created an imbalance in the sex ratio, which was 
called "the marriage squeeze" (Parke and Glick 1967; Akers 1967). 
Assuming that brides are usually two or three years younger than grooms, 
females born in 1947 have relatively few males from which to select a 
spouse. The calculation of marital opportunity index by Guttentag and 
Secord (1983: 175) shows that in 1960 there were 111 unmarried white men
between ages 22 and 26 for every 100 unmarried white women in the age 
group 20 to 24, but by 1970 this ratio had fallen to 84. Similarly, the 
ratio declined from 93 to 67 when unmarried men aged 23 to 27 years were 
used as the numerator. Numerous studies have documented evidence that 
sex ratio imbalances have important consegxiences for women's roles and 
the whole institution of marriage (Freiden 1974; Spanier and Glick 1980; 
Ermisch 1981; Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984; Darity and Myers 1983, 1984; 
Goldman et al. 1984; Veevers 1988; Trovato 1988; South 1988; South and 
Trent 1988; Farley and Bianchi 1987; Bennett et al. 1989; Landale 1989; 
Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman 1979, 1981; Grossbard-Shechtman 1980, 1984; 
Kiecolt and Fosset 1989; Fosset and Kiecolt 1990).
Sex ratio imbalances are even more Bevere among the black 
population in the United States. The marital opportunity index 
developed by Guttentag and Secord (1983: 201) for unmarried black men 
and women fell from 105 in 1950 to 87 in 1960 and further to 73 in 1970. 
This shows a severely restricted marital pool that black women face. 
Severe sex ratio imbalances were found among all age categories for 
blacks. In 1970, for every age group, 30 or more out of every 100 black 
women did not have a potential partner in the marriage pool, except for 
ages 16-19, where 21 women lacked a partner (Guttentag and Secord 1983: 
201).
There are three factors that contribute to the extreme sex ratio 
imbalances among black population (Espenshade 1985: 233):
1. A disproportionate number of black men are in the armed forces 
and in penal institutions.
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2. Blacks tend to have lower sex ratios at birth than whites. 
Blacks experience about 102 or 103 male births for every 100 female 
births ae compared with about 106 white males born for every 100 white 
females.
3. Mortality rates are especially high among black males. For 
example, black males are more than six timeB as likely as white males to 
die from homicides.
One must note that there is a greater under-numeration of black 
males than black females in the U.S census counts. This could imply 
that actual sex ratio imbalances may not be as severe as have been 
reported. However, since the majority of the uncounted black male 
population is in socially and economically unstable conditions, the 
higher rate of undercount among the black male population indicates a 
restricted marital pool for black females. Black women are further 
constrained in the marriage market by the educational differentials 
between black males and females. Although black men, on average, have 
higher incomes than black women, black women have higher educational 
attainment and occupational status.
Cox (1940) documented regional and racial differences in sex 
ratios in the U.S. cities and found that for a given change in the sex 
ratio, the slope of change in the percentage of marriages for black 
females was much steeper (+0.42) than that for white females (+0.28). 
This suggests that the marriage rate varies with the population 
composition much more for black females than for white females. Spanier 
and Glick (1980) noted significant black-white differences in sex 
ratios. The sex ratio falls below 100 males per 100 females for blacks
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before the typical years of mate selection at age 18 but does not do so 
for whites until well beyond that period at age 32. Much of thiB 
difference would persist if adjustments were made for the inadequacies 
in the baBic data. As a response to a more restricted marriage market 
facing black women, black females were found to be significantly more 
likely than white women to marry down in terms of educational levelB and 
marital status; never-married black women were more likely than their 
white counterparts to marry men who had been married previously.
Goldman et al. (1984) showed that by the time black women reach 
ages between 30 and 34, only 47 potential marital partners are available 
for every 100 black females, compared to 90 partners for women between 
age 20 to 24. This ratio takes into account age, race, marital status, 
and education, in determining the marriageability.
Farley and Bianchi (1987) found a much tighter marriage market for 
black than for white women. Bennett et al. (1989) also found a more 
severe marriage squeeze for black women: given the traditional age 
differences between spouses (usually between 2 to 4 years in age), there 
are far fewer eligible male partners for black women than for white 
women among the cohort born before the late 1959. Darity and Myers 
(1983, 1984) provide strong evidence for the marriage squeeze argument. 
Their findings demonstrate that the decline in the supply of black males 
has the strongest impact on the increase in black female headship.
However, findings from several more recent studies (Lichter et al. 
1991; Schoen 1983; Schoen and Kluegel 1988) appear to challenge the 
explanatory power of the sex-ratio imbalances argument. In a study by 
Lichter et al. (1991), the sex ratio was measured by sheer number of
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males over number of females between ages 20 and 29 In a labor market 
area. This measure displayed no significant effect on the local 
marriage rates. Although the spatial dimension of marriage market was 
taken into account in their measure, socio-demographic factors such as 
age, marital status, and education were not included in the calculation 
of the sex ratio in their investigation.
Gender differences in education among blackB are essential to the 
female independence argument and thought to have exacerbated the 
imbalances between the sexes among well-educated black population 
(Espenshade 1985: 232). Strong evidence suggests that similarity in 
education and social origin has been an important factor in American 
marriages (Hirschman and Matras 1971; Warren 1966; Rubin 1968).
"Finding a marriage partner is, in part, a function of the relative 
numbers and the distribution of available members of the opposite sex, 
but people do not marry just any one. They want to mate assortatively" 
(Oppenheimer 1988: 572). Therefore, an adequate measure of a 
marriageable pool in the population needs to take these socio­
demographic variables into consideration. In the Schoen and Kluegel 
study (1988), two mutually independent measures were constructed: 
marriage attraction and demographic composition. Schoen and Kluegel
(1988) found that marriage attraction accounted for a larger share of 
the racial gap in marriage rates than does the compositional effect in 
the North Carolina and Virginia. However, these results have limited 
generalizability due to the restricted geographic scope of the analysis.
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Spatial dimension is an important factor in the mate selection 
process, but it has not been adequately addressed in the past research. 
From the human ecological point of view:
"The human individual is time bound and is a finite creature in a 
finite world. The recurring needs for food and rest set a fundamental 
rhythm of life and regulate the allocation of time to all other 
activities... Given that a number of individuals must act in concert to 
cope with the exigencies of environments, the economization of time 
becomes a major preoccupation of human life" (Hawley 1986: 5).
The economization of time dictates a cost of finding potential 
partners across geographic boundaries. This cost restricts one's 
opportunity to seek potential partners outside a certain locale. Catton 
and Smircich (1964: 522-29) confirmed the importance of the spatial 
aspect of the marriage market:
"Distance gradients in patterns of human interaction may be 
plausibly interpreted as representing economy of time and energy, rather 
than either competition between distance and intervening opportunities, 
or response to norms reflected in ecological segregation..." "The 
average person, no matter how many potential Bpouses may be 'available' 
to him/her in terms of physical location and normative consideration of 
exogamy and endogamy, can be intimately acquainted with only a few of 
them. The probability that a given person of the opposite sex will be 
included in that small number apparently depends on the time and energy 
costs of crossing the intervening distance to engage in interaction 
rather than on intervening opportunities to interact with other similar 
persons."
Thus, the importance of the geographical factor rises from the 
fact that interactions across geographic boundary pose costs in energy 
and time consumed. Moreover, there are regional variations in age 
structure of the population. Consequently, these factors lead to 
regional variations in marital pool which in turn lead to regional 
variations in marriage rates. Substantial spatial variations in
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marriage have been noted by Cox (1940), Farley (1988), and Heaton et al.
(1989).
Nevertheless, most previous studies of marriage markets were based 
national (Goldman et al. 1984; Akers 1967; Travodo 1988; Veevers 1988; 
Farley and Bianchi 1987; Darity and Myers 1983, 1984; Spanier and Glick 
1980; Freiden 1974; Schoen and Baj 1985), state (Schoen and Kluegel 
1988; Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984), SMSAs (O'Hare 1988; Preston and 
Richard 1975), and county level data (Landale 1989). These studies fail 
to adequately measure the availability of marital partners. A marriage 
market measured at the county level is an improvement compared to the 
national level measure. Yet, it is still an inadequate measure because 
people cross county boundaries to commute to work, and the work place 
also provides an important opportunity for meeting potential mates. A 
marriage market measured at the labor market area level may be a more 
adequate measure. More empirical tests with the measure of marital 
availability are necessary before we can turn away from the theory.
A Perspective of Cultural Context
The outcomes of individual life experiences, including marriage 
and family, are not only influenced by individuals' access to structural 
resources but also by their exposure to a cultural context (Wilson, 
1991). Only recently have researchers begun to direct more attention to 
this aspect of structural impact on racial differences in marriage 
propensity.
In The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson (1987) has argued that basic 
economic shifts and transformations are important for understanding the
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changes in the life experiences of poor urban minorities and that one of 
the major factors involved in the growth of ghetto poverty is industrial 
restructuring and labor market changes in the Northeast and Midwest 
metropolitan areas. Wilson (1991: 10) stated that there are two major 
causes of weak labor force attachment: "One derives from macro-
structural changes in the broader society, most notably the economy, the 
other from the individual's social milieu... Poor individuals who live 
in a social context that fosters or enhances strong labor force 
attachment are less likely to experience persistent poverty than are 
those living in a social context that reinforces weak labor force 
attachment" (WilBon 1991: 10). In the same logic, individuals from a 
social context where people marry less and marry late, and where 
families-headed by unmarried or never-married females and illegitimacy 
are common, also tend to be less likely to have a strong attachment to 
the institution of marriage.
Postwar changes in norms and values regarding marriage and family 
have been taking place. Compared to young people a generation ago, 
young persons of both raceB today grow up with much greater uncertainty 
about their future family life. They are increasingly likely to have 
grown up in disrupted families and to face higher risk of divorce 
themselves. They are more apt to cohabit without marrying, to want few 
or no children, and they are more likely to view having out-of-wedlock 
birthB as not only feasible but also socially acceptable (Mare and 
Winship 1989: 22). All these trends indicate a declining centrality of 
marriage in today's American society.
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Because this detachment from marriage is much more pronounced in 
the black community than among whites and because of persistent racial 
residential segregation, individual blacks, on average, are at higher 
risk of being exposed to a cultural climate of low propensity for 
marriage. The racial differentials in this respect may contribute to 
the observed racial divergence in marriage rates. The more young women 
see other women in the community having children out-of-wedlock and 
heading families without husbands, the more acceptable theBe options may 
become and the less important marriage becomes.
Little empirical work has been done to test this hypothesis in 
spite of the fact that many have speculated that there is a connection 
between cultural context and individual marital and family aspirations 
{cf. Lewis 1965; Clark 1965). Sanders (1986) showed that black men have 
lower marital rates than white men even after controlling for a variety 
of demographic and socioeconomic factors. Sanders concluded that the 
differences in black and white marital rates may well be the results of 
cultural differences, although a direct test of "cultural differences” 
was not provided in the study. 0'Hare (1988) examined changes in the 
attitudes of blacks toward marriage and the growth of female-headed 
families between 1970-1980. O'Hare (1988: 189) used the level of black 
female-headed families in 1970 as a measure of the cultural influence in 
the black community. The finding was "puzzling" in that the percent of 
black female-headed families in 1970 displayed a strong but negative 
effect on the growth of female headed households between 1970-1980. The 
effect of cultural climate appears to be confounded by the effect of
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change in black male labor force position which was also included in the 
same model.
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Notes for Chapter Two
1. Some studies have ignored between group differences in the 
transition process all together (Hogan 1986).
2. Espenshade (1985: 234) also listed the modernization argument as one 
of the main theories that explain the declining centrality of marriage 
in Western countries. The modernization argument may explain the 
overall decline in the centrality of marriage in the Western societies, 
but it does not explain why the decline in marriage propensity is much 
more pronounced among blacks than among whites. Although blacks are 
more urbanized than whites, the urban black population iB characterized 
by a "underclass" rather than by a modern liberal class which tends to 
de-emphasize traditionalism, Buch as marriage and family. In other 
words, it is the poverty among urban blacks that suppresses their 
likelihood to marry rather than the urban residence.
3. "If childcare and other housework demand relatively large quantities 
of energy compared to leisure and other non-market uses of time by men, 
women with responsibility for housework would have less energy available 
for the market work than men. This would reduce the hourly earnings of 
married women, affect their jobs and occupations, and even lower their 
investment in market human capital when they worked the same number of 
market hours as married men. Consequently, the housework 
responsibilities of married women may be the source of much of the 
difference in earnings and of job segregation between men and women " 
(Becker 1991: 56).
4. Given that people Bhare love, personal contact and sharing of 
resources can occur more efficiently if individuals share the same 
household on a relatively permanent basis (Becker 1974: 310).
5. The increase in female labor force participation has led to a high 
divorce rate which in turn inflated the proportion of families that are 
at risk of female headship.
6. However, thie difference was not actually tested in the study. What 
Lichter et al. (1991) found was a relative difference in the 
coefficients for blacks and whites in separate models.
7. Some researchers (e.f. Wilson 1987; Lichter et al. 1991) alBO 
consider economic eligibility, such as employment, as a part of the 
definition of a marriage pool. Others (Schoen and Kluegel 1988) 
maintain that it iB necessary to preserve the distinction between 
demographic and economic factors.
8. Guttentag and Secord (1983: 162) pointed out that it is not 
necessary that individual men and women are aware of the imbalances in 
the relative number of available men and women. Bather, it is the 
experiences of males in encounters with the opposite sex in over supply 
"that lead the party whose gender in minority to have higher 
expectations for outcomes in the existing relationship and less
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willingness to commit oneself, while the individual of the opposite Bex 
feels a greater dependency on the existing relationship and is willing 
to give more."
CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TOWARD AN INTEGRATION
Theoretical Framework
While the micro-level approach often failed to include contextual 
forces which either favor or constrain individual choice of marriage, 
research based on the macro-model ignored individual characteristics 
which play an important role in individual decision-making about 
marriage. The pitfalls of macro-level analysis are that researchers 
oftentimes make inferences about individuals' behavior based on 
aggregated data (Landale 1989: 206). Marriage is individual behavior.
To marry or not marry at a given point of time is an individual's 
decision. However, the eventual occurrence of marriage is a function of 
both an individual's choice and structural conditions, such as the 
availability of marriageable partners in the marriage market and 
national and local economic prosperity. Given a favorable marriage 
market condition, an individual may not choose to marry because the 
career plans or concurrent roles conflict with family formation or 
because one does not place values on marriage or have more attractive 
alternatives to marriage. Variations in individual choice or values 
regarding marriage are related to variations in their socioeconomic 
attributes which they bring into the marriage market. Conversely, given 
that an individual chooses to marry, marriage may or may not occur 
because the unavailability of suitable partners and other conditions may
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prevent its occurrence. The following diagram illustrates the 
interaction between choice and condition.
Marriage Market and 
Conditions
Good Bad
Preference Yes 1 0 or 1
No 0 0
The ”1" cells in the table mean the occurrence of marriage and the 
"0" cells mean the non-occurrence of marriage. The "0 or 1" cells mean 
that marriage may or may not occur given that an individual desires it 
but the structural conditions are not conducive.
Buchmann (1989: 15-16) proposed a conceptual framework that 
includes structural and cultural perspectives. From the structural 
perspective, the crucial question is how society constructs, organizes, 
and defines the life course. From the point of view of the actor, the 
concern is how individuals perceive, evaluate, and carry out their 
lives. Buchmann (1989: 31-32) strongly argues for the following:
"To avoid either theoretical bias, a social theory must 
acknowledge the relative autonomy of individual action from social 
structure and recognize that societal development is not merely the 
result or the sum of individual actions. To put it another way: since 
both the logic of action and the logic of the social system are 
partially autonomous, an analysis of the relationship between structure 
and action is fundamental to any explanation of the social dynamic as a 
whole."
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The structure is viewed as " a hierarchically organized serieB of 
fields within which human agents are engaged in specific struggles to 
maximize their control over the social resources specific to that field" 
(Garnham and Williams 1980: 215: cited in Buchmann 1989: 33). Although 
there iB a "universalistic" tendency to maximize one's profit with a 
given investment, there are alBO "particularistic" strategies of 
investment that depend on the individual's own capacities and judgements 
about a strategy's likely success (Buchmann 1989: 35). Buchmann (1989: 
186) suggested that individual plans and actions play an increasingly 
important role in the life course transition as the patterns of 
adulthood transitions become increasingly diversified and individualized 
in industrialized societies. Thus, Buchmann views life course outcomes 
as the dynamic interplay between aspects of the broader society and 
individuals' plans and actions.
It is not a great intellectual leap to relate Buchmann's broader 
conceptual model to the immediate problem concerned in this research.
One can think of marriages as market transactions in which individuals 
are interested in seeking a most satisfactory match (or in Buchmann's 
words, maximizing the resources available in the social structure). 
Whether or not marriage occurs and when it occurs depend on several 
factors, including individuals' values about marriage, socioeconomic 
attributes, concurrent roles, marriage market and other structural 
conditions.
In the past a few studies on marriage and family formation 
behavior were carried out in a framework similar to Buchmann's 
conceptual model. Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) utilized micro and
contextual levels of data from the Philippines to predict the timing of 
entry into marriage. They found that the age at which a Filipino woman' 
entered marriage was not only determined by her socioeconomic attributes 
but also by the local sex ratios and rural residence. Marini (1985) 
proposed that the timing of entry into the adult roles of workers, 
spouBe, and parent was a function of (1) the duration of time spent in 
transition roles, (2) availability of the opportunity to enter an adult 
role, and (3) an individual's orientation to an adult role. Based on 
the data from a 15-year follow-up study of high school students 
originally surveyed in 1957-1958 and resurveyed in 1973— 1974, Marini 
(1985) found evidence for this conceptualization for both males and 
females. Davis-Brown, Salamon, and Surra (1987), in an ethnographic 
study on mate choice formation, incorporated into a single model 
proximal, distal, and historical factors. Based on data from archival 
records, a survey of 70 farm households, and intensive interviews and a 
participant observation with a sub-sample of eight families, Davis-Brown 
et al. (1987) demonstrated the importance of the interplay among 
variables from different analytical levels. For instance, dyadic 
variables such as resource exchanges provided an explanation for the 
intermarriage between German men and Irish women, but it was necessary 
to include macro and historical levels of variables to explain the 
occurrence of other inter-ethnic-religious marriages. On the other 
hand, Davis-Brown et al. (1985: 53) found that distal (macro and 
historical) factors could only explain the increased incidence of inter­
ethnic marriage, but not why particular combinations of intermarriages 
occurred. Thus, Davis-Brown et al. (1985: 53) acknowledged: "the value
of the multilevel approach used here is especially apparent when one 
considers Kerckhoff's (1974) contention that homogamy results not only 
from normative and personal preferences for similar partners, but also 
from propinquity and the distribution of Bimilar others in the pool of 
availables." Landale (1989) was interested in the impact of historic 
changes in the American industrial structure on the marriage behavior of 
farm sons at the turn of the 19th century. Landale (1989) also adopted 
a two level analytical model which incorporated both individual farm 
sons' characteristics and structural factors at county level, using data 
from the 1880-1900 National Panel Study. Overall, the findings 
demonstrated that the interplay between individual actions (as 
adaptations to structural changes) and structural forces have important 
consequences on individual farm sons' marriage behavior1.
While limited in one way or another2, these studies have 
demonstrated the importance of multilevel analyses. No studies, 
however, have attempted to bring this multilevel conceptualization into 
the context of black and white divergence in the likelihood of marriage. 
One consistent finding in previous research at the micro level shows a 
significant divergence between blacks and whites in propensity to marry 
net of the variations in individuals' characteristics. This raises the 
following question: does this divergence reflect a cultural difference 
or a difference in access to structural resources which are important 
for family formation? According to Staples (1985), blacks are not any 
different from whites in terms of family ideology, studies (Gary et al. 
1983: cited in Staples 1985: 1006) show, for example, that the greatest 
sources of life satisfaction for blacks come from family life, that
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black woman wish to play and maintain traditional roles in the conjugal 
relationships (Broderick 1965; Kulesky and Obordo 1972: cited in Staples 
1985: 1005), and that blacks tend to have strong kin networks. Thus, 
StapleB (1985) argued that the cause for a lower marriage propensity in 
the black community lies in the constraint of the structural conditions 
of the black population: the limited supply of potential mates who are 
economically capable of supporting a family.
In order to empirically address this question it is necessary to 
employ a model of both choice and condition. Such an integrated model 
will allow one to test to what extent the structural forceB can account 
for racial variations in the propensity for marriage, net of "cultural" 
differences. Figure 3-1 illustrates the full conceptual model. I must 
point out that since data for direct measures of individual choice and 
decisions about marriage are not available in most existing data sets, I 
use individuals' Bocioeconomic characteristics as proxy for their choice 
or preferences for marriage. I admit that individuals' socioeconomic 
attributes do not perfectly measure their choice about marriage, but 
they capture variations in individual preferences for marriage 
reasonably well.
Marriage propensity is influenced by three sets of factors: family 
background, individual characteristics, and structural variables. While 
childhood socialization and family structure shape an individual's 
orientation toward marriage, an individual's current socioeconomic and 
other attributes influence his/her plans for and values about marriage. 
Condition variables are measured by structural factors which either
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favor or suppress the likelihood of marriage, net of the effect of 
choice variables.
However, due to the lack of information on family background in 
the PUMS-D and the CO-STAT 3 data sets, it is not feasible to estimate 
this full model. This does not mean that an examination of the linkage 
of choice and condition pertaining to marriage propensity is not 
possible. With a merged data set of the PUMS-D and CO-STAT 3, one can 
still analyze an incorporated model including both individuals' 
socioeconomic variables and structural factors. Figure 3-2 illustrates 
a reduced model which excludes family background. While individuals' 
current socioeconomic and other attributes influence their values and 
plans about marriage, structural forces, such as marriage markets, local 
economic conditions, and cultural influence of the social context either 
enhance or suppress the likelihood for individuals to enter into 
marriage.
Individual factors in Figure 3-2 include:
1. Completed education;
2. Current school enrollment;
3. Employment;
4. Income;
5. Occupational type;
6. Welfare status;
7. Demographic aspects (Age, Sex, and Race);
Structural factors in Figure 3-2 include:
1. Local centrality of marriage;
2. Level of female independence in the social context;
PLANS
CHOICE
VALUES
CONDITION
STRUCTURAL FORCES
INDIVIDUALS'
SOCIOECONOMIC
RESOURCES
PROPENSITY FOR MARRIAGE
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
CULTURAL CLIMATE
MARRIAGE MARKET
F ig u re  3 - 2 A R e d u c e d  Model: M u lt i le v e l  I n f lu e n c e  o n  M arriage
62
3. Level of dependence on welfare in the social context;
4. Male unemployment in the social context;
5. Local marriage market;
6. Local economy.
Note that structural factors other than marriage markets are 
specified in the model because of their relevance. Kelley et al. (1983) 
proposed a four-level scheme to include various factors that affect 
interpersonal relationships: conditions in the social and economic 
environment; characteristics of the dyadic relationship; personal 
attributes of the individual partners; and the interaction of 
environmental factors with dyadic and individual factors. Kelley et al. 
(1983) argued that a comprehensive approach to influences on 
relationships should include causes that are both proximal and distal in 
time and space. Contextual influences that appear distant from partners 
in close relationships are important because they have bearings on more 
proximal factors (Davis-Brown et al. 1987). In relation to the present 
research problem, marriage propensity iB not only influenced by more 
proximal factors such as potential marital availability but also 
influenced by distal variables such as male unemployment, local economic 
conditions. Given that in most families males are still the main 
providers, a high rate of male unemployment in a locale will reduce 
men's marriageability and this in turn will reduce the marital 
availability for women in the market. Similarly, a weak local economy 
may delay the occurrence of marriage since most marriages are motivated 
by having children (Becker 1974) and since couples bear the costs to 
establish a household.
63
The link between local economic environment and family formation 
behavior is particularly strong in rural communities. As Bennett (1982) 
noted, the close relationship between the family and the agricultural 
enterprise requires researchers' attention to economic and social 
environmental variables when studying farm family formation.
The relationship between economic conditions and nuptiality rates 
has long been noted in the literature (Bernard 1940; Kirk 1960; Jacobson 
1959: 23; Hajnal 1965; Guest 1981). The well-known European pattern of 
late marriage and high rates of celibacy has been explained as a 
societal response to a shortage of farmland during a period of a 
declining mortality (Hajnal 1965: cited in Landale 1989: 204). Research 
has also demonstrated a direct connection between the early marriage of 
young people and encouraging economic situation (Easterlin 1980; Hogan 
1981; Evens 1983; Landale 1989; Bogue 1959: 239). In good times, 
nuptiality rates tend to be higher, whereas during depressions and 
recessions, marriageB are more likely to be delayed or put off entirely 
(Hirschman and Matras 1971). The logic of the economic arguments "rests 
on the idea that economic opportunity facilitates marriage and 
childbearing because it enables men to support families " (Landale 1989: 
206).
Expectations^
The theoretical arguments and previous findings discussed above 
lead to three expectations for the present analysis.
1. The racial gap in the likelihood of marriage results from the 
racial differences in accesses to structural resources that facilitate
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marriage and in accesses to contextual influences on family formation. 
Local centrality of marriage, female socioeconomic independence (indexed 
by female labor force participation and male-sex differentials in 
earnings) and level of welfare dependence in the labor market area 
indicate contextual influences on individual orientations toward 
marriage. On the other hand, local marital availability (specific to 
race, age and educational groups), the male unemployment rate, and local 
economy tap structural resources that facilitate marriage and family 
formation.
Blacks tend to be at higher risk than whites of exposure to the 
negative influence of structural factors that decrease individual 
propensity for marriage, but they have less access to structural 
resources that facilitate marriage. Once racial differences in the 
structural variables are held constant, the racial divergence in 
marriage likelihood should decrease to a significant degree.
Furthermore, if the contextual variables indeed have an important 
influence on the individual likelihood of marriage, a significant 
contribution to the predictive power of the model is expected when they 
are included in the analysis.
2. There are racial differences in the effects of the contextual 
variables on the likelihood of marriage. Specifically, local centrality 
of marriage, female independence, dependence on public assistance, male 
unemployment, and local marriage market should exert a significantly 
larger impact on the likelihood of marriage for blacks than for whites.
Local centrality of marriage. Blacks tend to concentrate in the 
social environment where marriage rates are low but the rates of
illegitimacy and female-headship are high. The reduced centrality of 
marriage in the black community, as a cultural influence, leads to a low 
propensity for individual blacks to ever marry. However, if blacks were 
integrated into social contexts where the majority of the neighbors are 
married and families are headed by both husbands and wives, they would 
have a higher propensity to marry than if they remain in the ghetto.
For whites, the process may be different. Since the marriage rates are 
already high among whites relative to blacks, to change the social 
context would not lead to as much a change in white marriage behavior as 
it would for blacks. The distributions of the indicators of centrality 
of marriage show more variations across labor market areas for blacks 
than for whiteB (see Table 5-2 in Chapter Five). This suggests that 
individual propensity for marriage may vary with social context more for 
blacks than for whites. Therefore, I expect that the propensity for 
marriage will vary more with social context for blacks than for whiteB.
Female independence. A high level of female economic independence 
reduces the marriage propensity more for blacks than for whites. Since 
black females have been approaching equity with black men in education, 
labor force participation, occupation, and income much more rapidly than 
white women are approaching equity with white men, the perceived gains 
to marriage have declined more for black women than for white women 
(Farley 1988; Walker 1988). On the other hand, the literature also 
suggests that black females tend to have stronger orientations toward 
family life (Gary et al. 1983; Broderick 1965; Kulesky and Obordo 1972: 
cited in Staples 1985: 1005). This would suggest that the propensity
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for marriage may be less responsive to the impact of female economic 
independence for black females than for white females.
Welfare dependency. Welfare has a larger inducement to blacks 
than to whites due to the fact that a large proportion of the black 
population is poor (Murray 1984). Thus, the dependence on public 
assistance is more pronounced among blacks than whites. In order to 
maximize their joint income under the existing welfare eligibility, poor 
black parents forego marriage and traditional family formation (Murray 
1984). All this implies that the provision of welfare and its 
eligibility tend to suppress the propensity for marriage more for blacks 
than for whites.
Male unemployment. The rapid decline of black male unemployment 
due to structural change in the economy has led to a shrinking pool of 
economically eligible males for marriage and family formation and thus 
lower marriage rates in the black community (Wilson 1987). Since the 
structural shift in the economy has a more severe impact on black males 
who tend to concentrate in manufacturing, the rates of unemployment, 
underemployment, and non participation in the labor force have risen 
much more rapidly for black males than for their white counterparts. 
Consequently, the black male unemployment rate may suppress the 
propensity for marriage for blacks more than the white male unemployment 
rate may suppress white marriage.
Sex ratio imbalances. It has been well documented in the 
literature that sex ratios imbalances are much more severe among blacks 
than among whites. The imbalances have led to a restricted pool of 
eligible male partners for black females. Two mechanisms operate in the
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relationship between sex ratio imbalances and low marriage rates. One 
is that a low sex ratio in the population reduces females' propensity 
for marriage simply because there are not enough male partners in the 
population for every female who wants to marry. The second factor is 
more subtle. Under a low sex ratio regime men would not remain 
committed to the same woman through her childbearing years because 
alternatives are plentiful elsewhere. Then, "the culture would not 
emphasize love and commitment, and a lower value would be placed on 
marriage and the family" (Guttentag and Secord 1983: 21).
Following the above reasoning and given the severe sex ratio 
imbalances in the black population, it can be expected that the linkage 
between sex ratio imbalances and individual marriage behavior is 
stronger for blacks than for whites. Furthermore, if black females have 
stronger preferences than whites for marriage and family life, their 
propensity for marriage would also vary with marriage market conditions 
more than that for whites. When the marriage market is tight, their 
propensity for marriage is suppressed, but when the marriage conditions 
are favorable the probability of marriage would increase.
3. The micro-economic theory of marriage (Becker 1971, 1974, 1991 
[1981]) viewB the marital relationship fundamentally as an exchange 
relationship between men and women. Men and women will marry only if 
the gains to marriage are positive or if each partner perceives that 
he/she will be better off by marrying than by remaining single. Men and 
women enter the marital relationship with different aspects of resources 
for exchange. Zt has been the husband who specialized in market work 
and the wife who specialized in home production. The wife traded her
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domestic services to the husband in exchange for part of the husband's 
income. Despite the recent changes in female labor force participation 
and improvement in female earnings, men remain the main income providers 
of the majority of two-couple families and households.
Micro-economic theory suggests that the impact of individual 
socioeconomic resources differs by sex. On the one hand, males with a 
high level of social and economic resources would be more likely to be 
married, perhaps because they demand marriage more and they are more 
capable of realizing their preferences for marriage. On the other hand, 
females with more socioeconomic resources tend to have less economic 
need for marriage, although they may be more attractive to potential 
husbands. To be consistent with the argument of female independence, 
sex differences should exist among both blacks and whites, and the 
differences should have the same meanings for both groupB.
It is reasonable to expect that the local economic conditions 
would affect marriage propensity more for males than for females, 
because family income is primarily determined by the economic activity 
of men. Similarly, while welfare dependence in the social environment 
should have a strong negative impact on the odds of femaleB to marry, it 
may not have any effect on the odds for males. While the level of 
female socioeconomic independence in a social context reduces the 
economic need of females for marriage, it should not reduce the desires 
of males for marriage. However, the fewer females who desire marriage 
are in the market, the more difficult it will become for males to find 
marital partners. In terms of the cultural aspect of contextual 
influence, the literature from the micro-level analysis suggests that
experiences of parental divorce tend to reduce the likelihood to marry 
more for females than for males (Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Kobrin and 
Waite 1984;). ThuB, a weak emphasis on marriage in the social context 
may affect females more than males in the propensity for marriage.
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Notes for Chapter Three
1. Specifically, Landale (1989: 365) found: "narrowing opportunities 
for farm ownership channelled the sons of U.S. farmers into farm labor 
and non-farm occupations. These alternatives, in turn, reduced marriage 
chances during the early adult years. In contrast, inter-county 
migration between childhood and young adulthood increased the likelihood 
of marriage among the men in each occupation. Overall, the analysis 
demonstrates a clear linkage between opportunity, occupations, 
migration, and nuptiality".
2. By that I mean small samples and inadequate measurements of 
structural conditions such as marital availability in these studies 
(Marini 1985; Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984; Landale 1989). Most of all, 
the selectiveness of the samples in these studies limits the
generalizability of their findings.
3. Here I lay out only general expectations for the analysis. More 
specific hypotheses about race and sex differences are formulated in 
Chapter Six.
CHAPTER FOUR 
METHOD, DATA, AND VARIABLES
Method
Whv A Logistic Regression Model ?
An Ordinary Least Squares regression model is not an appropriate 
statistical method to use to predict a dichotomouB dependent variable; 
e.g., whether a respondent got first married in 1977—1979. To overcome 
the problems associated with dichotomous dependent variables in OLS 
models (Aldrich and Nelson 1984: 12), binary logistic models are used to 
estimate the effects of individual characteristics and structural forces 
on the likelihood of first marriage. There are several important 
reasons for choosing the logistic regression model over OLS models. I 
discuss these reasons in the following section.
First, one of the basic assumptions of a linear regression model 
is a homoscedastic disturbance term, which means that the variance for 
the disturbance terms is constant for all values of an independent 
variable, X. Based on thiB assumption, the least squares estimators 
have the minimum variance, linear, and unbiased properties, so called 
"BLUE" (the best linear and unbiased estimators). However, using OLS 
models with a dichotomous dependent variable apparently violates this 
assumption in that the variance of the disturbance term in fact varies 
systematically with the values of the independent variable (Aldrich and 
Nelson 1984: 12). Thus, the OLS estimates will not be the best because 
the distribution does not have the smallest possible sampling variance.
As a result, estimates of the sampling variances will not be correct, 
and any hypothesis tests (e.g., t and F teBts) and confidence intervals 
based on these sampling variances will be biased, even for very large 
samples (Aldrich and Nelson 1984: 13-14). Employing standard 
statistical practices for improving the estimates may make them even 
worse (Aldrich and Nelson 1984:30).
Second, the linear constraint in OLS regressions specifies that 
the marginal effects of the independent variables are constant. This 
constraint does not describe the true relationship between an 
independent variable (continuous or categorical) and a dichotomous 
dependent variable, which takes a distribution like a S-shaped curve.
Third, with a dichotomouB dependent variable researchers often 
code as a "1" if the event of interest occurs and as a ”0 " if it does 
not occur. One could treat the proportion of response of "1" as linear 
probability and estimate this probability by uBing an OLS regression 
model. The problem is that such probability predictions fall outside 
the range of 0 to 1 ; for a sufficiently small value of the independent 
variable the probability falls below 0 and for a sufficiently large 
value it goes beyond 1 .
Derivation of Binary Locrit Models from Micro-Economic Choice Models
Binary logit models are derived from several related micro- 
economic choice models. They include micro-economic consumer models; 
discrete choice theory/qualitative choice models; and random utility and 
binary choice models. Z discuss each of these models in the following 
section.
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Micro-economic consumer ’theory. The basic idea of this theory is 
that individual decision makers maximize their utility of a commodity 
chosen, subject to their income constraint. With two commodities, the 
utility function of a consumer is:
where U donates the utility of the consumer, j?O'01r and Pz are the 
positive parameters for the tastes of the consumer (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
1986: 40), and qi, q2 are quantity of consumption for two goods. To 
maximize the utility function, U(qi,q2) = 00 qi*^  el^Zr subject to the 
income constraint, Piqi + P232 s If the Lagrangian function is used to 
obtain the following:
where X is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are 
obtained by differentiating the above equation. By solving the firBt 
order conditions equations for q^  and gj and substituting them in the 
utility function one obtains the maximum utility achievable under the 
given prices and income:
u(qnq2)= Po q^1 q^2* (4.1)
Max [/30q^ 1 - X(piq! + p2q2 " I)]» (4.2)
U <P1,P2*I) = Pol*/ P^Pz)^*0Z ( i3 l /P l)<*1 (02/P2)*2- (4.3)
Discrete choice theorv/qualitative choice models. Micro-economic 
consumer theory is based on the assumption of a continuous space of
alternatives: consumers consume more or less of different commodities 
and make quantitative choices. This assumption allows the use of 
calculus to derive demand functions. However, consumer theory can not 
be applied to situations where the consumption of one or more goods are 
zero (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1986:43). Discrete choice theory is 
developed to deal with situations where individuals make qualitative 
choices rationally. Thus, with the utility function,
U= U(q1fq2,q3), (4.4)
where qj, q2, and qj are, for example, three different commuter modes 
(e.g., bus, train, car), discrete choice theory uses different 
restrictions:
qi = 1 if mode 1 is chosen, 0 otherwise;
qj = 1 if mode 2 is chosen, 0 otherwise;
q3 = 1 if mode 3 is chosen, 0 otherwise;
and only one choice is selected:
qi<32 = qiq3 = qzq3 - o. (4.5)
Under these assumptions the utility function can attain only three 
possible values: U(1,0,0), U{0,1,0), and U(0,0,1), and is not 
differentiable with respect to the quantities qi, qj, and q3 (Ben-Akiva
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and Lerman 1986: 44). A utility function 1b defined in terms of the 
attributes of different commuter modes:
Ui = U(tj, ci, 01), (4.6)
U2 = U(tjf C2/ 02), (4.7)
U 3  =  U ( t 3 ,  03, 0 3 ) , (4.8)
where t denotes travel time, c travel cost, and o comfort. Alternative 
1 is chosen if and only if Uj > Ug, > U3,
The utility function of mode 1 for consumer n iB a function of 
both the attributes of mode 1 and his/her socioeconomic characteristics 
which according to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1986: 48) explain the 
variations of tastes for different types of transportation in the 
population. With two alternatives, i, and j, the utility function of 
choosing alternative i is
where, Zfn is a vector of the attributes for alternative i as viewed by 
the consumer n and Sn is a vector of characteristics of the decision 
maker n, such as income, age, and education, etc.
Random utility theory and binary choice models. Since the analyst 
does not know actual utilities of the decision, the prediction by the 
analyst is imperfect. Therefore, researchers treat the utilities as 
random variables (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1986: 55). Hanski (1973) 
identified four sources of randomness of utilities:
Uin = U(Zin, Sn), (4.9)
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1.) unobserved attributes,
2 .) unobserved taste variations,
3.) measurement errors and imperfect information,
4.) instrumental (or proxy) variables.
All these factors are entered in the model as an error term. 
Therefore, the random utility function of alternative i is a Bum of both 
observable and non-observable components of the total utilities:
Where Vjn denote factors observed in the model and Ejn denote random 
errors in the prediction. Similarly, the random utility function of 
alternative j is:
Uin= V(Zin, Sin) + E (Zjn, Sin ) = V,n + Ein (4.10)
Ujn =VJn + Ejn. (4.11)
The probability of choosing alternative i is:
Pn (i)= Pr (U,-n & 0 jn),
= Pr(Vin+ Ejn & Vjn + Ejn),
(4.12)
= Pr(Ejn - Ejn £ V in - Vjn)
Thus, "for a binary choice situation the absolute levels of V and E do 
not matter; all that matters is whether the difference in the V's is 
less than the difference in the E's" (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1986: 62).
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The general assumption about the disturbances is that all the
disturbances have zero means with unity variance,
a2Var(Ejn - Ein) = 1 (4.13)
The shape of the distribution of the difference in disturbances, Ejn - 
Ejn, determines different binary choice models; the linear probability 
models, binary probit, binary logit, and others.
The binary logit model is based on the assumption that En - Bjn" 
Ejn is logistically distributed, namely the S-shaped curve with the 
tails fatter than the normal distribution. In other words, ®Jn» and E;n 
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman 1986: 71). Under the assumptions that En 1b logistically 
distributed, the choice probability for alternative i is:
Sociologists often present the binary logit model in a simpler 
form as follows:
where P is, for an example, the probability that an individual will get 
married at certain point of time; X<j is a constant; Xi and X2 are 
independent variables; Xi and X2 denote the effect of a unit change in 
the independent variables on the log odds of getting married. The e is
Pn(i) = Pr(Ujn a u jn) (4.14)
loge ( P / 1  — P ) = X q  + X,X, + X2X2 + e, (4.15)
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the error term that contains all other attributes of individuals which 
are not empirically observed by the researcher. These attributes may 
include personality traitB, physical appearance, etc.
Assumptions of Looit Models
The estimates of logit models are based on the following 
assumptions some of which are parallel to those in OLS models1:
1). The dependent random variable, Y, is assumed to be binary, 
taking on only two values; 1 or 0. The outcomes on Y are assumed to be 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
2). The dependent variable is assumed to be dependent on K 
observable variables; or the exogenous variables are assumed to account 
for the variation in the probability,
P= P(Y/X), (4.16)
where Y is the one of the two outcomes.
3). Instead of the assumption that Y and X are linearly related
in OLS models, the logit model is based on this assumption:
P(Y s 1/X) = exp(Ebk Xk) /[l + exp(Ebk Xk)J, (4.17)
where the remaining unknowns are the parameters bk, K=l,...., K.
4). The data are generated from a random sample of size N. This
assumption requires that the observations on Y be statistically
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independent of each other, thus ruling out the serial and spatial 
correlation among variables across observations.
5). There is no exact linear dependence among the independent 
variables, the Xj^ 's; there are no two X^'s perfectly correlated.
Logit parameters are estimated by the method of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) in contrast to ordinary regression models which are 
estimated by the method of Least Squares Estimation (LSE). The 
principle of MLE is to choose as an estimate of b, say b*, which makes 
the likelihood of having observed the V as large as possible. Each 
"trial value" of b will yield a value of L(Y/X, b). The b* is taken as 
the MLE estimate which yields the largest value for the L(Y/X, b) 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984: 50).
Interpretation of Loait Coefficients
Qualitatively the interpretation of the coefficients is the 
same as in the linear regression model, although the magnitude of the 
effect varieB with the value of exogenous variables and the description 
of that effect is not quite as straightforward (Aldrich and Nelson 1984: 
44-45). The interpretation involves two issues: determining the 
functional relationship between the dependent and the independent 
variables, and appropriately defining the unit of change for the 
independent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989: 38).
Dichotomous independent variables. Given a logistic regression 
equation such as:
Ln ( p / l - p )  = Xo + XjBlack + X2Female, (5.18)
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where Ln ( p / 1 - p) represents the dependent variable, the log-odds 
(logit) of getting married in 1979, for example, Xq represents the 
intercept, and Xi is the logit coefficient for "Black” and the X2 the 
coefficient for "Female”. Both "Black” and "Female” are dummy coded as 
l's for being black and female, and 0 's for white and male. 
Qualitatively, the X coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of 
being in a certain group. Quantitatively, the X's are converted into 
odds ratios by taking the exponential of the coefficients. The odds 
ratios tell the riBk that the event of interest will occur for members 
in one group relative to members of the other group (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1989: 42). Some simply call the converted coefficients the "effect" of 
being in one group on the dependent variable relative to the other group 
(Agresti and Finlay 1986: 489). Suppose the estimated equation is:
Ln ( p / 1 - p) = -1.237 -0.531(Black) + 0.103(Female), (4.19)
where the intercept represents the log-odds or logit for the combination 
of all the omitted categories, namely white and male. Taking the 
exponential of this logit will give the mean odds for this group. 
However, the intercepts may not be always meaningful, especially in a 
model with both categorical and continuous variables which range from 0 
on. Taking the exponential of the logit for "Black” gives the odds 
ratio for blacks or the effect of being black. It gives a sense about 
how much more or less likely blacks are to marry relative to whites. A
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value above 1 Indicates a positive effect of being black and a value 
below 1 indicates a negative effect.
To obtain the odds for blacks, one has to multiply this odds ratio 
to the exponential to the power of the intercept, e"1*237. Thus, the 
mean odds for blacks are: e'1*23^ '0*531. The same applies to the odds 
ratio and odds on the outcome of the dependent variable for females. To 
obtain the odds ratio and odds of being both black and female, the 
following expression is used:
(p / 1- p) = e^e^e*2, (4.20)
= e-1.237e-0.531e0.103
Note that the proportion, p, ranges from 0 to 1, but the logit 
increases from negative infinitive to positive infinitive. When p = 1/2 
or .50, logit equals to 0, and p values above (below) 1/2 correspond to 
a positive (negative) logit.
Continuous variables. Generally, the interpretation for a 
continuous variable is not different from that for a categorical 
variable. Consider, for example, the equation,
Ln (p / 1 - p) = Xo + X^ Ed, (4.21)
where we Buppose that the left side of the equation is the log-odds of
supporting the legalization of abortion, and "Ed" is years of education 
completed. For an increase of a year of education, the log-odds of 
supporting abortion increases by the amount of ex1{1*. For an increase
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of 10 years of education, the log-oddB will increase by ex1(10>. The 
estimated odds of supporting abortion for those with 10 years of 
schooling is obtained by using the expression:
(p / 1- p) = ex0ex1(10>. (4.22)
Note that Xi can not be simply interpreted as a slope as it can be 
in the OLS model "because the rate at which the curve climbs or descends 
changes according to the value of "Ed" (Agresti and Finlay 1986: 483). 
The exponential relationship between "Ed" and the log-odds of supporting 
the legalization of abortion implies that every unit increase in 
education produces a multiplicative effect of ex1 on the log-odds.
Data
In this part of the chapter I discuss the data sets used for the 
analysis and the measurement of variables. First, I briefly describe 
the nature of the two source data sets used for the analysis: Public-Use 
Microdata Sample-D 1980 (the Data User Service Division, U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1983) and County Statistics File 3 (U.S. Dept, of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census 1989). I then discuss how the final data set was 
created for the logit analysis, based on these two sources. Second, I 
discuss how the variables of theoretical importance were constructed. 
More details on the file creation and variable measurement are presented 
in the footnotes.
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Public-Use Microdata Sample-D fPUMS-Dl
This research is based on two data sets, the Public-Use Microdata 
Sample-D (PUMS-D) and County Statistics File 3 (CO-STAT 3). PUMS-D is a 
one percent sample (2.2 million persons) of the total U.S. population.
A unique geographic Bcheme was employed in PUMS-D to group counties into 
labor market areas based on commuting patterns (Tolbert and Killian 
1987). All standard PUMS variables are provided in the PUMS-D file, 
including detailed housing information and person information, Buch as 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
Tolbert and Killian (1987) defined 382 labor market areas in the 
United States. These labor market areaB allow researchers to assess the 
contextual influence on individuals who reside or work in the labor 
market areas2. More specifically, they allow a contextual study of how 
the local marriage market, the local taste for marriage, and the local 
economy affect individuals' propensity for marriage.
Labor market areas as a geographical dimension on marriage markets 
have two advantages. First, the definition of labor market areas 
includes rural and non-metropolitan areas. In applications of SMSA's 
to labor markets, rural areas are generally omitted by definition from 
the research (Tolbert and Killian 1987). The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis' economic areas (BEA), which are based on county groups, tend 
to minimize the number of exclusively non-metropolitan areas, thus 
posing particular problems for non-metropolitan labor markets (Tolbert 
and Killian 1987) and hence non-metropolitan marriage markets as well. 
Second, by uBing labor market areas as a geographic unit researchers are
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able to measure marriage markets in terms o£ both residency and work 
place which provides opportunities for meeting potential mates.
Two files were constructed from four PUMS-D tapes. One file 
contains 2,269,893 persons with a Bet of variables relevant to the 
research. Persons from the Alaska labor market areas were excluded from 
the data due to the fact that many counties in that state have missing 
values on marriage and divorce rates for the years concerned. The 
decision to exclude the labor market areas in Alaska was also based on 
the fact that there are so few blacks from this state. Since the 
analysis focuses on black-white differences in marriage patterns, I 
would not gain much by including it in the analysis. Based on this 
large file, I constructed the contextual variables (at labor market area 
level) selected for the analysis. A detailed discussion on these 
variables follows in a later section.
A smaller file was built from the same four PUMS-D tapes. This 
data set contains 253,095 individuals and their demographic and 
socioeconomic variables. I made several selections to create this data 
set based on race, marital status, and age. The data set contains white 
and black persons, between age 20 and 41, who either got first-married 
between 1977-1979 or who were never married during this period. First, I 
selected only whites and blacks because I am interested only in black- 
white differences in marriage patterns in the research. Second, Z 
selected the above two marital-status groups because Z am predicting the 
log-odds of first marriage for 1979 and two previous adjacent years 
(1977,1978). The adjacency in timing is important because most of the 
predictive variables were constructed from cross-sectional data in
1979/80. ThuB, for those who got firBt-married 10 years from 1979, 
residency, work place, and socioeconomic attributes may have changed.
In this instance, a model based on the recent information would have 
little predicative power. I focus on the propensity for first marriage 
for two reasons. First, there is no information for the timing of 
remarriage in the data. Second, the marriage market may be different 
for remarriage than for first marriage. By dealing with first marriage 
only, my analysis is free of possible complications associated with 
remarriage propensity. Finally, I selected individuals of age 20 to 41, 
because first marriage primarily takes place within this age range3.
The contextual variables were then merged with the selected 
individual file with 253,095 cases by labor market area codes. For the 
final logit analysis, I used a random sub-sample* with 20,283 cases and 
about 66 variables in order to reduce computing costB. The sub-sample 
is 8 percent of the original sample (253,095). The proportions of 
different demographic groups mirror those in the full sample and the 
means on all variables from two samples are identical (See Appendix B).
County Statistics File 3 fCO-STAT 3)
The CO-STAT 3 (machine readable file) was prepared by the Data 
User Services Division, Bureau of the Census. The file provides data 
for the United States, 50 States and the District of Columbia, and 3,139 
counties or county equivalents defined as of January 1, 1983. The CO- 
STAT 3 is a compilation of several data sources, including census data, 
national health statistics, labor statistics, etc. Several contextual 
variables5 were constructed based on the data from the CO-STAT 3. I
first aggregated the county-level data into labor market areas and 
computed the variables and then merged them by labor market area code 
with the individual data from the PUMS-D6.
Variables
Dependent Variable (source: PUMS-D)
First marriage. The log odds of first marriage 1977-1979; 1* first 
married in 1977-1979 and 0= never married by 1979. This variable was 
constructed from three variables, age, age of first marriage, and 
marital status in 1979. First marriage here is defined aB a marriage 
which is "first" for either bride or groom (Bogue 1985: 25). Age and 
age of first marriage were used to sort out those who got first-married 
in 1977, or 1978, or 1979. I cross-tabulated age of first marriage in 
1979 and age in 1979. Thus, for those who first-married in 1979, the 
age and the age of first marriage should generally overlap. For those 
who first-married in 1978, the age of first marriage should lag one year 
from their age in 1979. For those who first-married in 1977, their age 
of first marriage lagB two years from their age in 1979. I am aware 
that the derivation of the age of first marriage in this manner may be 
off by months. However, since I am only interested in the occurrence of 
marriage in all the three years, the monthly slippage does not pose a 
problem to the analysis.
Independent Variables; Individual Characteristics /source; PUMS-D1
Demographic
87
Aae. There is strong evidence in the literature for a curvilinear 
relationship between age and entry into first marriage (Sorensen and 
Sorensen 1986). Researchers have developed various ways to model the 
curvilinear relationship between age and rates of marriage (McDonald and 
Rindfuss 1981; Waite and Spitze 1981; Michael and Tuma 1985; Sorensen 
and Sorensen 1986). One way is to run separate models for each age 
category. While this approach has "the advantage of not imposing any 
specific assumptions about the duration dependency and it allowB other 
variables to interact freely with the age dependency" (Sorensen and 
Sorensen 1986: 56), it would be too cumbersome to do so, given the age 
range (20 to 39) of the sample I selected for the analysis. The second 
approach is to use partial likelihood estimation and the third way is to 
"Bpecify the age dependence in a fully parametized model in a manner 
that is theoretically and empirically meaningful" (Sorensen and Sorensen 
1986: 57). I adopted the third approach. I first specified a 
curvilinear relationship between age and the log-odds of first marriage 
by including age as a continuous variable and a squared term of age, 
plus individuals' socioeconomic variables in the model. The functional 
form follows:
Ln( p/l-p) = bo + b^Age + b2&geSq + b„Xs, (4.23)
where Xb denote a set of socioeconomic variables. Figure 4-1 shows the 
plot of the actual and predicted log-oddB of first marriage against 
single years of age, 20 to 41. Ignoring the random fluctuations at the 
older ages, the bi-variate plot of the actual log-odds of first marriage
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largely corresponds with the plot of the functional form. As shown in 
Figure 4-1, there are a lot of variations between ages 20 and 23 and 
between ages 28 and 39. The peak of first marriage is between age 23 
and 26. According to the plot of the actual curve in Figure 4-1, I 
created 7 dummy variables: Age20, Age21, Age22, Age23-26, Age27-28, 
Age29-30, Age31+, with Age23-36 as the reference group.
Sex. Female is coded as 1 and male is coded as 0.
Race. Black is coded 1 and white 0. Regarding to the
croBB-classification of blacks and Hlspanics, prior analyBiB showed that 
the data do not have this problem. However, it is possible that a 
person might have identified himself/herself as a black even though 
he/she has a Hispanic origin. Numerically, this should not pose a 
problem to the interpretation of the results. Other races were excluded 
from the analysis.
Socioeconomic
Education. Years of education completed is coded as four dummy 
variables: less than high school, high school, three years of college, 
and four years or of college. Those with high school education are the 
reference group. Carter and Glick (1976: 49-50), based on 1960 U.S. 
Census, found that the relationship between education and rate of first
marriages is generally positive and is largely higher for those with the
usual terminal levels of education than for those with a little more or 
a little less education than that.
Enrollment. Being enrolled in school in 1979 is coded 1 and no 
enrolled in school is 0 .
Market Work. Based on two original variables, "Labor", and 
"Hours79", four dummy variables are created; full-time working, part- 
time working, unemployed, and not in the labor force. Since there were 
very few persons who were employed in 1979 but were not at work, they 
were included in the unemployed category. Full-time working is defined 
as working 35 or more hours a week; part-time is defined as working less 
than 35 hours per week. Full-time working is the reference category.
Zn addition, I also looked at whether or not a person had worked since 
1975 but not neceBBarily worked in 1979. For those who married in 1978 
or 1977, work status in 1976 or 1975 may have an effect on first 
marriage. Thus, 1 = worked since 1975 and 0 = not worked since 1975.
Income. The individual income is measured as the incomes from all 
sources in 1979 ("income8 "). I chose to use the incomes from all 
sources rather than just Belf-employment or employment incomes, because 
the former is a better measure of personal income than the latter. 
Individuals with no employment income can have other sources of income 
such as interests, dividends, social security incomes, public assistance 
and other. I use logarithm of income in the analysis because of the 
skewed distribution of income.
There are 24 persons in the sub-sample who reported negative 
incomes in 1979. Conceptually, they are outliers because their 
resources and standard of living can not be accurately measured by their 
reported income. These persons are very likely to be self-employed with 
large businesses and hence the negative incomes they reported may not 
mean that they live in poverty as the poor. Rather, the reported 
negative incomes reflect their loss in profit relative to input into the
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business. Empirically, preliminary analysis (nob shown) also suggested 
that they are influential outliers. The analyses with and without the 
outliers differ significantly not only in the intercept but also in the 
directions of some parameter estimates, and in the magnitude of the 
income itself. With the outliers in the model there are Borne 
nonsensical estimates of the parameters. The estimates are in the 
expected directions without these variables. Given these 
considerations, the 24 cases were excluded from the analysis.
However, I left those who reported zero incomes from all sources 
in 1979 in the analysis. There are 1,553 cases with zero incomes and 
they tend to be students and females not in the labor force. Since X 
can not take a log of zero income, X assigned Hl" to the cases that have 
zero income before the log of income was taken. This Blight 
manipulation should not distort the distribution of the variable. An 
alternative would be using a dummy variable for the zero income 
category. However, this variable will be highly correlated with other 
variables, such as being enrolled in school and not in the labor force.
Occupation. Four categories of occupational types are coded from 
the census occupation codes: (1) unemployed or not worked since 1975;
(2) managerial and professional specialty occupations (003-199); (3) 
technical, sales, administrative support, and service occupations (203- 
469); and (4) blue-collar occupations (473-784), including agricultural 
and industrial manual workers. Persons in managerial and professional 
specialty occupations are the reference group.
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Public assistance. Persons who received public assistance in 1979 
are coded as ”1 " and those who did not receive it are coded as "0 ”.
Independent Variables; Contextual Factors
The major problem encountered in constructing the contextual 
variables is missing values for some counties and labor market areas. 
Different strategies were used to deal with the different situations of 
missing cases.
My first strategy was to choose alternative variables for which 
the data are complete. Nonetheless, alternative variables often posed 
the same problem, although the data are more complete for them. In this 
case, I still chose the alternative variables and I used either mean 
substitutions or estimations based on the data of the adjacent counties. 
For instance, the variable, the number of marriages that took place in 
1979, has many counties missing. Instead of doing mean substitution for 
these many counties, I choBe to use marriages for 1980 which had far 
fewer counties missing. Since marriage rates for 1979 and 1980 are very 
Bimilar, few inaccuracies are introduced by choosing the 1980 rates over 
the 1979 rates, still there are 8 counties missing for this alternative 
variable. I estimated the marriages in 1980 for each of these counties 
based on the number of marriages that took place in their geographically 
adjacent counties, usually sharing a long boundary. Assuming that 
counties that share a long boundary also share similarity in marriage 
and divorce rateB, the estimation is reasonable.
In other instances, I used mean substitution for labor market 
areas with missing values, because adjacent labor market areas are not
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as easy as counties to identify. A few very small counties with missing 
values for several variables were excluded from the computation. These 
counties usually have very small populations, numbering between 100-400 
persons. The footnotes in the section on contextual variable 
construction provide more details on how I dealt with the problem of 
missing cases.
Most of the contextual variables are race specific with exceptions 
for local economy, population density, and general marriage rates. The 
measure of local economy does not need to be race specific as a local 
economic climate. Population density is not race specific because it is 
just a very general measure of the size of local marriage market. The 
general marriage rate in the labor market area is not race specific 
because of data limitation in both PUMS-D and CO-STAT 37. The race 
specific variables for whites were created based on 381 labor market 
areas. For blacks, these variables were constructed based on only 216 
labor market areas that have 100 (in the PUMS-D ) and 10,000 (in 
universe) black population. This selection was necessary because many 
labor market areas have missing values on the variables for blacks.
Thus, for instance, the concept of female-headed households 1b measured 
with two indicators: percent of female-headed households for whiteB, and 
percent female-headed households for blacks.
Percent female-headed households, percent female in labor force, 
sex differences in earnings, current marriage rates, percent population 
on welfare, percent below poverty level, male unemployment rate, and 
local marriage market were constructed from the PUMS-D data. General
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marriage rate, population density, and local economy were created from 
the CO-STAT 3 data.
With the PUMS-D data, the information on the individual variables 
waB first summed up and then aggregated into labor market area. The 
computation of the variables was done after the aggregation. For 
instance, for the male unemployment rate, I first got a total count of 
unemployed persons and a count of persons in the labor force. I then 
used the "Proc Sum" SAS procedure to aggregate the two variables into 
labor market areas. The computation of the unemployment rate took place 
afterwards. With the CO-STAT 3 data, the procedure is the same except 
that I aggregated the information from county level, rather individual 
level, into labor market area level.
Centrality of marriage
General marriage rate (source! CO-STAT 3s Census and NCHS18. 
General marriage rate is defined as: GMR = ((total annual marriages)/ 
(unmarried females 15+)) x 1,000. The numerator is defined as the total 
number of marriages that took place in a labor market area in 1980 and 
the denominator is defined as the total number of single, divorced, and 
widowed females age 15 and older9 in that year.
Current marriage rate tsource: PUMS-D^. It is defined as: CMR= 
((total current marriages)/(total population 15+)) x 1,000. The 
numerator includes all persons who were married in 1979 and the 
denominator includes the total population age 15 and older. Current 
marriage rates were computed separately for blacks and whites.
Mean aae of first marriage I source: PUMS-D1. I constructed the 
mean age of first marriage separately for whites and blacks, although
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the definition is the same for both groups. First, I created a total 
count of person-ages of first marriage for each year (1977, 1978 and 
1979) and a total count of persons who first married in each of these 
years from PUMS-D. Then the variables were aggregated into labor market 
areas. After aggregation, the mean age of first marriage for each year 
was derived as: (total person-ages)/(total marriages). Finally, to 
derive the mean age of first marriage between 1977-1979, I simply took 
the average of the three means^.
Percent female-headed households (source; PUMS-D>. Percent of 
female-headed households is defined as: ((total female-headed 
households)/(total family households)) x 100. Since the aggregation 
procedure iB the same for all contextual variables that were constructed 
from PUMS-D, I will not repeat diBcuBBing it for the following section. 
The female-headed households are defined as family households with 
female householders, no husband present. A family household is a 
household that has "two or more persons, including the householder, who 
are related by birth, marriage, or adoption, and who live together as 
one household; all such persons are considered as members of one 
family." "A person maintaining a household alone, or two or more 
unrelated persons are regarded as a household but not a family." (The 
Data User Services Division, Bureau of the Census, 1983: Appendix k-15).
Female independence (source: PUMS-D1
Female labor force participation. It is defined as: ((total 
number of females in labor force in 1979) / (total female population 
aged 15-64)) x 100.
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Sex differences in earnings. Only the working population between 
age 24 and 64 in 1979 were selected for the calculation of this 
variable. Sex differences in earnings are defined as: [((average male 
full-time earnings - average female full-time earnings) x (total persons 
working full-time)) + ((average male part-time earnings - average female 
part-time earnings) x (total persons working part-time)) / (total 
persons working full-time and part-time in 1979)). The size of the 
full-time and part-time working population is adjusted in this 
calculation11.
Welfare dependence lsource: PUMS-D1. Welfare dependence is 
defined as: ((Total persons who received public assistance in 1979)/ 
(population age 16 and older)) x 1 0 0.
Local economy I Source: CO-STAT 3: BLS>12. Local economy in a 
labor market area 1b measured by civilian employment change between 1975 
and 1979 in a labor market area. The employment change during the 1975- 
1979 period is defined as: employment change = ((employment in 1979- 
employment in 1975)/(employment in 1975)) x 100. Although alternative 
indicators of local economy are also available, such as total earnings 
or unemployment rate, preliminary analysis has shown that employment has 
a much stronger effect on the log-odds of first marriage than the 
alternative indicators.
The rationale for using employment change in 1975-79 is based on 
the fact that I am looking at first marriage across three adjacent years 
(1977, 1978, and 1979) rather than a single year. The local economy 
prior to 1977-1979 might have influence on individual decisions about 
marriage. X realize that change in employment could be due to increases
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in the size of the labor force rather than economic growth itself. 
However, the change in the labor force size is also strongly related to
the economy. When the economy is strong, more people will want to seek
employment and firms want to employ more workers. The labor force 
participation rate for women and young people, such as high school and
college graduates, may be particularly sensitive to change in the
economy. For instance, when the economy is Btrong and jobs and good 
jobB are plentiful, college graduates are more likely to seek jobs after 
their graduation from college, and there are also more likely to get 
jobs than when the economy is weak. In the latter case I would think 
high Bchool and college graduates would continue their education instead 
of going into the job market right away. Deseran, Li, and Wojtkiewicz 
(1991) found that females were more likely to participate in the labor 
force in labor market areas where the economy was strong.
Male unemployment rate (source: PUMS-DI. Male unemployment rate 
is defined aB: ((total unemployed males)/(total males in labor force)) x 
100. The definition of "unemployed persons” follows that of the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics13. Whether or not a 
male has a job affects his attractiveness in the marriage market. A 
high rate of male unemployment in the labor market area shrinks the pool 
of marital availability for femaleB14. Male unemployment rates were 
computed separately for blacks and whites. Race specific rates may not 
fully reflect the impact of the broader economy on individual decision 
to marry. However, preliminary analysis (not reported here) has shown 
that at the labor market area level the correlation coefficient for 
black and white male unemployment rates is quite strong, .62. This
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indicates that labor market areas with high black male unemployment 
rates also tend to have high male unemployment rates for white. Thus, 
race-specific rates of male unemployment taps the contextual influence 
of the larger economy reasonably well.
Local marriage market
Population density (source; CO-STAT 3; Cenaua)^. Population 
density is defined as total number of persons per square mile in a labor 
market area. The total land areas in square miles and total resident 
population in 1980 by county are readily available in the CO-STAT 3. 
After the aggregation of counties into labor market areas, the density 
measure is derived as: (total resident population in 1980) / (total land 
areas in square mileB). Population density is considered as a proxy for
the size of the local marriage market. The more densely labor market
areas are populated, the greater marital availability there would be.
Local marital availability (source: PUMS-D) includes:
1 ). local marital availability ratio (age);
2 ). local marital availability ratio (age & education);
3). local marital availability (number of eligible in terms of age
and education).
BaBed upon "the Availability Ratio" developed by Goldman et al. 
(1984), I constructed three measures for marriage market, using labor 
market areas as a geographic unit. The availability ratio (AR) is 
defined as follows:
The number of suitable men for W
AR = ___________________________________________________________
average number of suitable women for H's suitable men
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Suppose16, for example, W is a female and in her labor market area 
there are 100 males of suitable age, education, and race for her to 
marry. Suppose further that each of these 100 suitable men has 100 
women suitable for him in terms of age, race, and education. Then the 
marriage pools are well matched and the availability ratio would be 1 . 
However, if each of the 100 suitable men had 500 suitable women from 
which to choose a mate, the availability ratio would be .2 males per 
female. In the latter case H would have trouble in finding a suitable 
mate. The comparable calculation for men simply reverses the sexes: 
the AR for a man or male cohort is defined as the number of suitable 
women divided by the average number of suitable men for those women.
Goldman et al. (1984) pointed out that this availability ratio is 
not equivalent to the probability of the person's marrying, but it gives 
some sense of how likely one is to find a mate and the odds that he/she 
could marry only if other conditions are conducive to marriage. The 
female ARs less than one indicate an imbalance in the marriage pool that 
makes it difficult for women to find mates; conversely the ARs greater 
than one suggests a favorable marriage market from the female point of 
view (Goldman et al. 1984).
Mathematically, the AR can be expressed as the following equation:
AR = E j Ej Mjj -r [E jE j  wM{j M,-j -5- E j E j M j j ] ,  (4-24)
which can be rewritten as:
(4.25)
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where My is the number of men aged i in educational level j, and wMy 
denotes the number of women who are suitable for men aged i and 
educational level j.
In equation (4.24), the firnt term on the right side denotes the 
number of men aged i in education level j who are suitable for H, for 
example; the entire second term represents the average number of 
suitable women for W's suitable men (My). While the first term 
reflects the marriage pool available, the entire second term measures 
the competition for that pool. This measure was calculated separately 
for blacks and whites, men and women, and four age cohorts: 20-24, 25- 
29, 30-34, and 35-39. To define the "suitable" and "availability", I 
made the following assumptions and constraints.
Race. Marriage markets operate within racial groupB. According 
to Goldman et al. (1984: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982b), only 1.3 
percent of all married couples in 1980 are classified as interracial 
marriages. For the present research, race includes blacks and whites 
and I assume a segregated marriage market for the two groups.
Aae. There have been no set criteria for age constraints in 
calculating marriage pool in the literature. Demographers and 
statisticians set various age ranges of differences in their measures. 
Most of them use an average age difference of 2-4 years. The problem 
with this constraint is that it captures substantially fewer marriages 
than actually occur. Therefore, it tends to underestimate the marital 
availability.
Goldman et al. (1984) used constraints that cover approximately 
95.6 percent of all marriages that occurred between the ages of 16 and
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75 during the period 1976-1978 and cover at least 85 percent of 
marriages for each single-year age group of bride (except for 75 year- 
old brides) and of groom. For example, women aged 30 were assumed to 
have a pool of males aged between 23 and 49; men of the same age were 
assumed to have a pool of females between 19 and 38 years old. Farley 
and Bianchi (1987) determined an age range which included 90 percent of 
the husbands actually selected by women of a given age who married in 
1980 and then used this range to establish the age criteria for the 
eligibility pool.
I adopted a similar approach to set up age constraints for the 
present analysis. In the first step, I obtained from a cross-tabulation 
of all marriages in 1979 by age of bride and by age of groom in single 
years17 and selected cells that have at least 2 percent or more 
marriages by either sex. This selection covers at least 85 percent 
marriages that took place in 1979 in the United StateB. Based on this 
criterion18, I constructed an age map for calculating the marital 
availability in terms of age. Table 4-1 showB that for females 20 years 
old, the majority married grooms age 18 to 2819. However, most twenty- 
year-old males married brides who were between 16 and 23 yearB old.
The first column in Table 4-2 shows that for females of ages 20- 
2420, the majority married male partners between age 18 to 33, and the 
second column indicates the age range of females that each single 
category of these males tend to marry. In other words, while the first 
column shows the age ranges of "suitable" males for females of age 20- 
24, the second column shows the age ranges of suitable women for each
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Table 4-1.
Age Constraints for Male and Female 
Age of Bride1 Ages of Mi2 Age of Groom Ages of Wmi3
20 18...28 20 16...23
21 19...29 21 16...24
22 20.■.30 22 17...25
23 20...32 23 17...26
24 21...33 24 18...27
25 21...34 25 18...28
26 21...36 26 18...38
27 22.. .37 27 18...31
28 22...38 28 18...32
29 22...39 29 19...32
30 23...41 30 19...33
31 23...42 31 19...34
32 24...45 32 20...35
33 25...46 33 20...37
34 25...47 34 20...38
35 26...49 35 21...39
36 28...52 36 21...40
37 28...52 37 22...41
38 29...52 38 22...42
39 30...53 39 22...43
40 31...55 40 24...43
41 32. . .57 41 24...44
42 33. ..57 42 24...45
43 34. ..59 43 25...45
44 35...59 44 26...47
Note
1. The age range of suitables contains at least 85 percent of all 
marriages of a single age group. At least 2 percent of marriages in 
each cell were counted in the 85 percent coverage.
2. Mi denotes the number of suitables males for unmarried women of a 
given age group.
3. Wmi denotes the number of women who are suitable for Mi or the 
number of women who compete for Mi.
4. Source: cross-tabulations of marriages by age of bride and by age of 
groom, 1979, National Center for Health Statistics.
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Table 4-2.
Age Constraints by Age Group and Sex
Female20-24 Female25-29 Female30-34 Female35-39
Mi Wmi Mi Wmi Mi Wmi Mi Wmi
18 15-21 21 16-24
19 16-22 22 17-25
20 16-23 23 17-26
21 16-24 24 18-27
22 17-25 25 18-28
23 17-26 26 18-30
24 18-27 27 18-31
25 18-28 28 18-32
26 18-30 29 19-32
27 18-31 30 19-33
28 18-32 31 19-34
29 19-32 32 19-35
30 19-33 33 20-37
31 19-34 34 20-38
32 20-35 35 21-39
33 20-37 36 21-40
37 21-41
38 22-42
39 22-43
23 17-26 26 18-30
24 18-27 27 18-31
25 18-28 26 18-32
26 18-30 29 19-32
27 18-31 30 19-33
28 18-32 31 19-34
29 19-32 32 20-35
30 19-33 33 20-37
31 20-34 34 20-38
32 20-35 35 21-39
33 20-37 36 21-40
34 21-38 37 22-41
35 21-39 38 22-42
36 22-40 39 22-43
37 22-41 40 24-43
38 22-42 41 24-44
39 22-43 42 24-45
40 24-43 43 25-45
41 24-44 44 26-47
42 24-45 45 26-49
43 25-45 46 26-49
44 26-47 47 28-50
45 26-49 48 27-52
46 26-49 49 28-51
47 28-50 50 32-53
51 32-54
52 32-55
53 33-57
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Age Constraints by Age Group and Sex
Male20-24 Male25-29 Male30-34 Male35-39
Mi Wmi Mi Wmi Mi Wmi Mi Wmi
16 16-24 18 17-26 19 18-27 21 19-29
17 17-25 19 18-27 20 18-28 22 20-30
18 17-26 20 18-28 21 19-29 23 20-32
19 18-27 21 19-29 22 20-30 24 21-33
20 18-28 22 20-30 23 20-32 25 21-34
21 19-29 23 20-32 24 21-33 26 21-36
22 20-30 24 21-33 25 21-34 27 22-37
23 20-32 25 21-34 26 21-36 28 22-38
24 21-33 26 21-36 27 22-37 29 22-39
25 21-34 27 22-37 28 22-38 30 23-41
26 21-36 28 22-38 29 22-39 31 23-42
27 22-37 29 22-39 30 23-41 32 24-45
30 23-41 31 23-42 33 25-46
31 23-42 32 24-45 34 25-47
32 24-45 33 25-46 35 26-49
34 25-47 36 28-52
35 26-49 37 28-52
36 28-52 38 29-52
37 28-52 39 30-53
38 29-52 40 31-55
41 32-57
42 33-56
43 34-59
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age category of these "suitable” males. Table 4-2 (continued) defines 
the age constraints for males.
Marital Status. Since the study is concerned with the pools of 
unmarried men and women available, those who were classified as 
currently married were excluded from the calculation. Further, those 
who were practicing cohabitation were also excluded from the pools. 
Cohabiting couples were identified according their relation to the 
household head. The variable, "Relatl", in the PUMS-D file allows an 
identification of those who were partners of the household head21. In 
1980, cohabiting persons comprised 7.8 percent of the unmarried adult 
(20-74) male population and 6.4 percent of the unmarried adult (20-74) 
female population (Goldman et al. 1984). These figures are very similar 
to the number of cohabiting persons I identified in the data set. ThuB, 
in terms of marital status, the pool of marital availability includes 
never married, divorced, and widowed population age 16 and older22.
Education. There is substantial evidence that homogamy with 
regard to education and social origin has been a strong and stable 
factor in American marriages (Hirschman and Matras 1971, Warren 1966;
Rubin 1968), although social norms tend to urge women to marry men of
higher social class. Mare (1991: 30) demonstrated that "barriers to 
marriage between persons with unequal amounts of former schooling 
increased between the 1930s and the present" as a result of trends of 
average increases in educational attainment, age at leaving school, and 
age at marriage. Mare (1991) pointed out that higher rates of women's 
labor force participation in recent decades also have an effect on the
increase in educational assortative mating:
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"As women participate in the labor force at higher rates and for 
larger fractions of their lives, their economic value to potential male 
spouseB becomes more salient than in the past (Oppenheimer 1988). This 
suggests that men's and women's views of the marriage market are 
becoming increasingly symmetrical...The result may be a high correlation 
between educational attainments of husbands and wives" (Mare 1891: 31).
The present calculation of marriage market not only reflects the 
educational homogamy in marriage but also allows for marriages between 
partners across adjacent educational boundaries. Goldman et al. (1984) 
demonstrated that the constraints on educational level alter the 
available pool of mates, particularly for highly educated women and for 
black women. Goldman (1977) found the marriage market for college- 
educated black women is especially limited, with measures of 
availability values reaching as low as 1:5 men per woman in major urban 
areas. Goldman et al. (1984) developed several ways to constrain 
educational levels in defining the marriage market for the entire U.S.
Z used a symmetrical 3 by 3 matrix to define the availability pool in 
terms of educational level. The constraint encompasses 96 percent 
marriages in 1980 (Goldman et al. 1984). Since there are very few 
persons in the sample with an educational level higher than college by 
age group at the labor market area level, I combined those who have only 
3 years of college with persons who have college and higher education. 
The constraint is illustrated in the following table.
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Husband's by wife's educational level 
Husband's education
Wife's < HS HS COL
CHS 1 1 0
HS 1 1 1
COL 0 1 1
where "I” means marriage with the educational difference is possible;
"0" means the marriage iB not possible.
Census Undercount. The census undercount is less of a problem for 
whites but it is more severe among blacks, especially black males. 
Moreover, underenumeration is worse in the unmarried population.
Goldman et al. (1984: 25) provided adjustments for the unmarried 
population by race, age, and sex at the national level. However, it 
would be difficult to adjust the unmarried population in labor market 
areas since there is no information on undercount rates specific to 
different areas. To apply the national adjustment to labor market areas 
would result in a much more serious problem. I am aware that there is 
some under-representation of blacks, particularly black men, in my 
estimates of local marriage market based on the unadjusted unmarried 
population. However, this concern is lessened to some degree 
considering that uncounted persons also tend to be in social and 
economic situations (homeless, addicted to drugs, and unemployed) that 
may constrain their ability to marry and limit eligibility for marriage.
Finally, based on the constraints on race, age, marital status, 
and education, I calculated 16 marriage market measures at the labor 
market area level by race, sex, and age; and 48 measures at the labor
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market area level by race, eex, age, and plus education (Bee Table 4-3).
The operationalization of these measures at the labor market area level
is an enormous task. Based on the definition of the "suitability" 
discussed above, two baBic variables, EjEf  Mjj and EjEf  uMfj M f j ,  were 
defined to calculate the availability ratio:
AR ■ EjEf Mjj -i- [E jEj  uMfj Mfj -5- E j E f M f j ] ,  (4.26)
or AR =  [ E j E f M f j ] 2 +  EjEfUM f j M i j ,  ( 4 . 2 7 )
where EjEf  Mfj means the number of male "suitable" partners in a labor 
market area for W, for instance, and EjE; wMjj Mfj means the number of 
suitable women for W's "suitable" men. Suppose W is a black and female, 
with college education, and within age 20-24, her marriage market would 
be:
[the number of black men between age 18 to 33 with high school or 
college* education] + [the number of black females between age 21 and 
37, with 1 to 25+ years of schooling (for the suitable men with high 
school education) or with 14 to 25 + years of education (for the 
suitable men with college* education)].
The operationalization of this formula actually requires 32 
variables for the numerator (16 for high school and 16 for college*) and 
32 variables for the denominator (16 for 1 to 25 years of schooling, and 
16 for those with high school* education). I first obtained a count of 
total persons in each of these 64 categories from the PUMS-D file and 
then aggregated at labor market area level. Then, I did a great deal of
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Table 4—3.
Outline for Marriage Market by Age, Race, and Education
Age White Black
Male Female Male Female
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
Local Availability (Age)
Local Availability fAoe and Education1)
<Hiah School
Hloh School
College
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restructuring of the aggregated data by sorting, match-merging, and 
transposing in order to obtain the two basic terms, E jE f  M y  and EjE f  wM y  
M f j ,  by labor market area for the final computation.
I computed three measures for local marriage markets; availability 
ratio in terms of age (ARage), the availability ratio in termB of both 
age and education (ARage&ed), and the number of suitables in terms of 
age and education (NS). While the first two measures reflect a 
competition effect of local marriage markets, the third measure reflects 
the scale effect of the market. The number of suitables is defined as:
NS =  EjE f  M f j ,  ( 4 . 2 8 )
specific for race and sex. For the ARage measure, 16 marriage markets 
were computed for 16 subgroups (by race, sex, and age) and for the 
ARageSed and NS measures, 48 marriage markets were calculated specific 
for race, sex, age, and education.
These marriage market measures were correctly attached, one at a 
time, to the individual data set which contains persons selected for 
final logistic analysis. To avoid mismatches between individuals and 
their local marriage markets, the two data sets were merged by both the 
labor market area code and an identification variable common to both 
data sets. While the labor market area code identifies individuals' 
residence or work place in a labor market area, the identification 
variable correctly identifies the subgroups, specific to race, sex, age 
and education. Following this I also checked the N's and the means
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before and after merging. All these procedures helped insure that there 
were no mismatches in the merging process.
The ARb were attached to both never married persons in 1979 and 
those who first married between 1977 and 1979. Here I made an 
assumption that the availability ratio is the same for 1977 and 1978 as 
for 1979, which is reasonable because sex ratios for unmarried 
population Bhould be fairly stable across three years during peace time. 
This assumption is supported by the statistics presented in Appendix A.
After an "arduous" journey of file creation and variable 
construction, one would be very eager to see the result of the work.
What is the distribution of these variables? Will these variables 
predict the likelihood of first marriage reasonably well? To answer 
these questions, I now turn to Chapter Five.
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Notes for Chapter Four
1. This discussion is based on Aldrich and Nelson (1984: 48-49).
2. A.labor market is a set of relations between buyers and sellers of 
labor. Zt is a specific locale in which interactions between buyers and 
sellers of labor take place (Tolbert and Killian 1987: 2).
3. PersonB of ages 40 and 41 were also included because those aged 38 
or 39 who got first married in 1977 or 1978 have to be 40 or 41 years 
old in 1979 and early 1980.
4. The RANUNI function in SAS program was used to generate the random 
sub-sample.
5. These variables include density, marriage rates, and measures of 
local economy for 1975-1980.
6. Some think that statistically, there is a potential problem with 
attaching contextual variables with individual data. For instance, the 
N for labor market area level variables is 381, but it is no longer the 
same after these variables were merged with individual data and the 
distribution of these variables also have changed afterwards. Actually, 
it is not a problem that the N changes after the labor market area level 
data are merged with the individual level data. The N is no longer the 
same after the merging because the unit of observation has changed from 
labor market areas to individuals. The means for labor market area 
level variables in the merged data depend on the composition of 
individuals from each labor market area in the sample.
7. In the CO-STAT 3 the total marriages that took place in 1980 are not 
race specific. Neither is the base population with which the general 
marriage rate is calculated. In the PUMS-D there is no information on 
the number of marriages that took place in 1980. Therefore, it is not 
possible to calculate an annual marriage rate for 1980.
8. The data from both sources are based on the total countB. From NCHS 
marriage statistics are total counts of events gathered by collecting 
already summarized data reported by State offices of vital statistics 
and by county offices of registration. From the census, unmarried 
females 15 years and older are complete counts of females who were 
separated, or divorced, and widowed at the time of enumeration.
9. Before I aggregated county level data on marriage into labor market 
areas, three other small counties were also excluded from the 
computation of the general marriage rate in 1980 due to their missing 
values on marriage and other variables; Hindal, CO, with 408 population, 
Yellowstone, MT, with 275 population, and Loving, TX, with 91 
population. Still there were 8 counties with missing values on marriage 
for 1980. Because these counties have fairly large populations, it is
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important to keep them in the data set and estimate the total number of 
marriages that took place in 1980. The estimation for each of these 
counties was based on the marriages that took place in its 
geographically adjacent county, usually sharing a long boundary. The 
assumption is that the marriage rate is similar for two neighboring 
counties. The counties for which marriage rates have been estimated 
include: Breckinridge, Ky; Robertson, Ky; Carter, Ky; Lawrence, Ky; 
Martin, Kyj Letcher, Ky; Hart, Ky; Whitley, Ky.
10. For blacks, 27 labor market areas were estimated for their average 
age of first marriage for 1979, 9 for 1978, and 17 for 1977. The 
estimation was based on the mean age at first marriage of all labor 
market areas that do not have the problem of missing data.
11. For blacks, 6 labor market areas out of the 216 have missing values 
on black male part time income. X used the mean substitution to 
estimate black male part time income for the 6 labor market areas.
12. The data on employment and unemployment come from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. "The data for the civilian labor force are the product of a 
Federal-State cooperative program in which State employment security 
agencies prepare labor force and unemployment estimates under concepts, 
definitions, and technical procedure estimated by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics”. "The national unemployment statistics published monthly by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics are obtained from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), a Bureau of the Census Burvey of households. The size of 
the CPS is sufficiently large to obtain reliable annual average 
unemployment estimates for all States and the district of Columbia. 
County estimates, which are controlled to the CPS-based State totals, 
are derived through the use of statistics from State unemployment 
insurance operations, as well as adjustments based on data from the CPS, 
decennial census, and other sources" (CO-STAT 3 Code Book: VX-24).
13. "Unemployed persons are all civilians who had no employment during 
the survey week, were available for work, and 1) had made specific 
efforts to find employment sometime during the prior 4 weeks, or 2) were 
waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been laid off, or 3) 
were waiting to report to a new job within 30 days" (U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1983).
14. Based on the average black male unemployment rate (11.8 percent), I 
estimated the total number of black males unemployed for these three 
labor market areas with missing values on the data.
15. Data for land area come from U.S. Bureau of the Census. Land area 
measurements are shown to the nearest hundredth of a square mile.
16. The following discussion is based on Goldman et al. (1984: 7).
17. The cross-table was provided by the Natality, Marriage and Divorce 
Statistics Branch, Division of Vital statistics, National Center for 
Health Statistics.
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18. I constructed the age constraint based on the age patterns for all 
marriages rather than first marriages because no data available for age 
patterns for first marriages for either bride or groom, although data on 
first marriages for both partners were available. "All marriages” 
include higher order marriages, since age differences are larger for 
higher-order marriages than for first marriages, an upward bias may 
result from using the age pattern of all marriages. In other words my 
measure of marriage markets based on the age patterns of all marriages 
may exaggerate the pool of eligibles. However, a much more serious 
downward bias would result from using the age constraints based on first 
marriages. The effect would be to drastically reduce available pool for 
never married individuals by restricting them to marry partners who had 
never been married before. Since I am predicting the probability of 
first marriages for either bride groom, the upward bias is less of a 
problem.
19. I used the same age constraints for whites and blacks. I realized 
that the range of age differences between black couples may be different 
from that for white couples, but a review of the cross-tabulations of 
bride age by groom age for both races shows no substantial differences 
(Table 1-24, Marriage and Divorce, Vital Statistics, 1979).
20. Ideally, one would want to construct a marriage market for each 
single age. However, given the cumbersomeness and the coBt of such a
computation, grouping adjacent ages is a more economic way. Besides,
marital availability should not differ substantially within a 5-year 
interval.
21. The category 7 in the variable, "Relatl", identifies individuals 
who were partners or roommates of the household heads. I am aware that 
by excluding these cases I may have lost respondents who were actually 
roommates rather than partners of the household heads. This may be
particularly true for college students who share apartments. To
minimize this possible loss, I constrained the age of thoBe who were 
excluded from the calculation. That is that I eliminated only those 
older than 24 who identified themselves as partners or roommates of the 
household heads.
22. Unmarried persons 60 years of age and older were also excluded from 
the computation of the availability ratio because very few people 
between age 20 and 39 would marry partners age 60 and older.
CHAPTER FIVE
VARIABLE DISTRIBUTIONS AND RESULTS FROM POOLED MODELS
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I present 
the distribution of the variables and in the second part, I discuss the 
resultb from pooled models. At the end of the second part I address the 
issue of migration involved in the contextual analysis. For the sake of 
an orderly presentation of the results, I do not deal with race and sex 
interactions in thiB chapter. Race and sex differences will be 
addressed in Chapters Six and Seven.
I have speculated in chapter Three that the racial divergence in 
propensity for marriage are due to parallel racial differentials in 
social and economic resources. The discussion of the distribution of 
the variables attempts to support this argument. My speculation would 
prove reasonable if I find a substantial racial difference in the 
variables that have important bearings on the likelihood of marriage.
I have further argued for the importance of testing both 
individual and structural variables in a pooled model in order to better 
understand sources of racial differences in marriage. If racial 
differences in individual socioeconomic attributes and individual access 
to structural sources are accountable for racial variations in marriage, 
the negative effect of being black would be significantly reduced when 
both sets of variables are included in the model. Also, if the 
structural factors proposed in this research have a significant impact 
on individual propensity for marriage, the addition of these variables
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into the model should have a significant contribution to the prediction 
power of the model.
Distribution of Variables
Table 5-1 presents the distribution of individual variables by sex 
and race. The first major racial difference is the percent of persons 
who first married between 1977-1979. While the first marriage rate is 
23.3 (per 100 persons) for whites, it is only 15.2 for blacks. These 
differentials are translated into proportions, odds, and log-odds as 
follows:
All White Black W/B Diff
Prop .220 .233 .152 .081
Odds .282 .304 .179 .125
Log-oddB -1.266 -1.193 -1.716 .523
Odds are computed by dividing the total number of persons who 
first married by the total number of persons who were at risk of 
marriage but did not marry. Log-odds are obtained by taking the natural 
log of the odds. Odds ratioB are an alternative way to express the 
differences between groups and differences between one group and the 
mean. For instance, dividing the white odds by black odds gives an idea 
about how much more likely whites are to marry than are blacks: .304 / 
.179 = 1.70, which means that whites on average are 1.7 times as likely 
to marry as blacks are. Alternatively, the black to white odds ratio, 
.179 / .304 = .59, indicates that the occurrence of firBt marriage is 
only 60 percent as frequent for blacks as for whites1.
Table 5-1.
Distributions of Individual Level Variables 
by Sex and Race
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Variables All Male Female White Black
Demooraohic
First Marriage 22.00 21.36 22.81 23.28 15.23
(1977-79)
Age 24.83 24.95 24.67 24.72 25.40
Age20-24 58.68 56.93 60.98 59.73 53.16
Age25-29 26.29 27.61 24.55 25.94 28.13
Age30-34 10.39 10.74 9.94 10.05 12.19
Age35-39 4.64 4.72 4.53 4.28 6.51
Black 16.05 14.42 18.20
White 83.97 85.58 81.80
Male 56.79 57.90 51.01
Female 43.21 42.10 48.99
Education
Years of School 15.39 15.29 15.53 15.58 14.40
< High School 11.55 13.13 9.47 9.37 22.97
High School 32.96 33.99 31.62 31.97 38.14
Colllege 1-3 30.23 28.45 32.58 30.72 27.70
College 4+ 25.25 24.43 26.34 27.94 11.18
Enroll 22.40 21.27 23.88 23.33 17.51
Not Enroll 77.60 78.73 76.12 76.67 82.49
Occuoation
OccO 9.24 9.48 8.95 7.12 20.39
Occl 18.32 17.02 20.03 20.10 9.03
Occ2 41.69 28.13 59.52 41.98 40.17
Occ3 30.74 45.37 11.51 30.80 30.41
Work status
Full-Time 60.29 63.81 55.67 62.74 47.51
Part-Time 11.57 9.50 14.30 12.08 8.91
Unemployed 6.95 8.10 5.44 6.24 10.66
Not Working 21.19 18.60 24.59 18.94 32.92
Work75-79 93.07 94.17 91.61 95.05 82.71
Not Worked75-79 6.93 5.83 8.39 4.95 17.29
Income (in 5) 8099 9204 6647 8497 6015
Log of Income 8.04 8.22 7.81 8.22 7.11
Pubasst 4.25 2.31 6.80 2.76 12.04
No Pubasst 95.75 97.69 93.20 97.24 87.96
N 20283 11519 8764 17027 3256
Note
1. OccO: not in the labor force and unemployed; Occl:
professionals and managerial and administrative; 0cc2: technical, sales, 
and services; Occ3: agricultural and blue-collar jobs.
2. the N for the mean incomes (from all sources) includes non­
working population, age 20-39.
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Proportion, Odds, and Log-odds of FirBt Marriage 
by Age, Race, and Sex
White Black Difference
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
Proportion
20 0.058 0.069 0.039 0.065 0.019 0.004
21 0.144 0.191 0.081 0.091 0.063 0.100
22 0.239 0.309 0.132 0.176 0.107 0.133
23-26 0.291 0.346 0.213 0.161 0.078 0.185
27-28 0.273 0.293 0.217 0.155 0.056 0.138
29-30 0.235 0.250 0.234 0.132 0.001 0.118
31-41 0.204 0.151 0.170 0.141 0.034 0.010
Mean 0.245 0.275 0.180 0.153 0.065 0.122
Odds
20 0.062 0.074 0.041 0.070 1.51 1.06
21 0.168 0.236 0.088 0.100 1.91 2.36
22 0.314 0.447 0.152 0.214 2.06 2.09
23-26 0.410 0.529 0.271 0.192 1.51 2.76
27-28 0.376 0.414 0.277 0.183 1.36 2.26
29-30 0.307 0.333 0.305 0.154 1.01 2.16
31-41 0.256 0.178 0.205 0.164 1.25 1.09
Mean 0.325 0.379 0.220 0.181 1.48 2.09
Loo-odda
20 -2.788 -2.602 -3.204 -2.667 0.416 0.065
21 -1.782 -1.444 -2.429 -2.301 0.647 0.857
22 -1.158 -0.805 -1.883 -1.544 0.725 0.739
23-26 -0.891 -0.637 -1.307 -1.651 0.416 1.014
27-28 -0.981 -0.881 -1.283 -1.696 0.302 0.815
29-30 -1.180 -1.099 -1.186 -1.883 0.006 0.784
31-41 -1.361 -1.727 -1.586 -1.807 0.225 0.080
Mean -1.125 -0.969 -1.516 -1.711 0.391 0.742
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As shown in Table 5-la, age-specific differences in propensity for 
firBt marriage are even more pronounced between blacks and whites, as 
suggested by the figures in Table 5-la. Observe that for females the 
racial divergence in proportions for first marriage starts at age 21 and 
it increases sharply from then on. It drops at ages 27-28. The 
divergence is most pronounced for the age group 23-26 which are the 
primary ages for first marriage for both white males and females. For 
males the pattern of divergence is similar, except that black and white 
marriage rates start to converge earlier, at ages 29-30. However, one 
noticeable difference between male and female trends in divergence is 
that the black/white gap is much narrower for males of all ageB than for
femaleB, except for the ages of 20 and 31-41.
The differences in proportions are translated into white to black 
odds ratios which give a sense of how much likely are whites of a 
specific age group to marry relative to the black counterparts. At ages 
23-26, the odds ratio suggests that white females are 2.8 times as 
likely to marry as black females. The corresponding odds ratio for 
males suggests that white males are 1.5 times as likely to marry aB 
black males.
As shown in Table 5-1, the second racial gap lies in the 
socioeconomic attributes of individuals. Compared with whites, blacks, 
on average, have lower levels of education, occupation, and income2, and 
they are more likely to be unemployed, to be out of the labor force, and
to be on welfare. For instance, 27.9 percent of whites have college or
more education, only 11.2 percent of blacks have the same level of 
schooling. While 20.1 percent of whites have managerial and
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professional occupations, less than 10 percent of blacks have those 
occupations. Similarly, only 6.2 percent of whites were unemployed in 
1979, but about 11 percent of blacks were unemployed. While only about 
2.8 percent of whites received public welfare in 1979, four times as 
many blacks were on welfare.
Pertaining to sex differences, females have a higher rate of first 
marriage, but a lower rate of labor force participation than males.
They tend to have lower occupational status and lower incomes, and are 
more likely to be on welfare than males. The generally lower level of 
social resources that females have may make them desire marriage more 
than males as a means to enhance their life chances.
The top panel of Table 5-2 shows local centrality of marriage and 
local economy. Crude and general marriage rates and general divorce 
rates show a lot of variation across labor market areas and indicate 
that the taste for marriage differs by geographic areas. The local 
economy, measured in employment, also displays substantial variation 
across labor market areas. Employment growth among labor market areas 
between 1975 and 1979 ranged from 49 percent to only 0.2 percent. 
Population density as a measure of marriage market size also varies 
substantially across labor market areaB, ranging from a low of 207 
persons per square mile to a high of 10,079 persons per Bguare mile. If 
these variables indeed have an influence on the log-odds of first 
marriage, one should expect individuals' odds for first marriage to 
differ by the social context (labor market areas) in which they lived or 
worked during the period of 1977-1979.
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Distributions of Contextual Level Variables
Variables Mean ST.D Min Max N
(Source: CO-STAT 3)
Crude Marriage Rate
(1979) 11.29 8.15 5.03 135.61 381
Crude Divorce Rate
(1980) 5.44 1.75 .79 15.82 381
General Marriage Rate
(1980) 72.84 57.24 23.87 869.58 381
General Divorce Rate
(1980) 22.84 7.21 3.83 67.80 381
Population Density 775.27 947.30 207.21 10079.09 381
Local Employment
(1975-79) 17.38 7.58 0.20 48.98 381
White (Source:PUMS-D)
Mean Age of First
Marriage 1977-1979 22.55 1.09 19.90 27.97 381
Current Marriage Rate 628.52 38.14 514.26 728.97 381
Illegitimacy Rate 17.11 8.78 0.00 58.61 381
% Female Headed Hds 9.84 1.93 2.48 16.04 381
% on Welfare 3.64 1.40 1.22 8.78 381
Male Unemployment Rate 6.17 3.03 0.98 19.92 381
Sex Differences
in Earnings(in $) 8142.66 1444.23 3795.49 13111.88 381
Female in Labor Force 47.16 5.17 27.66 60.16 381
Black (Source:PUMS-D)
Mean Age of First
Marriage 1977-1979 24.86 2.82 20.00 39.83 216
Current Marriage Rate 406.53 47.34 219.05 558.14 216
Illegitimacy Rate 145.60 47.37 13.51 333.33 216
% Female Headed Hds 35.15 6.91 15.00 54.44 216
% on Welfare 11.78 4.14 2.33 28.92 216
Male Unemployment Rate 11.29 5.86 1.70 35.42 216
Sex Differences
in Earnings (in $) 3604.03 2070.04 -1626.48 21774.58 216
Female in Labor Force 52.48 7.65 30.77 76.00 216
Note
1. N denotes the number of labor market areas. Alaska was 
excluded from the analysis and for blacks, only 216 labor market areas 
were selected that had 10,000 or more black population in 1979.
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The middle and bottom panels of the table show the distribution of 
other contextual variable by race. Two racial differences are apparent. 
First, compared with whites, blacks tend be more likely to live in the 
social environment where current marriage rates are low, but age at 
first marriage, illegitimate rate, and percent of female-headed 
households, and male unemployment rates are high. These factors may 
exert negative influences on blacks' desirability for marriage.
The most pronounced racial differentials are in the illegitimacy 
rate, female headed households, proportions of persons on welfare, and 
sex differences in earnings. While only 17 white females out of 1,000 
had non-marital births, 145 black females out of 1,000 had children out 
of wedlock. The latter is 8.5 times as great as the former. Similarly, 
the percent of female-headed households and the percent of population on 
welfare are three times as high for blacks as for whites. Sex 
differences in wages among whites are more than twice as large as among 
blacks, and the rate of female labor force participation is higher among 
blackB than among whites.
Note that one labor market area has a large maximum value in sex 
differences in earnings for blacks. This labor market area includes 
four counties in Kentucky. There are only 16 blacks from this labor 
market area in the full sample and there is no black from this labor 
market area in the sub-sample. Since the analysis is based on the sub- 
Bample, the outlier has no effect on the results.
The second major racial difference at the contextual level is in 
the variations of these variables across labor market areas. This is 
especially true with mean age at first marriage, current marriage rates,
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sex differences in earnings, and female labor force participation. 
Statistically, it could be that the larger the mean value is, the more 
fluctuations there are in the distribution.
Table 5-3 displays the distributions of marital availability 
ratios by race, sex, and age. An availability ratio of 1.00 indicates a 
balanced marriage market in the labor market area. A ratio above 1.00 
or below 1.00 indicates an imbalanced marriage market; while a ratio 
above 1.00 means a favorable market, a ratio below 1.00 means a poor 
market.
For white males, the availability ratios indicate a generally 
favorable marriage market. White males of ages 30-34 have the largest 
pool of available partners. For white females, the marriage market is 
the most favorable for those between 20 and 24 years of age. But, the 
marital pool begins to shrink at ageB 25-29. It begins to be imbalanced 
for those aged 30 and it becomes worse for those aged 35 to 39.
The availability ratioB show a much more severe imbalance among 
blacks. The ratios are much higher for black maleB than for white 
males. Beginning from ages 20-24, for every 100 black men there are 139 
black females available, age wise, in a labor market area. The pool of 
eligibles for black males improves with age. Between ages 35-39, for 
very 100 black men there are 172 black females available for marriage in 
a labor market area. For black females, however, the marriage market 
shows a totally different picture. The market is the most favorable for 
black females between ages 20 and 24 and it starts to decline 
drastically from age 25 on. Black women aged 35-39 face the worBt 
market; for 100 black females there are only 64 black males available in
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Table 5-3.
Distributions of Availability Ratio1 
by Race, Sex, and Age
Mean ST.D Min Max N2
White
20-24
Hale
1.08 0.18 0.36 1.81 381
25-29 1.01 0.18 0.38 1.70 381
30-34 1.10 0.20 0.43 2.04 381
35-39 1.07 0.22 0.44 2.24 381
White
20-24
Female
1.44 0.31 0.90 4.08 381
25-29 1.02 0.21 0.54 2.16 381
30-34 0.95 0.20 0.49 1.73 381
35-39 0.80 0.19 0.37 1.54 381
Black
20-24
Male
1.39 0.48 0.23 3.44 216
25-29 1.45 0.49 0.24 2.80 216
30-34 1.68 0.59 0.21 3.67 216
35-39 1.72 0.62 0.21 4.39 216
Black
20-24
Female
1.33 0.79 0.47 7.04 216
25-29 0.89 0.44 0.25 4.10 216
30-34 0.79 0.36 0.19 3.29 216
35-39 0.64 0.32 0.06 3.29 216
Note
1. The ratios were calculated at labor market level, based on
unmarried and non-cohabiting population aged 16 and older.
2. Alaska labor market area was excluded from the data for all
population. For blacks, only 216 labor market areas that had 100 or
more black population in the Bample were selected for the computation.
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a labor market area. The extreme Imbalance in the marriage market 
among blacke is strongly consistent with black sex ratio imbalances 
found in the literature3 (Cox 1940; Guttentag and Secord 1983; Spanier 
and Glick 1980; Goldman et al. 1984).
Overall, the marriage market generally improves with increases in 
age for maleB, particularly for black males, but it declines with age 
for females, especially for older and black females. Consequently, 
black women face the worst marriage market among all sub-groups under 
study.
Table 5-4 displays the availability ratios by race, sex, age, and 
education. The ratios in the top panel indicate that the marriage 
market is imbalanced against whites who did not complete their high 
Bchool degree. For blacks who have less than high school education, the 
marriage market is favorable for males, but unfavorable for females aged 
25 and older. The ratios in the middle panel of the table show that 
persons with high school education face a much better marriage market, 
particularly for males. However, white females aged 35-39 and black 
females aged 30-39 with high school education still face an unfavorable 
market. The figures in the bottom panel of the table demonstrate that 
persons with 15 or more years of schooling face a better market than 
those who did not graduate from high school, but still they face a worse 
market than high school graduates. White males aged 30-34 and females 
aged 20-24 face a balanced and favorable marriage market. Black males 
of all age groupB have the best market among all sub-groupB.
In sum, the availability ratios suggest that in terms of 
educational groups, persons with high school education have the most
Table 5-4.
Distributions of Availability Ratios1 
by Race, Sex, Age, and Education
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Mean ST.D Min Max N2
Less Than Hioh School
White Male
20-24 0.78 0.18 0.27 1.56 381
25-29 0.55 0.15 0.12 1.35 381
30-34 0.62 0.18 0.14 1.56 381
35-39 0.68 0.22 0.17 1.93 381
White Female
20-24 0.90 0.30 0.35 3.45 381
25-29 0.60 0.19 0.23 1.63 381
30-34 0.61 0.19 0.19 1.23 381
35-39 0.57 0.19 0.21 1.53 381
Black Male
20-24 1.14 0.47 0.14 3.27 216
25-29 1.05 0.43 0.04 2.61 216
30-34 1.26 0.54 0.17 3.03 216
35-39 1.37 0.59 0.16 3.77 216
Black Female
20-24 1.08 0.74 0.19 6.26 216
25-29 0.70 0.39 0.10 3.28 216
30-34 0.66 0.36 0.13 3.83 216
35-39 0.58 0.35 0.06 3.89 216
Hiah School
White Male
20-24 1.28 0.22 0.39 2.14 381
25-29 1.14 0.21 0.40 2.09 381
30-34 1.26 0.25 0.47 2.71 381
35-39 1.24 0.28 0.48 3.09 381
White Female
20-24 1.69 0.35 1.07 4.40 381
25-29 1.18 0.24 0.64 2.38 381
30-34 1.10 0.24 0.51 2.05 381
35-39 0.94 0.22 0.46 1.74 381
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Distributions of Availability Ratios 
by Race, Sex, Age, and Education
Mean ST.D Min Max N
Black
20-24
Male
1.67
Hiah school 
0.58 0.24 4.07 216
25-29 1.73 0.58 0.25 3.17 216
30-34 2.01 0.70 0.23 4.36 216
35-39 2.07 0.74 0.22 5.31 216
Black
20-24
Female
1.59 0.90 0.54 7.35 216
25-29 1.07 0.51 0.31 4.29 216
30-34 0.95 0.44 0.20 4.47 216
35-39 0.78 0.40 0.06 4.52 216
White
20-24
Male
0.86
Colleae+
0.17 0.28 1.42 381
25-29 0.97 0.19 0.35 1.50 381
30-34 1.03 0.20 0.39 1.68 381
35-39 0.96 0.20 0.40 1.80 381
White
20-24
Female
1.38 0.29 0.68 3.64 381
25-29 0.95 0.21 0.43 2.02 381
30-34 0.82 0.20 0.31 1.50 381
35-39 0.64 0.17 0.15 1.24 381
Black
20-24
Male
1.26 0.58 0.11 3.73 216
25-29 1.27 0.44 0.25 2.88 216
30-34 1.41 0.51 0.14 3.67 216
35-39 1.36 0.51 0.14 3.97 216
Black
20-24
Female
1.11 0.73 0.31 6.51 216
25-29 0.73 0.44 0.20 4.05 216
30-34 0.59 0.32 0.10 4.46 216
35-39 0.42 0.25 0.00 2.12 216
Note
1. The ratios were calculated at labor market level, based on 
unmarried and non-cohabiting population aged 16 and older.
2. Alaska labor market area was excluded from the data for all 
population. For blacks, only 216 labor market areas that had 100 or 
more black population in the sample were selected for the computation.
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favorable marriage market and those who did not complete high school 
face the worst market. However, in terms of combinations of race, sex, 
age, and education, black females of 30 years of age and older with some 
college and higher education face the worst market among sub-groups.
Table 5-5 showB the distribution of the number of suitables by 
race, sex, age and education. The patterns are consistent with those 
found in the availability ratios. The number of suitable partners is 
highest for high school graduates and lowest for the leBB than the high 
Bchool category. The size of the marriage market decreases as one 
advances in age, particularly for black females. Note that the 
variation in the number of suitables is very substantial across labor 
market areaB. This has to do with the population size of the labor 
market areas.
Table 5-6 displays male to female comparative ratios by race, sex, 
age, and education. The comparative ratios give a general sense of how 
one sex fares in the marriage market relative to the other. The 
comparative ratio is obtained by dividing male availability ratios by 
female ratios. A comparative ratio below one indicates a favorable 
market for females, and a comparative ratio above one means a favorable 
market for males. For white females with less than high school and high 
school education, the marriage market begins to decline at age 30. For 
white females with some college or college level of education, market 
begins to decline gradually at age 25. For black females, the marriage 
market starts to decline for all educational groups at age 20-25, 
especially for the college category.
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Table 5-5.
Distributions of Number of Suitables 
By Race, Sex, Age, and Education
Mean ST.D Min Max N
White
20-24
Male
192
Less Than 
340
Hiah School 
14 3423 381
25-29 131 246 8 2470 381
30-34 126 245 6 2504 381
35-39 112 220 5 2357 381
White
20-24
Female
180 307 11 3245 381
25-29 116 209 5 2191 381
30-34 101 184 3 1937 381
35-39 84 154 3 1602 381
Black
20-24
Male
84 159 3 1460 216
25-29 74 145 1 1333 216
30-34 81 164 1 1556 216
35-39 78 165 1 1634 216
Black
20-24
Female
75 133 3 1138 216
25-29 55 103 1 891 216
30-34 51 99 1 901 216
35-39 44 92 1 1249 216
White
20-24
Male
319
HiaiL
595
School
21 5920 381
25-29 282 557 17 5769 381
30-34 282 579 17 6165 381
35-39 238 511 10 5559 381
White
20-24
Female
356 669 18 6911 381
25-29 260 533 12 5604 381
30-34 222 474 11 5097 381
35-39 174 383 5 4196 381
Black
20-24
Male
121 234 4 2147 216
25-29 121 244 4 2211 216
30-34 130 274 3 2546 216
35-39 122 267 3 2554 216
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Distributions of Number of Suitables 
By Race, Sex, Age, and Education
Mean ST.D Min Max N
Hiah School
Black Female
20-24 109 201 6 1758 216
25-29 83 164 4 1437 216
30-34 75 156 3 1402 216
35-39 63 137 1 1249 216
Colleae+
White Male
20-24 236 457 13 4657 381
25-29 255 505 14 5198 381
30-34 252 520 13 5466 381
35-39 208 452 8 4819 381
White Female
20-24 310 590 17 5899 381
25-29 229 476 12 4900 381
30-34 191 419 9 4444 381
35-39 142 329 2 3648 381
Black Male
20-24 86 162 2 1404 216
25-29 94 190 4 1670 216
30-34 99 211 1 1900 216
35-39 89 200 1 1851 216
Black Female
20-24 78 146 5 1258 216
25-29 60 122 2 1060 216
30-34 52 113 1 1020 216
35-39 39 94 0 848 216
Table 5-6.
Kale to Female Comparative Ratios 
by Age, Race, and Education
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Age White Black
Less Than Hiah School
20-24 0.87 1.06
25-29 0.92 1.50
30-34 1.02 1.91
35-39 1.19 2.36
High School
20-24 0.76 1.05
25-29 0.97 1.62
30-34 1.15 2.12
35-39 1.32 2.65
College-*-
20-24 0.62 1.14
25-29 1.02 1.74
30-34 1.26 2.39
35-39 1.50 3.24
Note
The ratio = male availability ratio / female availability ratio.
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Table 5-7 shows the overall distribution of the availability 
ratios for the sub-sample which includes 8 percent of the original full 
Bample. The distribution was obtained after the marriage market 
variables were attached to the individual data. The "eligible” denotes 
the number of suitable partners in a labor market area, "AR (age)" 
denotes the availability ratios with age controlled at a labor market 
area, and "AR (age&ed) denotes the availability ratios with both age and 
education controlled. The general patterns show consistency with the 
distributions discussed above, except that white females, on average, 
have a better market than white males. Younger females face a favorable 
market, and that pulls up the average for all females. Once again, 
black females, on average, have the worst marriage market among all 
Bub-groupB.
Thus far the distributions of the independent variables showB a 
strong consistency with theoretical expectations pertaining to 
black/white differences in marriage. Blacks tend to be high on 
variables that have negative influences on the propensity for marriage 
but low on social and economic resources that facilitate marriage. To 
empirically test whether these variables explain the racial gap in the 
propensity for marriage, a multi-variate analysis is in order.
Results From A Pooled Model
Table 5-8 displays the maximum likelihood estimates for the 
influence of individual attributes on the log-odds of first marriage 
1977-1979. All demographic variables have strong effects on the log- 
odds of first marriage. The classic curvilinear relationship between
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Table 5-7.
Distributions of Local Marriage Market at Individual Level
Variable Mean
by Race and Sex 
ST.D Min Max
£11
Eligible 1133 1453 2 6911
AR (age) 1.15 0.27 0.23 5.86
AR (age&ed) 1.07 0.30 0.11 5.56
White Male
Eligible 1179 1435 8 6165
AR (age) 1.07 0.13 0.36 2.19
AR (age&ed) 0.97 0.17 0.27 3.06
White Female
Eligible 1408 1651 12 6911
AR (age) 1.24 0.27 0.42 4.06
AR (age&ed) 1.20 0.30 0.32 4.38
Black Male
Eligible 435.29 477 2 2546
AR (age) 1.49 0.32 0.23 3.44
AR (age&ed) 1.32 0.35 0.11 3.19
Black Female
Eligible 339 358 3 1758
AR (age) 0.95 0.37 0.30 5.88
AR (age&ed) 0.79 0.38 0.12 5.56
N
20283
20283
20283
9858
9858
9858
7169
7169
7169
1661
1661
1661
1595
1595
1595
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age and the propensity for first marriage receives a strong confirmation 
from this analysis. The likelihood of first marriage increases with 
increments in age but decreases as one passes the primary ages for first 
marriage (See Figure 4-1 in Chapter Four). Being black has a 
significant negative effect on the log-odds of first marriage, and 
females tend to have higher log-odds of first marriage than males.
A negative logit coefficient corresponds to a lower chance that 
a respondent makes a response "1” on the dependent variable, namely the 
chance of getting married in this instance. Although the logit model is 
formulated as the log of the odds, and the parameter estimates refer to 
the log scale, it may be easier to understand numbers expressed as odds 
or probabilities than as log-odds. The antilogs of the parameter 
estimates are multiplicative effects on the odds scale (Agresti and 
Finlay 1986: 489). For example, the effect of being black is obtained 
by taking the exponential of the logit coefficient, -.54 (see panel A in 
Table 5-8),
gXblack _ e -.54 = .5 8 2 7, (5.1)
which means that first marriage is only about 60 percent as frequent for 
blacks as for whites. In terms of socioeconomic attributes, unemployed 
and non-working persons have lower log-oddB, but blue collar workers 
tend to have higher log-odds of first marriage than people with 
managerial and professional occupations (the reference group). Persons 
engaged in technical, saleB, and service occupations are not 
significantly different from the reference group.
Table 5-8.
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes
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Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Log! t S.E.
Constant
Demographic
Age
Agesq
Uhi te
Black
Male
Female
Occupation
OccO
Oce1
0cc2
0cc3
Education 
< High School 
High School 
College 1-3 
Col lege 4+
Enroll 
Not Enroll
Log of income 
Pubasst 
No pubasst
Uork Status 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Not Worked 75-79 
Worked 75-79
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
-13.13** 0.62
0.87** 0.05 
- 0 . 02** 0.00
-0.54** 0.05
0.21** 0.04
-0.27** 0.08
-0.05 0.05
0.19** 0.05
20283
603.35
7
20765.48
■11.47** 0.65
0.77** 0.05 
-0 .01** 0 .00
-0.50** 0.05
0.19** 0.04
-0.14* 0.06
-0.08 0.05
-0.16** 0.05 
-0.89** 0.06
0.02** 0.01 
-1.06** 0.12
-0.25** 0.06
-0.28** 0.08
0.05 0.06
20283
1074.68
13
20294.14
-12.00** 0.65
0.78** 0.05 
-0 .01** 0 .0 0
-0.50** 0.05
0.19** 0.04
-0.12* 0.06
-0.08* 0.05
-0.17** 0.05 
•0.90** 0.06
0.01 0.06 
-0.90** 0.12
0.57** 0.11
20283
1073.01
11
20295.82
Note
1. ** : P < 0.05; * : P i 0.10.
2. OccO: not in labor force and unemployed; Occl: professionals and managerial and administrative; 
Occ2: technical, sales, and services; 0cc3: agricultural and blue collar jobs.
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In separate models (A, B, and C) I tested the effects of other 
socioeconomic attributes of individuals on the likelihood of first 
marriage. I ran separate models to test the effects of education, work 
status, and income on first marriage because of a high multicollinearity 
between occupation, educational, and work status. Observe that an 
individual's educational attainment, income, work status, and welfare 
status have an influence on his/her log-odds of firBt marriage.
Compared with persons with high school education, high school drop-outs 
and those with college and higher education have significantly lower 
log-odds of first marriage. Those who have some college but did not 
complete college are not different from the reference group.
Two things seem to be operating in the negative relationship 
between longer schooling and marriage. First, persons pursuing higher 
than average education tend to delay marriage. Second, as a result of 
delaying marriage, these persons face a shrinking pool of suitable and 
available partners. Nonetheless, one must note that those who did not 
complete high school also tend to have lower log-oddB of first marriage. 
This could be due to their reduced marriageability.
Being enrolled in school strongly decreases one's log-odds of 
first marriage. While a high level of income increases one's log-odds 
of first marriage, being dependent on public assistance reduces one's 
chances for marriage.
Work status was tested in a separate model due to its high 
multicollinearity with occupation. Contrasted with full-time workers, 
part-time workerB and unemployed persons are less likely to marry. 
However, the effect of work status may be different for males than for
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females. For instance, females working full-time may be less likely to 
be married than females working part-time. I will address the sex 
interaction issues in the next chapters for an orderly presentation of 
the results.
One concern arose that by looking at a person's work statuB in 
1979 I may have missed information on females who had worked before 1979 
but stopped working after they got married in 1977 or in 1978. To 
supplement information on a persons' work status prior to 1979, I also 
tested the variable, whether a person had worked since 1975. The 
results indicate that this variable has an important effect on hiB/her 
chances for first marriage in 1977-1979. Those who had worked since 
1975 were more likely to marry than those who had not worked since then.
Table 5-9 shows a refined model with a different specification of 
the curvilinear relationship between age and the log-odds of first 
marriage. Based on the graphical shape of the age effect on the 
dependent variable (See Figure 4-1 in Chapter Four), I included in the 
model 7 age parameters: Age 20, Age 21, Age 22, Age 23-26, Age 27-28,
Age 29-30, and Age 31-41. Age 23-26 is the reference category because 
the probability of first marriage peaks during these ages. The 
probability of first marriage increases rapidly from age 20 and it peaks 
at ages 23-26. It begins to decline in late 30s and declines more 
rapidly after age 30. Thus, a different specification shows how 
propensity for marriage varies with age groups relative to the reference 
group.
In a separate but similar model, I tested work status since 1975 
with the modified age parameters. I tested this variable in a separate
Table 5*9. 1 3 8
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes with Respecification of Age
Variables___________________________ Logit S.E.______________ Logit S.E.
A B
Constant -0.80** 0.10 -1.12** 0.10
Demooraohic
Age20 -1.73** 0.09 -1.75** 0.09
Age21 -0.73** 0.06 -0.75** 0.06
Age22 -0.16** 0.05 -0.18** 0.05
Age23-26 ----- ..... ..... .....
Age27-28 -0.16** 0.06 -0.14** 0.06
Age29-30 -0.34** 0.07 -0.32** 0.07
Age31+ -0.69** 0.06 -0.65** 0.06
White --- --- --- ---
Black -0.51** 0.05 -0.51** 0.05
Male ..... ..... ..... .....
Female 0.19** 0.04 0.19** 0.04
Education
< High school -0.15** 0.06 -0.13** 0.06
High School --- --- --- ---
College 1-3 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.05
Col lege 4+ •0.21** 0.05 -0.21** 0.05
Not enroll --- --- --- ---
Enrol I ■0.82** 0.06 -0.83** 0.06
Log of income 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01
No Pubasst ..... .....
Pubasst -1.06** 0.12 -0.90** 0.12
Uork Status
Full-time ..... .....
Part-time -0.23** 0.06
Unemployed -0.28** 0.03
Not Working 0.07 0.06
Not Work 75-80 .....
Worked 75-80 0.56** 0.11
N 20283 20283
Model Chi-Sq 1452.42 1449.64
D.F. 17 15
-2 Log 19916.79 19919.19
Note
**: P < 0.05; * : P < 0.10
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model due to a high correlation between work statue in 1979 and work 
Btatus since 1975. About 65 percent o£ those who had worked since 1975 
worked full-time, 12 percent worked part-time, 16 percent dropped out of 
the labor force, and about 7 percent were unemployed in 1979. Although 
the improvement in Model B is about as good as the other model, the 
former is preferred to the latter because "Work75-80n seems to be 
masking the effect of income on the dependent variable when both are 
included in the model. I realize, however, that the work status 
variable for 1979 does not reflect the work status of females, 
particularly females who first married during 1977-1979 and had worked 
prior 1979 but did not work in 19794.
In the following step I introduced structural variables into the 
model. Each set of structural factors was tested one at a time in order 
to get a sense of how each of the structural factors influences the 
dependent variable in conjunction with individual demographic and 
socioeconomic variables. The occupation variable was dropped out of the 
model because it is highly correlated with education, income, and work 
status. Moreover, it mainly duplicates information on other 
socioeconomic attributes already included in the model. The work status 
variable between 1975-1979 was excluded from the model for the reason 
discussed above.
The results in Table 5-10 demonstrate that local centrality of 
marriage measured by general marriage rates and average age of first 
marriage during 1977-1979 have significant influences on the individual 
log-odds of first marriage during thiB period5 net of individual 
socioeconomic attributes. As expected, the marriage rate in a labor
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market area Is positively, although only moderately, related to 
individual likelihood of marriage. A high average age at first marriage 
is negatively and strongly relates to the log-odds of getting married. 
The other measures of centrality of marriage (female-headed households, 
illegitimacy) were not included in this model because they are very 
highly correlated with the race variable; to include them all in the
i
same model will cause serious multicollinearity which would make it 
difficult to interpret the estimates of the parameters. The following 
chapter addresses the importance of these two variables regarding to
racial differences in marriage. Percent female in the work force in the
labor market area decreases the log-odds of first marriage (see the 
second model in Table 5-10).
Observe that the impact of being black has decreased going from 
Model A to Model B in Table 5-10: -0.51 versus -0.30. The difference
between two models is the addition of marriage rates and the mean age of
marriage in the latter model. This suggests that the general marriage 
rate and average age of first marriage explain part of the racial 
difference in the log-odds of fist marriage. Substantively speaking, 
blacks are more likely than whites to live the social environment where 
the centrality is relatively low; e.g., people marry less and marry 
late. As a result, blacks have lower propensity than whiteB to marry.
Table 5-11 presents three models in which I tested the effects of 
local marriage markets and local economy on the log-odds of first 
marriage net of the influence of individual demographic and 
socioeconomic attributes. Two measures of local marriage markets were 
tested in separate models due to a high correlation between them.
Table 5-10.
Propensity for First Harriage <1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes, Local Centrality of Marriage 
and Female Labor Force Participation
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Variables Individual
Variables
Centrality of Marriage Female Independence
logit S.E. logit LOGIT S.E. logit LOGIT S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20
Age21
Age22
Age23*26
Age27-28
Age29-30
Age31-41
Female
Male
Black
Wh i te
Socioeconomic 
< High School 
High school 
College 1-3 
College 4+
Enrol I
Not Enrolled
Full-time
Part-time
Unemployed
Hot in Labor F.
Income 
Pubasst 
No Pubasst
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar.
Female Independence 
Female Labor F. Partici|
N
Model Chi-Sq 
O.F.
- 2 Log L
-0.80** 0.10 2.04 0.36 - 0.10 0.20
-1.73** 0.09 -1.75** -0.14 0.09 -1.73** -0.13 0.09
-0.73** 0.06 -0.75** -0.08 0.06 -0.73** -0.08 0.06
-0.16** 0.05 -0.17** -0.02 0.05 -0.16** -0.02 0.05
-0.16** 0.06 -0.14** -0.01 0.06 -0.16** •0.02 0.06
-0.34** 0.07 -0.32** -0.03 0.07 -0.34** -0.03 0.07
-0.69** 0.06 -0.66** -0.07 0.06 -0.69** -0.08 0.06
0.19** 0.04 0.20** 0.04 0.04 0.19** 0.04 0.04
-0.51** 0.05 -0.30** -0.03 0.06 -0.45** -0.05 0.06
-0.15** 0.06 -0.17** -0.02 0.06 -0.16** •0.01 0.06
-0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.05
-0.21** 0.05 -0.19** -0.03 0.05 -0.20** -0.03 0.05
-0.82** 0.06 -0.82** •0.09 0.06 -0.82** -0.09 0.06
-0.23** 0.06 -0.22** •0.02 0.06 -0.24** -0.02 0.06
-0.28** 0.08 -0.28** -0.02 0.08 -0.30** •0.03 0.08
0.07 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06
0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01
-1.06** 0.12 -1.06** -0.06 0.12 -1.06** -0.06 0.12
0.001* 0.01 0.00
-0.12** -0.06 0.01
it ion -0.01** -0.03 0.003
20283 20283 20283
1452.42
17
19916.79
1539.13
19
19829.69
1467.55
18
19901.27
Note
1. ** : P < 0 05; * : P < 0.10
2. The logit columns are unstandardized and the LOGIT colums are standardized coefficients.
Standardized logit coefficients were presented in parenthesis which 
allow a comparison of the strength of parameters within the same model6. 
The estimates in model A demonstrate that the local marriage market as 
indicated by an availability ratio in terms of age has a strong and 
positive effect on individual chances to marry. While population 
density (as a measure of local marriage market size) has no significant 
effect on the dependent variable, the number of eligible partners in 
terms of age has a negative effect on the log-odds for marriage7. 
Unexpectedly, the sign of both measures of the scale effect of the local 
marriage market is negative. This appears to suggest that the larger 
the marriage market is, the lower log-odds of marriage a person has.
Such an inverse relationship seems to be contradictory with marriage 
market theory. However, if one thinks of the two variables as measures 
of urbanity rather than the size of marriage markets, the results make a 
good sense. Urbanization as an indicator of modernization tends to 
decrease the centrality of marriage because it weakens the importance of 
traditionalism. Since a marriage involves two partners, a better 
measure of marriage markets should be the ratio of eligibles of one sex 
to eligibles of the opposite sex.
From Model A to Models B and C, one change is noteworthy. Being 
in the category of age 27-28 has a significantly lower log-odds of 
marriage than being in the category of age 23-26 in the previous model, 
but the significance disappears in the present model when the marriage 
market is controlled for. This suggests that the negative effect of 
being classified in age 27-28 is due to an unfavorable marriage market 
for this group.
Table 5-11.
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes, Local Marriage Market and Local Economy
Individual Marriage Market Marriage Market Local Economy
Variables (Age) (Age & Educ)
Variables logit S.E. logit LOGIT S.E. logit LOGIT S.E. logit LOGIT S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES A B C D
Constant -0.80** 0.10 -1.64** 0.13 -2.55** 0.13 -0.93** 0.11
Age20 -1.73** 0.09 -1.79** -0.14 0.09 -1.78** -0.14 0.09 -1.73** -0.13 0.09
Age21 -0.73** 0.06 -0.78** -0.08 0.06 -0.81** -0.09 0.06 -0.73** -0.08 0.06
Age22 -0.16** 0.05 -0.20** -0.02 0.05 -0.20** -0.02 0.06 -0.16** -0.02 0.05
Age27-E8 -0.16** 0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.16** -0.02 0.06
Age29-30 -0.34** 0,07 -0.26** -0.02 0.07 -0.24** -0.02 0.07 -0.34** -0.03 0.07
Age31-41 -0.69** 0.06 -0.62** -0.07 0.06 -0.60** -0.07 0.06 -0.69** -0.08 0.06
Female 0.19** 0.04 0.14** 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.19** 0.04 0.04
Black -0.51** 0.05 -0.67** -0.08 0.06 -0.75** -0.08 0.06 -0.51** -0.06 0.05
< High school -0.15** 0.06 -0.18* -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.07 -0.16* -0.01 0.06
College 1-3 -0.07 0.05 -0.08* -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05 •0.08 -0.01 0.05
College 4+ -0.21** 0.05 -0.22** -0.03 0.05 -0.09* -0.01 0.05 -0.22** -0.03 0.05
Enroll -0.82** 0.06 -0.82** -0.09 0.06 -0.81** -0.09 0.06 -0.82** -0.09 0.06
Part-time -0.23** 0.06 -0.25** -0.03 0.06 -0.28** -0.03 0.07 -0.24** -0.02 0.06
Unemployed -0.28** 0.08 -0.30?* -0.02 0.08 -0.30** -0.03 0.08 -0.27** -0.02 0.08
Not in labor F. 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.06
Income 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01
Pubasst -1.06** 0.12 -0.99** 0.05 0.13 -0.92** -0.05 0.13 -1.06** -0.06 0.12
CONTEXTUAL VAR.
Marriage Market
Density -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00** -0.01 0.00 --- --- .....
Number of Eligibles -0.00** -0.03 0.00 -0.00** -0.04 0.00 .... .... ....
Availability (Age) 0.82** 0.08 0.07 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • 1 • .... .... .... ....
AvallabiIity(AgeSED) 1.74** 0.17 0.07 .... .... ....
Local Economy 0.01** 0.02 0.00
N 20283 20283 20283 20283
Model Chi-Sq 1452.42 1601.49 2191.23 1465.27
D.F. 17 20 20 18
- 2 Log L 19916.79 19767.33 19177.60 19903.56
Note
1. **: P < 0.05, *: P < 0.10
2. The logit columns are unstandardized and the LOGIT columns are standardized logits.
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Model C in Table 5-11 shows the effect of the local marriage 
market (with both age and education controlled) on the log-odds of first 
marriage. The availability ratio has an enormous impact on the 
individual log-odds of first marriage and itB impact is the strongest of 
all variables in the model (see the standardized coefficients under 
LOGIT). It could be that the second measure of marriage markets 
reflects part of the positive effect of education on the odds of 
marriage (see the change in the parameters for education from B to C). 
Since educational attainment is translated into socioeconomic resources, 
I would expect that the more education a person has, the more attractive 
he/she becomes in the marriage market.
To better understand the magnitude of the impact of continuous 
variables on the dependent variable, I briefly discuss the 
interpretations of the logit coefficients for these variables. Recall 
that the baBic logistic regression model takes this form (see Chapter 
Four)j
log [p/(l -p)] = Xo + XX. (5.2)
P / (1 -P ) = e_ „xo + xx _= e*(e*)x \ X# (5.3)
Equation (5.3) is obtained by taking antilogs of both sides of Equation 
(5.1). The right side of Equation (5.3) implies that every unit 
increase in X variables produces a multiplicative effect of e* on the 
odds which are expressed on the left side of the equation (Agresti and
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Finlay 1986: 485-486). Thus for every one increment in the availability 
ratio, the estimated odds of getting married is:
p / ( 1 - P) = e '2‘55 + 1-w  «= .46, (5.4)
where, the first exponential term is the intercept and the second is the 
logit for the availability ratio (age&ed). Taking the exponential of 
the logit coefficient for the availability ratio gives the 
multiplicative effect on the log-odds of getting married for every unit 
of increase in the ratio. Thus, the equation:
gives the rate of change of in the odds of marriage for one unit of 
increase in the ratio. Note that one whole unit of increase in a 
male/female availability ratio means an increase of 100 male eligible 
partners in a labor market area with the number of female partners 
unchanged. For instance, the availability ratio of 1 indicates that for 
every 100 females there are 100 males in the market. When the ratio 
increases from 1 to 2, or increases by 1 unit, it means that for every 
100 females there are 200 males available in a locale. To get the 
effect for an increase of 1 potential partner in the labor market area, 
one simply applies a unit of 0.01 to the multiplier:
e 1.75(1> =  5 > 7 6 (5.5)
e1.75(0.01) = e0.017S = i.02 (5.6)
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Observe that several changes have occurred in the estimates of 
individual variables from Model A to Model C in Table 5-11. First, 
femaleB no longer have higher log-odds of marriage than males in the 
present model. It might be that females on average tend to have a 
better marriage market than males (as a result of a better marriage 
market for younger white females). This may be contributing to the 
higher log-odds of marriage that females have. Once, the marriage 
market is held constant, females no longer significantly differ from 
males in log-odds of marriage.
Second, the effect of being black has increased from Model A to 
Model C. The logit coefficient for black is -0.51 in A, -0.67 in B, and 
it further increases to -0.75 in c. I suspect that sex interaction is 
operating in this process. Since black males have a better marriage 
market but black females face the worst marital pool of all groupB, 
controlling for the marriage market effect might have produced different 
changes in the logit coefficients for black males and black females. To 
prove this supposition, I ran two additional analyses, separately for 
females and males8. The results in Table 5-12 suggest that as the first 
marriage market variable (in terms of age) was added to the model, the 
negative effect of being of black decreased from -0.757 to -.425 for 
females. Further, when the second marriage market measure (in terms of 
both age and education) was added to the model, the negative effect of 
being black lost its significance. This suggests that among females 
black/white differentials in the log-odds of first marriage are mainly 
due to the black/white differences in the local marital availability in 
terms of age and educational level. The finding further suggests that
Table 5-1Z.
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-1979):
Influence of Individual Attributes and Local Marriage Market
Female
Variables Individual Marriage Marriage
Variables Harket(age) Harket(ageSed)
Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
A B C
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -0.298** 0.134 -2.113** 0.213 -3.581** 0.223
Demooraohic
Age20 -1.705** 0.127 -1.853** 0.130 -1.917** 0.132
Age21 -0.703** 0.091 -0.862** 0.094 -0.970** 0.096
Age22 -0.071 0.080 -0.185** 0.082 -0.255** 0.084
Age23-26 ----- ..... ..... ..... ..... ....
Age27-28 -0.204** 0.092 0.165* 0.098 0.451** 0.100
Age29-30 -0.445** 0,116 -0.038 0.122 0.324** 0.125
Age31-41 -0.970** 0.100 -0.421** 0.111 0.076 0.114
Black -0.757** 0.084 -0.425** 0.093 0.122 0.101
Socioeconomic
< High School -0.391** 0.111 -0.425** 0.112 0.056 0.116
High School ----- .... ----- .....
College 1-3 0.081 0.070 0.064 0.071 0.254** 0.073
College 4+ -0.174** 0.075 -0.174** 0.076 0.027 0.078
Enrol led -1.370** 0.092 -1.374** 0.094 -1.402** 0.095
Not Enrolled ..... ..... ..... ..... ....
Full-time ---- ..... ..... ----- .....
Part-time 0.057 0.088 0.054 0.089 0.044 0.091
Unemployed 0.034 0.131 0.006 0.134 0.015 0.137
Not Working 0.701** 0.093 0.703** 0.094 0.696** 0.096
Income -0.027** 0.014 -0.026* 0.014 -0.028** 0.014
Pubasst -1.471** 0.167 -1.421** 0.168 -1.466** 0.170
Not on Pubasst --- ..... ....
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Marriage Market
Densi ty -0.036 0.028 -0.071** 0.029
H of Eligibles^ -0.022 0.018 -0.044** 0.018
Availability ratio
Cage) 1.453** 0.125
Availability ratio
(age&education) 2.562** 0.131
N 8764 8764 8764
Hodel Chi-Sq 990.08 1152.52 1468.79
D.F. 16 19 19
-2 Log 8421.77 8259.33 7943.06
Note
1. The logit coefficient of “Density" is interpreted as: the effect on the log-odds of 
first marriage for every 1,000 population per square mile.
2. The logit coefficient of "# of eligibles" is interpreted as: the effect on the log- 
odds for an increase of 1,000 eligibles in a labor market area.
3. ** : P i 0.05; * : P < 0.10
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the local availability ratio with both age and education taken into 
account, is a more important factor than the local availability, with 
age controlled only in explaining racial differences in the propensity 
for marriage.
Table 5-13 presents the same model estimates for males. Note that 
the effect of being black increased from Model A to Model B and from 
Model B to Model C. In substantive terms, the favorable marriage market 
black males face offsets the negative effect of being black and hence 
suppresses black/white differences in the propensity for marriage. Once 
the marriage market is introduced into the model, the racial difference 
becomes much more apparent. In other words, if it were not for a 
favorable marriage market, black males would have significantly lower 
odds of marriage than white males.
Back to Table 5-11, in Model D, the classic positive relationship 
between economy and nuptiality is observed (Easterlin 1989). Local 
economy as indicated by local civilian employment has a positive effect 
on individual chances to marry. Increases in civilian employment in the 
labor market area are positively related to individual log-odds of first 
marriage during 1977-1979.
To recapitulate the analysis discussed thus far, I now turn to 
Table 5-14. Table 5-14 shows the improvement in the fit of the model as 
variables are added to the model. Model A contains demographic 
variables only, Model B contains both demographic and socioeconomic 
variables, and Model C the contextual variables which have been tested 
separately in previous models.
Table 5-13. 1 4 9
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes and Local Marriage Market
Male
Variables Individual Marriage Marriage
Variables Harket(age) Market(ageBed)
Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
Constant
A
-1.708** 0.173
B
-1.611** 0.230 -4.141**
C
0.226
DemoaraDh ic 
Age20 -1.733** 0.124 -1.746** 0.125 -1.610** 0.126
Age21 -0.770** 0.089 -0.782** 0.089 -0.675** 0.091
Age22 -0.222** 0.075 -0.229** 0.075 -0.136* 0.078
Age23-26 --- ---
Age27-28 -0.118 0.079 -0.108 0.079 -0.264** 0.081
Age29-30 -0.260** 0.094 -0.245** 0.094 -0.502** 0.097
Age31-41 -0.513** 0.077 -0.496** 0.079 -0.899** 0.814
Black -0.213** 0.075 -0.271** 0.098 -1.373** 0.102
Socioeconomic
< High School 0.031 0.080 0.022 0.080 0.401 0.085
High School --- --- --- --- ---
College 1-3 -0.201** 0.064 -0.194** 0.064 0.070 0.067
College 4+ -0.229** 0.067 -0.221** 0.067 0.012 0.070
Enrolled -0.267** 0.080 -0.266** 0.080 -0.278** 0.081
Not Enrolled --- --- --- --- .....
Full-time --- --- ..... .....
Part-time -0.485** 0.097 -0.479** 0.097 -0.507** 0.099
Unemployed -0.414** 0.096 -0.411** 0.096 -0.460** 0.098
Not Working -0.662** 0.100 -0.664** 0.100 -0.745* 0.103
Income 0.127** 0.018 0.128** 0.018 0.114** 0.018
Pubasst -0.337* 0.194 -0.333* 0.194 -0.392** 0.199
Not on Pubasst ..... • ■ * " * ..... •••**"
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Marriaoe Market 
Density 
# of Eligibles 
AvallabiIity ratio 
(age)
Availability
(age&education)
N
Hodel Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
11519 
BBS.77 
16
11065.16
-0.039
-0.067**
-0.001
11519
901.79
19
11049.15
0.027
0.018
0.145
-0.018
-0.130**
2.624**
11519
1305.98
19
10644.96
0.027
0.019
0.140
Note
1. The logit coefficient of "Density" is interpreted as: the effect on the log-odds of 
first marriage for every 1,000 population per square mile.
2. The logit coefficient of "# of eligibles" is interpreted as: the effect on the log- 
odds for an increase of 1,000 eligibles in a labor market area.
3. ** : P < 0.05; * : P < 0.10
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As illustrated earlier, logit differences between groups 
correspond to differences in odds and probabilities for the outcome 
variable between groups. Note how these differences change as more 
independent variables are added to the model. One noticeable change 
occurs in the logit coefficient for black. The difference between 
blacks and whites in the odds for marriage decreases slightly from Model 
A to Model B, but it decreases much further from Model B to Model C9. 
This suggests that variables other than demographic factors, 
particularly the contextual variables, play a role in explaining race 
differences in the outcome variable. The improvement in the fit of the 
model as these variables are introduced into the analysis confirms the 
importance of these variables.
The Model Chi-Square indicates the joint significance of all 
variables included in the model. The increases in Model Chi-Square and 
decreases in -2 Log Likelihood indicate significant changes going from 
Model A to Model B and then from Model B to Model C. From Model A to, 
the likelihood ratio test is:
G - -2 Ln [(likelihood of Model A)/(likelihood of Model B)], (5.7)
G =(20392.44 - 19916.79) =475.65,
with an increase of 9 degrees of freedom, F-value < 0.0001. Once again, 
the significant improvement in the fit of the model suggests that 
demographic variables alone are not sufficient to explain the process of 
first marriage. Life course transitions such as entry into first 
marriage follow demographic norms, but socioeconomic attributes of
Table 5-14.
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Integration of Individual and Contextual Variables
Variables logit S.E. logit S.E. logit LOGIT S.E
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
Constant
A
-0.85** 0.03
B
-0.80** 0.10 1.83**
C
0.47
Demographic
Age20 -1.88** 0.09 -1.73** 0.09 -1.79** (-0.14) 0.09
Age21 -0.85** 0.06 -0.73** 0.06 -0.83** (-0.09) 0.06
Age22 -0.22** 0.05 -0.16** 0.05 -0.21** (-0.02) 0.06
Age27-28 -0.14** 0.06 -0.16** 0.06 -0.02 ( 0.00) 0.06
Age29-30 -0.31** 0.07 -0.34** 0.07 -0.21** (-0.02) 0.07
Age31-41 -0.64** 0.06 -0.69** 0.06 -0.56** (-0.06) 0.06
Female 0.14** 0.03 0.19** 0.04 -0.03 ( 0.00) 0.04
Black -0.56** 0.05 -0.51** 0.05 -0.31** (-0.03) 0.07
Socioeconomic 
< High School •0.15** 0.06 0.07 ( 0.00) 0.07
College 1-3 ------ -0.07 0.05 0.07 ( 0.00) 0.05
Col lege 4+ ------ -0.21** 0.05 -0.06 < 0.00) 0.05
EnrolI ------ -0.82** 0.06 -0.81** (-0.09) 0.06
Part-time ------ -0.23** 0.06 -0.28** (-0.03) 0.07
Unemployed ------ -0.28** 0.08 -0.32** (-0.03) 0.08
Not Working ------ 0.07 0.06 0.00 ( 0.00) 0.07
Income .... 0.02** 0.01 0.02** C 0.01) 0.01
Pubasst .... -1.06** 0.12 -0.92** (-0.05) 0.13
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centralitv of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 0.00 ( 0.00) 0.00
Age of First Mar. ------ .... .... .... -0.16** (-0.06) 0.02
Femate Indeoendence 
Females in Labor F. ... a m m m • .... -0.02** (-0.03) 0.00
Marriage Market 
Density .... _ • • • «... .... •0.04** (-0.01) 0.02
Nunber of Eligibles .... ------ ................... 0.02 ( 0.00) 0.02
Availability ------ ........... 1.77** ( 0.17) 0.07
(Age&Education) 
Local Economy 
Employment 75-79 .... .... .... .... 0.004* ( 0.01) 0.002
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
20283
976.39
8
20392.44
20283
1452.03
17
19916.79
20283
2305.97
24
19062.85
Note
1. •* : P 3 0.05; * : P 3 0.10.
2. Standardized coefficients are shoun in parenthesis for Model C.
3. The reference groups are: age 23-26, white, male, not enrolled in school, high school
working full-time, and not received public assistance.
4. The effect of "Density" is interpreted as: change in the log-odds for an increase in 
population of every 1,000 population per square mile.
5. The effect for "# of suitables" is interpreted as: change in the log-odds for an
increase of every 1,000 suitables in the labor market area.
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Individuals also have an important role to play in this process.
There is also a significant improvement from Model B to Model C:
G = (19916.79 - 19068.06) (5.8)
= 848.73,
with an increase of 7 degrees of freedom, P-value < 0.001. This 
indicates that the social and economic context in which individuals live 
or work have an important impact on their likelihood of marrying. 
Contextual factors such local marriage markets, local centrality of 
marriage, female labor force participation, and local economy do affect 
individuals' chances to marry in a significant way10.
Table 5-15 demonstrates how either individual or contextual 
variables alone and both levels of variables together predict the 
likelihood of first marriage. Model A contains individual level 
variables only, Model B contains contextual variables only, and Mode C 
contains both. Both level of variables have significant impacts on the 
dependent variable. By looking at variables at one level alone one 
would have missed an important part of the picture. Model C allows one 
to see how individual attributes and social context jointly affect 
individual propensity for marriage.
The IsBue of Migration
One problem that researchers of contextual analysis face is that 
people constantly move in and out of a social context. People who had 
recently moved into a labor market area will not have been in the area
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Propensity for First Marriage <1977-79):
Influence of Individual and Contextual Variables
Variables logit S.E. logit S.E. logit LOGIT S.E
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20
Age21
Age22
Age23-26
Age27-28
Age29-30
Age31-41
Female
Male
Black
White
-0.80** 0.10
-1.73**
-0.73**
-0.16**
-0.16**
-0.34**
-0.69**
0.19**
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.04
-0.51** 0.05
2.15** 0.036 1.83** 0.47
-1.79**<-0.14) 0.09 
-0.83**<-0.09) 0.06 
-0.21**(-0.02) 0.06
-0.02 ( 0.00} 0.06 
-0.21**(-0.02) 0.07 
-0.56**1-0.06} 0.06 
-0.03 ( 0.00) 0.04
-0.31**(-0.03) 0.07
Socioeconomic 
< High School 
High School 
College 1-3 
Col lege 4+ 
Enrolled 
Not Enrolled 
Part-time 
Full-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Income 
Pubasst 
No Pubasst.
-0.15** 0.06
-0.07
-0 .21**
•0.82**
0.05
0.05
0.06
-0.23** 0.06
-0.28**
0.07
0.02**
-1.06**
0.08
0.06
0.01
0 .12
0.07 ( 0.00) 0.07
0.07 ( 0.00) 0.05
-0.06 ( 0.00) 0.05
-0.81**C-0.09) 0.06
-0.28**(-0.03) 0.07
-0.32**(-0.03) 0.08 
0.00 < 0.00) 0.07
0.02**< 0.01) 0.01 
-0.92**(-0.05) 0.13
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Marriage Rate ..... ..... 0.00 0.00 0.00 ( 0.00) 0.00
Age of First Mar. ----- ..... -0.18** 0.02 -0.16**<-0.06) 0.0 2
Female Independence
Female in Lab. F. ----- ..... -0.02** 0.00 -0.02**(-0.03) 0.00
Marriage Market
Density ----- ..... -0.04** 0.02 -0.04**(-0.01) 0.02
Nunber of Eligibles ----- ..... 0.05** 0.01 0.02 ( 0.00) 0.00
Availability Ratios 
age&education) ----- ..... 1.57** 0.06 1.77**( 0.17) 0.07
Local Economy
Employment 1975-79 ..... ..... 0.004* 0.00 0.004* (0.01) 0.00
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
20283
1452.03
17
19916.79
20283
931.91 
7
20436.91
20283
2305.97
24
19062.85
Note
1. ** : P S 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
2. Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis for Model C.
3. The effect for density is interpreted as the effect for every increase of 1,000 
population in the labor market area and so is the ninber of suitables.
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long enough to have been affected by contextual Influences of that area 
to the same extent that non-movers have been affected (Gudmund 1991).
The concern arises from the possibility that since the migration 
variable is not controlled in the model, the analysis so far could have 
masked certain patterns of the relationship between individual behavior 
and its social context. One possible solution to the mobility problem 
is to include the length of time a person lived in a social context as 
an individual level explanatory variable (Gudmund 1991: 5). Although 
the information on exact length of time individuals lived in a labor 
market area is not available, data on migration between 1975 and 1980 
allows for a construction of a dummy variable which taps migration 
between 1975-1980. However, only for half of the sample are data on 
migration available. This results in a smaller number of cases for both 
the original sample (159,303) and the 8 percent sub-sample (17,991) for 
the analysis.
Table 5-16 shows the distributions of individual variables from 
the migration sub-sample by migrator status. The overall distributions 
mirror the distributions for the other sub-sample which includes both 
those who were asked the migration question and those who were not asked 
the question, except for the percentage of first marriage. In the other 
sub-sample, 22 percent of the population married between 1977-1979, but
24.4 percent of the population did so in the current sample. Note that
27.4 percent of the sample had moved between 1975 and 1980 which is a 
substantial proportion. A comparison between the second and third 
panels reveals that there are differences between migrants and non­
migrants in several aspects. First, among the migrants there are more
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Table 5-16.
Distributions of Individual Variables for the Migration Sample1 
by Migration Status
Variables
Demographic 
First Marriage 
{1977-1979) 
Age20 
Age21 
Age22 
Age23-26 
Age27-28 
Age29-30 
Age31-41 
Uhi te 
Black 
Male 
Female
Socioeconomic 
< High school 
High school 
College 1*3 
College 4+ 
Enrol led 
FulI-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not working 
Ineome(log) 
Pubasst
Migrate
All
Mean STD
24.39 0.429
13.19 0.338
13.47 0.341
13.12 0.338
34.98 0.477
9.00 0.286
6.07 0.239
10.16 0.302
83.47 0.371
16.53 0.371
57.06 0.495
42.94 0.495
12.40 0.330
33.73 0.473
29.48 0.456
24.40 0.429
22.44 0.417
59.37 0.491
11.67 0.321
7.54 0.264
21.42 0.410
7.97 2.583
3.99 0.196
27.44 0.446
17991
Normi grant 
Mean STD
22.82 0.420
13.56 0.342
13.71 0.344
13.05 0.336
33.61 0.472
8.95 0.285
6.12 0.240
10.99 0.313
80.64 0.395
19.36 0.395
56.41 0.496
43.59 0.496
13.80 0.345
38.39 0.486
28.69 9.452
19.12 0.393
19.20 0.394
59.72 0.490
11.02 0.313
8.30 0.276
20.96 0.407
7.75 2.647
4.76 0.213
13054
Migrant 
Mean STD
2B.54 0.452
12.21 0.327
12.84 0.335
13.31 0.340
38.61 0.487
9.14 0.288
5.93 0.236
7.96 0.271
90.95 0.287
9.05 0.2B7
58.78 0.492
41.22 0.492
8.69 0.282
21.41 0.410
31.56 0.465
3B.34 0.486
31.01 0.462
58.46 0.493
13.37 0.340
5.55 0.229
22.63 0.418
8.04 2.404
1.96 0.139
4937
Note
1. Only hBlf of the PUMS-D sample were asked the question: whether a person had moved between 1975 and 
1980. The migration data were pulled out from the tapes and merged with the 8 percent sub-sample on 
which the analysis is based.
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persons in age group 23-26, more whites, and more males than among non­
migrants. Second, there are more persons who first married between 
1977-1979 among migrants than among non-migrants. Third, on average 
migrants are more likely than non-migrants to have college or higher 
education and to have high income. The percent of the population 
enrolled in school is somewhat higher among migrants than non-migrants. 
However, the non-migrants are over three times as likely as migrants to 
receive public assistance. In an indirect way, this suggests a 
relationship between immobility and poverty.
Table 5-17 shows the replicated results from the migration 
sub-sample. The models in the table parallel to those presented earlier 
in Table 5-14, except for the addition of a dummy variable which taps 
the mobility of the individuals. With the same number of degrees of 
freedom, the current model appears to fit better than the comparable 
model in Table 5-14 as indicated by model Chi-Square.
Turning to Model B, the results overall resemble those in the 
comparable model in Table 5-14 in that there is no reversal in the 
direction of the relationship between the explanatory and the dependent 
variables. Having moved between 1975 and 1980 has a strong positive 
effect on the log-odds of marriage. Several explanations are plausible. 
It could be that mobility reflects one's marriageability since migrants 
are also more likely to have attractive attributes such as education and 
income and tend to be in the primary ages for marriage (see the 
distribution in Table 5-16). It could also be that mobility enhances 
one's marriage market which in turn facilitates marriage. It is also
Table i-17.
Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
influence of Individual Attributes and Contextual Varfables
(migration sample)
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Variables logit S.E. logit S.E. logit LOGIT S.E
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20
Age21
Age22
Age27-28
Age29-30
Age31-41
Female
Black
-0.75** 0.03
-2.06** 0.09 
-0.90** 0.06 
-0.31**
-0.03 
-0.11  
-0.44** 
0.19** 
■0.60**
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.05
- 0 . 88* *  0.10
-1.95** 0.09 
-0.79** 0.06 
-0.26** 0.06 
-0.04 0.06
-0.12* 0.07 
-0.47** 0.06 
0.26** 0.04 
-0.53** 0.06
1.74**
-1.99**(-0 
-0.89**(-0 
-0.31**(-0 
0.08 ( 0 
0.02 ( 0 
-0.36**(-0 
0.04 ( 0
-0.36**(-0
0.4B
0.10  
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.08 
0.07 
00) 0.04 
03) 0.07
15)
10)
.04)
.00)
.00)
,04)
Socioeconomic 
< High School 
College 1-3 
Col lege 4+ 
Enrol I 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Income 
Pubasst 
Migrate
-0.20**
■0.09*
-0.36**
-0.85**
■0.37**
-0.28**
0.11*
0 04** 
■1.05** 
0.37**
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.07
0.01
0.13
0.04
0.06 ( 
0.06 ( 
-0.17**(' 
-0.82**(- 
-0.44**(- 
-0.28**(' 
0.03 ( 
0.04**( 
-0.87**(' 
0.31**(
0.00)
0.00)
0.02)
0.09)
0.04)
0.02)
0.00)
0.03)
0.05)
0.05)
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.09
0.08
0.01
0.13
0.04
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar. 
Female Independence 
Female in Lab.F. 
Marriage Harket 
Density
Number of Eligibles 
AvailabiIi ty 
(Age&Edueation)
Local Economy 
Employment 75-79
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
17991
10B4.73
8
18904.48
17991
1685.97
18
18303.24
0.00 ( 0.00) 0.00 
-0.15**(-0.06) 0.02
-0.02**(-0.03) 0.00
-0.07**(-0.02) 0.02 
0.02 ( 0.00) 0.02
1.73**( 0.17) 0.07
0.00 ( 0.00) 0.00
17991
2460.04
25
17529.17
Note
1. ** : P S 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
2. Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis for Model C.
3. The reference groups are: age 23-26, white, male, not enrolled in school, high school, 
working full-time, not received public assistance, and non-migrants between 1975-1989.
4. The effect of density is interpreted as: change in the log-odds of first marriage for an 
increase of by 1,000 population per square mile. Similarly, for the number of eligibles, 
it is an increase in eligibles in 1,000.
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possible that some people move to a different labor market area to get 
married.
Turning to Model C, one difference between the current and the 
former models is the effect of having college or more education on the 
log-oddB of marriage. In the former model this effect ia no longer 
significant when contextual variables were added, but in the current 
model the effect of having college education remains significant after 
contextual factors were brought into the model. The distribution in 
Table 5-16 shows that persons with college or more education are much 
more likely to be migrants than persons in other educational categories. 
The analysis in the current table demonstrates that mobility has a 
positive effect on one's odds of getting married.
Two mechanisms appear to be operating in the relationship between 
having a higher education and the likelihood of getting married in the 
context of mobility. One is that having higher education delays 
marriage. The other is a positive effect due to higher mobility of 
well-educated persons. It may be that the negative effect overwhelms 
the positive effect of having high educational attainment. In sum, the 
results from the migration sub-sample mirror those based on the full 
sub-sample. Mobility is positively associated with the probability of 
marriage.
Summary
The results presented thus far have generally shown consistency 
with theoretical expectations. First, the results demonstrate that both 
individual attributes and contextual forces have an important influence
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on -the Individual propensity for first marriage. To ignore individual 
demographic and socioeconomic attributes relevant to marriage will lead 
to an unreasonable assumption that the structural forces have a uniform 
impact on all demographic and socioeconomic sub-groups. On the other 
hand, to omit the contextual factors from the analytical model amounts 
to another invalid assumption that all individuals live in the same 
social environment. An integration of both Bets of factors means 
adjusting for the variations at the both levels. Thus, it has 
strengthened the prediction power of the model and presents a clearer 
picture on the causes of the variations of the individual propensity for 
first marriage.
Second, the results support the hypothesis that black/white 
differences in the propensity for marriage are to an important degree 
due to the racial differentials in the access to social resources which 
are important to individual marriage and family formation behavior. 
Particularly for females, black/white differences in the 
log-odds of first marriage disappeared when black/white differences in 
marital availability were adjusted. The shrinking pool of 
socioeconomically eligible black males is constraining the opportunity 
of black females to get married and establish family as the majority 
white females do.
For males, racial differences in the marriage market suppress to a 
considerable degree the racial differential in the likelihood of 
marriage. Once adjusting for this factor, a greater racial divergence 
manifests itself. The dynamic process of racial variation in the
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propensity for marriage reinforces the importance of the social context 
in understanding groups differences in individual outcomes.
Third, the analysis has provided strong evidence for the 
importance of marriage markets which take into account demographic, 
socioeconomic, and geographic aspects of mate selection. Individuals 
residing or working in the labor market areas where the marital 
availability ratio is high tend to have higher log-odds of first 
marriage. The findings from the present analysis support the 
speculation that the insignificant effect of various sex ratio measures 
on marriage behavior found in the previous research is due to the 
crudeness of these measures.
However, it is still not clear how blacks differ from whites and 
females differ from males in the effects of both individual and 
structural variables on the likelihood of first marriage. Do these 
variables have differing impacts for whites and blacks on the propensity 
for marriage? If so, how do they affect blacks and whites differently?
Furthermore, other aspects of the theoretical arguments pertaining 
to racial differences in marriage are yet to be empirically evaluated. 
For instance, sex differences in earnings iB an important part of the 
argument of female independence {Farley 1988; Walker 1988). Percent of 
female-headed households and illegitimacy are also important indicators 
of a reduced centrality of marriage. All these variables along with the 
male unemployment rate (Wilson 1982) and welfare dependency (Murray 
1984) still need to be tested in order to better understand causes of 
the racial gap in marriage. It is to address these issues that I now 
turn to Chapter Six.
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Notes for Chapter Five
1. The estimated odds can also be translated into (0,1) probability 
scale by using the expression:
odds/ (1 + odds).
Hence, the average probability of first marriage for whites between 
1977-1979/80 is:
[.304 / (1 +.304)] = .233, and for blackB it is:
[.179 / (1 +.179)] = .1518.
Both probabilities are identical to the sample proportion of first 
marriage for each group.
2. Note that the mean incomes presented here are much lower than 
average incomes because the computation of the mean includes persons 
with zero income for the ease of presentation. The mean income is 
similar to the national average once respondents with zero income are 
excluded from the calculation.
3. It is not surprising that these ratios are generally somewhat larger
than thoBe at national level (Goldman et al. 1984) because of variations
across labor market areas in the base population from which the 
availability ratios are calculated.
4. For females who first married during 1977-1979, 94 percent (1,881) 
had worked prior to 1979. About 61 percent of these women were working 
full-time, 11.8 percent were working part-time, 22 percent were not in 
the labor force, and about 5 percent were unemployed in 1979.
5. Other measures of local centrality of marriage were also available, 
such as the general divorce rate, percent of female-headed households, 
and illegitimacy. The divorce rate was not included in the model 
because it highly correlates with the marriage rate. As an indicator of 
centrality of marriage it is an alternative measure but it is not 
different from the marriage rate.
6. "The standardized estimate for the slope parameter is computed by 
dividing the slope parameter estimate by the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the underlying distribution, which is the inverse of the 
link function, to the sample standard deviation of the explanatory 
variable. The standardized estimates of the intercept parameters are 
set to missing" (SAS User's Guide/Statistics version 6 1991: 1097).
7. The Beale of the variable, the number of eligibles, is in persons. 
The unstandardized coefficient seems to be negligible if one interprets 
the change in the log-odds of marriage as due to an increment in an 
additional person in the labor market area. But if one thinks of an
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Increase of 1,000 persons in the market, the change in the log-odds is 
not negligible. By applying the logit coefficient and an appropriate 
unit into the odds-ratio multiplier, eb(unit), the change in the log-odds 
for an increase of 1,000 persons in the locale is obtained as follows:
e 0.00005(1000)= l  ^ 0 5  ^
8. Here, I ran separate models just to demonstrate how the process of 
racial differences in marriage differ for males and females.
9. The estimates for the odds of first marriage can be calculated for 
specific combinations of age, race, and sex by using the expression:
p2|j / 1 - pjj = ex0 exirace ex^ sex e^aae
For black and female 27-28 yearB old, the estimated odds are:
= e-*85 e*14 e-’56 e-14
*» ( .43) ( .87) ( .57) (1.15) = .245
The estimated odds can also be translated into a (0,1) probability Beale 
by using the expression:
odds/ (1 + odds).
Thus, an estimated probability that a black female of age 27 or 28 would 
get married during the 1977-1979 period is:
.245 / (1 +.245) = .197.
For white females of the same age group, the estimated oddB are: 
eintercept eage27-28 efemale#
= (.43)(.87)(1.15) = .427,
and it corresponds to a probability of:
[.427 / (1 +.427)] = .299,
which is close to the proportion of first marriage for this group (not 
shown). Thus, the difference in the probability of getting married 
(during 1977-1979) between black and white females, 27-28 years old is: 
(.197)-(.299) = .102. The same method of calculation can be applied to 
obtain comparable odds and probabilities for other combinations of 
subgroups.
10. I have run the same models based on the original sample. The 
patterns are similar to those shown in the sub-sample. Also, the same
163
analyses were run for the 216 labor market areas from which blacks were 
selected for the analysis. The results generally mirror those reported 
in Table 5-14 (see Appendix D and E).
CHAPTER SIX 
RACE AND SEX DIFFERENCES
In this chapter I address two issues that arise from the 
theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter One. These issues include: 
1) Do blacks differ from whites in the impact of individual and 
contextual variables on marriage behavior? 2) Do females and males 
differ in the effects of these variables and do sex differences exist 
among both blacks and whites? The investigation of each of these issues 
is an integral part of the broader inquiry about the black/white 
divergence in marriage.
Race Differences
Theoretical Context
Four theoretical perspectives have been proposed in the existing 
literature about the causes of a declining propensity of marriage among 
blacks. They are: the female Independence argument (Becker 1981; Farley 
1988; Walker 1988; Espenshade 1985); structural change in male 
unemployment (Moynihan 1965; Wilson 1987); the welfare argument (Murray 
1984); and sex ratio imbalances (Guttentag and Secord 1983; Parke and 
Glick 1967; Akers 1967; Spanier and Glick 1980; Ermisch 1981; Bennett 
and Bloom 1989).
The female independence argument is grounded in the economic 
theory of marriage (Becker 1974, 1977, 1991 [1981]). The essence of 
this argument is that since the 1960s black females have been
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approaching equity with black men in education, occupation, labor force 
participation, and earnings much more rapidly than white women are 
approaching equity with white men. Hence the perceived gains to 
marriage have declined more for black women than for white women. As a 
result, this development has led to a lower propensity for marriage in 
the black community.
The argument of the change in male unemployment (Wilson thesis) 
posits that the economic transformation since the 1960s in the American 
urban centers, from centers of production and distribution of material 
goods to centers of administration, information exchange, and higher- 
order service provision, has left a large proportion of black males, 
particularly young black males, unemployed. The rapid decline of black 
male unemployment has led to a shrinking pool of economically eligible 
maleB for marriage and family formation and hence lower marriage rates 
in the black population.
The welfare argument, a variant of the economic theory of 
marriage, posits that economic inducements of welfare are stronger among 
blacks than whites because black incomes from sources other than welfare 
are generally lower and a much larger proportion of black population 
live at or below poverty level. ThuB, in order to maximize their joint 
income under the existing welfare eligibility, poor black parents forego 
marriage and traditional family formation (Murray 1984).
The theorists of the sex ratio imbalances essentially argue that 
the extreme sex ratio imbalances among black population have been 
constraining the opportunity for black females to marry and establish 
traditional family forms. From the male point of view, the severe
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Imbalances of sex ratios reduce the desire of black males for marriage. 
When in scarce Bupply, "men would not remain committed to the same woman 
through her childbearing years. The culture would not emphasize love 
and commitment, and a lower value would be placed on marriage and 
family. Transient relationships between men and women would be 
important" (Guttentag and Secord 1983: 21).
While the arguments of the change in male unemployment and of sex 
ratio imbalances point to structural forces that tend to constrain 
individuals' ability to marry, the female independence and welfare 
arguments point to structural changes that might have altered 
individuals' perceptions about marriage.
A cultural perspective is also essential to the investigation of 
the black/white divergence in marriage. WilBon (1991: 1) pointed out a 
joint influence of structural and cultural factors on individual life:
"Poverty, like other aspects of class inequality, is a consequence 
not only of differential distribution of economic and political 
privileges and resources, but of differential access to culture as 
well". "Poor individuals who live in a social context that foBters and 
enhances strong labor force attachment are less likely to experience 
persistent poverty than are those living in a social context that 
reinforces weak labor force attachment".
The problem of labor force detachment is most severe for jobless 
individuals and families in neighborhoods with low employment rates.
The drifting away from the main-stream value system as a result of being 
joblessness iB reinforced by the similar condition of other individuals 
and families in the same neighborhood (Wilson 1991: 10).
Although Wilson (1991) was addressing the problem of poverty, the 
perspective he proposed is readily relevant to the issue being addressed
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in this study. The social context in which individuals find themselves 
also has an influence on their marriage behavior. The more often 
individuals who see their neighbors remain unmarried and raise children 
out of wedlock, the more likely they would think of non-marriage as a 
preferred life style. As a result, individuals who grew up in the 
social context where marriage rates are low and illegitimacy occurs 
often will have a low propensity for marriage.
Given the theoretical coherence of the five arguments laid out 
above, an important question follows: Are they empirically valid? One
way to answer this question is to directly address race differences in 
the impact of these five factors on marriage.
The level of female independence in a social context is indicated 
by female labor force participation and male/female differentials in 
earnings in a labor market area. The male unemployment is indicated by 
the male unemployment rate in a labor market area. The welfare argument 
is indicated by percent of population who were on welfare in 1979 in the 
labor market area and by whether or not an individual was on welfare in 
that year. The sex ratio imbalances are measured with three indicators. 
One is the male to female ratio in a labor market with race, age, and 
marital status controlled, and the other is the male to female ratio in 
the labor market area, with race, age, marital, and education 
controlled. The third indicator is the number of eligible potential 
partners in a labor market area. The variable "eligible" is defined the 
same way as are the availability ratios. The local cultural climate 
about marriage is indicated by five variables: the general marriage rate 
in 1980, the cumulative marriage rate in 1979, percent of households
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headed by unmarried femaleB, the illegitimacy rate, and the average age 
of first marriage (1977-1979) in the labor market area. The marriage 
propensity is measured as the log-odds of first marriage between 1977 
and 1979.
Hypothesis
In light of the above theoretical arguments, I formulated the 
following hypotheses for testing:
Hypothesis 6.1: Centrality of Marriage
a: The lower the centrality of marriage in a social context, the
lower the chances of marriage
b: The higher the general marriage and current marriage rates in
the labor market area, the higher the individual chanceB of marriage.
c: The higher the average age of first marriage, the percent
female-headed households, and the illegitimacy rates in the labor market 
area, the lower the individual chances of marriage.
d: The local centrality of marriage as measured by these five 
variables has a significantly larger impact for blacks than whites.
Hypothesis 6.2: Female Independence
a: A high level of female independence in a locale has a negative
impact on individual chances of first marriage.
b: The impact of female independence differs by race.
On the one hand, female socioeconomic independence may reduce the 
propensity for marriage more for blacks than for whites. On the other
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hand, female socioeconomic independence may have no impact at all on 
black marriage since black females tend to have strong orientations 
toward family life {Gary et al. 1983; Broderick 1965; Kulesky and Obordo 
1972: cited in Staples 1985: 1005). Evidence suggests that the positive 
relationship between female socioeconomic achievement and likelihood of 
remaining single is much weaker among blacks than among whites (Mueller 
and Campbell 1977; White 1981).
Hypothesis 6.3: Male Unemployment
The male unemployment rate in a labor market area reduces the 
chances of first marriage and it has a significantly larger impact for 
blacks than for whites.
Hypothesis 6.4: Welfare Argument
Percent of population on welfare in a labor market area has a 
significantly larger impact on the chances for first marriage for blacks 
than for whites.
Hypothesis 6.5: Sex Ratio Imbalances
The higher the availability ratio in a labor market area, the 
higher the odds of first marriage. The impact of the availability ratio 
is significantly stronger for blacks, particularly black females, than 
for whites.
Hypothesis 6.6:
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A lower level of socioeconomic status has a negative impact on the 
log-odds of marriage and the impact is significantly larger for blacks 
than for whites.
I expect that a lower level of education, a weak attachment to the 
labor force, low income, and dependency on public assistance have 
differing effects for blacks and whites. Cherlin (1981) observed that 
the movement away from the centrality of marriage was more pronounced 
among poor blacks than other social and racial groups. This observation 
suggests that marriage propensity may vary with social class more often 
among blacks than among whites. Accordingly, socioeconomic attributes 
will have a Btronger linkage with marriage among blacks than among 
whites.
Results
Table 6-1 displays the effects of the independent variables on the 
log-odds of first marriage for blacks and whites. The race-specific 
estimates were obtained by including two race product terms in the 
pooled model. For instance, to estimate separate effects of income on 
the log-odds of first marriage for blacks and whites, two product terms, 
"white*income" and "black*income”, were entered, but with the main 
effect income omitted from the model, with the adjustment of other 
variables. Each set of interaction termB was tested one at a time, 
controlling all other variables in their main effect form1. The 
different effects for blacks and for whites were estimated by testing
Table 6-1.
Black and White Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
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All
Variables Black1 
Logi t S.E.
White2
Logit S.E.
D i f ference"® 
Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
DemoqraDhie
Age20 -1.339** 0.244 -1.781** 0.094 0.442 0.261
Age21 -0.843** 0.202 -0.719** 0.066 -0.123 0.212
Age2 2 -0.191 0.168 -0.157** 0.057 -0.033 0.177
Age23-26 -- -- ..... ..... .....
Age27-2B -0.051 0.166 -0.173** 0.064 0.122 0.177
Age29-30 -0.048 0.180 -0.390** 0.079 0.342* 0.196
Age31-41 -0.293** 0.148 -0.762** 0.066 0.469** 0.162
Female -0.091 0.101 0.228** 0.038 -0.319** 0.108
Socioeconomic 
< High School -0.303** 0.142 -0.100 0.071 -0.203 0.157
High School --- --- ..... ..... .....
College 1-3 0.195 0.122 -0.108** 0.050 0.303** 0.130
Col lege 4+ 0.033 0.164 -0.234** 0.051 0.267 0.170
Enrolled -0.488** 0.154 -0.863** 0.062 0.375** 0.161
Not Enrolled -- -- .....
Full-time -- .. ..
Part-time 0.111 0.175 -0.282** 0.069 0.392** 0.187
Unemployed -0.194 0.174 -0.314** 0.085 0.121 0.191
Not Working -0.251* 0.133 0.123* 0.067 -0.375** 0.134
Income 0.057** 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.044** 0.189
Pubasst -1.464** 0.234 -0.882** 0.144 -0.532** 0.270
Not on Pubasst --- --- --- .....
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centralitv of.Marriaoe 
Marriage Rate’ 0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.006** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age of First Mar. -0.069** 0.028 -0.148** 0.016 0.079** 0.033
% F. K. Households -0.036** 0.009 -0.072** 0.010 0.036** 0.014
11 legitimacy Rate -0.004** 0.002 -0.008** 0.003 0.004 0.004
Female IndeDendcnce 
Female in Lab. F._ 0.007 0.008 -0.019** 0.004 0.026** 0.009
Sex Diff. in Uage -0.076 0.144 -0.097 0.121 0.021 0.188
y. on Uelfare -0.035** 0.015 0.025 0.017 -0.060** 0.022
Male UnemDlovment -0.025** 0.010 -0.000 0.008 -0.025* 0.013
Marriage Market 
AR (age) 0.555** 0.109 0.984** 0.097 -0.428** 0.152
AR(age&educ) , 1.103** 0.112 2.009** 0.088 -0.906** 0.149
# of Eligibles -0.033 0.117 -0.034** 0.012 0.000 0.000
N 3256 17027 20283
Note
1. & 2. The black and white estimates are obtained by including two product terms for race in the
same pooled model. For example, to estimate separate effects of income on the log-odds of first
marriage for blacks and whites, "white*income", and "black*income", were tested with other variables 
adjusted. For individual variables, each set of interaction terms was tested one at a time 
controlling the main effect and other individual variables. For structural variables, each pair of 
interaction terms was tested with the adjustment of the main effect structural variables and all 
individual attributes.
3. The estimates in this column were obtained by testing the race interactions in the pooled model. 
Each the product terms was tested one at a time with the main effect structural and all individual 
variables controlled.
A. The general marriage rate is defined as marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate 
variables are interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
5. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
6. The logit estimate for the number of eligibles is interpreted as the change in the log-odds for 
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
7. **: P < 0.05; *: P « 0.10.
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the race Interactione with each of the other independent variables, one 
at a time, and other variables in main-effect form controlled2.
Demographic variables. The first two columns show the separate 
effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable for 
blackB and whites. The third column shows the differences between the 
two effects. Contrasted with age 23-26, persons in the categories of 
age 20, age 21, age 22, age 27-28, age 29-30, and age 31-41 have 
Bignificantly lower log-odds of firBt marriage for whites. For blacks, 
however, only age 20, age 21, age 31-41 are significantly different from 
the reference group. This suggests that the relationship between age 
and marriage for whites mirror the curve of marriage dependency on age 
observed in Chapter Four (Figure 4-1). The estimates of black/white 
differences in the slope of age in the third column suggest that the 
negative effect of being in the older age groups of 29-30 and 31-41 are 
significantly Btronger for whites than for blacks.
While black females are not different from males in the log-odds 
of first marriage, white females are significantly more likely than 
males to be married. The statistic in the third column Bhows that this 
race difference is significant. That iB to say: the effect of being 
female depends on race. In other words, black and white females have 
significantly different levels of propensity for marriage. This finding 
further confirms what has been observed in the existing literature.
Individual Socioeconomic Attributes. Blacks with less than high 
school education have lower log-odds of first marriage than do blacks 
who have high school degrees. However, whites with less than high 
school education are not significantly different from the reference
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group. While blacks with three years or more college education are not 
different from the contrast group in the log-odds of first marriage, 
their white counterparts are significantly different from the reference 
group. Being enrolled in school has a strong negative effect on the 
dependent variable for both blacks and whites, but the impact is larger 
for whites than for blacks.
Turning to work status, working part-time and being unemployed 
have no significant effect on the log-odds of first marriage for blacks, 
but both variables significantly reduce the log-odds of getting first 
married for whites. For blacks, the non-working status tends to reduce 
the log-odds of first marriage, whereas it has a positive effect on 
marriage for whites.
While income has a significant positive effect on the log-odds of 
first marriage for blacks, it has no impact for whites. I suspect that 
the positive effect of income for white males cancels out the negative 
effect of income for white females. Although being on public assistance 
has a strong negative impact for both blacks and whites, the effect is 
stronger for blacks than for whites. The race interactions with the 
effects of work status, income, and welfare dependence Bupport the 
hypothesis that the propensity for marriage vary with socioeconomic 
characteristics more among blacks than among whites.
Contextual variables. As hypothesized, all indicators of the 
centrality of marriage in a social context exert a significant impact on 
individual propensity for marriage. While marriage rates in the labor 
market area have a positive effect, the age of first marriage, percent 
of female-headed households, and illegitimacy have a negative impact on
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Individual log-odds of first marriage. This supports the notion that 
individual behavior is influenced by the social context.
However, the results seem to be inconsistent with the second part 
of Hypothesis 6.6 in that the local centrality of marriage does not have 
a significantly stronger impact for blacks than for whites. Conversely, 
the estimates in the third column suggest that the impact of age of 
first marriage and percent of female-headed households are significantly 
larger for whites than for blacks. This may suggest that whites are 
more sensitive to the influence of local centrality of marriage.
While female labor force participation in a labor market area 
reduces individual log-odds of first marriage for whites, it has no 
impact whatsoever for blacks. Sex differences in earnings have no 
effect for neither group on the log-odds of first marriage, although the 
sign is consistent with the expectation.
Percent of population on welfare in a labor market area 
significantly reduces individual log-odds of first marriage for blackB 
but not for whites. The male unemployment rate in a labor market area 
significantly reduces the propensity of blacks for marriage, but it has 
no significant impact for whiteB.
Consistent with the expectations, the availability ratios in the 
labor market area has a very strong positive influence on individual 
log-odds of first marriage for both groups. Note that the second 
measure of marriage market with education taken into consideration has 
twice as strong an effect on the dependent variable as does the first 
measure where only demographic factors were controlled. Inconsistent
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with the expectations, however, the Btrength of the marriage market 
effects is significantly larger for whites than for blacks.
The size of local marriage markets (indicated by the number of 
eligible potential partners in the labor market area) has a significant 
negative effect, instead of a positive effect, on marriage. Once again, 
this variable may be reflecting the effect of being in the urban 
context, rather than the effect of marriage market size. Further 
analysis (not presented) Bhowed that the effect of marriage market size 
became positive and significant at 0.10 level when the effect of being 
urban was controlled3. But this effect does not differ for blacks and 
whites.
The evidence thuB far supports the two arguments about the causes 
of black/white differences in marriage propensity: male unemployment and 
welfare dependency. But the findings have provided only partial support 
for the other three hypotheses. One concern arises that the differences 
in the total number of blacks and whites in the sample could be blurring 
the picture of race interactions. To addresB this issue, a different 
sub-sample of about 20,000 was drawn from the original, with 10,000 
blacks and 10,000 whites. The distribution of means of this sample is 
largely identical to that of the first sub-sample representative of the 
original sample. However, the results (not shown) based on the second 
sub-sample did not change the patterns of race interactions observed in 
Table 6-1.
The results in Table 6-1 have shown the overall pattern of race 
differences in the effect of the independent variables. However, it is 
still not clear how the race differences would vary by sex. Sex
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interactions might be masking the patterns of race interactions as 
suggested by the theoretical arguments. For instance, according to the 
theory of sex ratio imbalances, local marriage markets Bhould have a 
larger impact for black females than for white females, but this 
difference does not necessarily hold true for males (Guttentag and 
Secord 1983)4.
To untangle the race interactions nested in the sex interactions,
X ran the same interaction tests (as shown in Table 6-1) separately for 
females and males. Although a three-way interaction test would be a 
statistically appropriate way to control sex interactions while testing 
race interactions, the interpretation of the main-effect variables and 
the lower-order interaction terms is often difficult in regression 
models. Besides, little guidance has been provided in the existing 
literature for the interpretation of the estimates with three-way 
interactions5.
Table 6-2 shows that the estimates for blacks and whites and the 
difference between two estimates for females only. The discussion 
focuses on the effects that are of statistically significance.
Contrasted with the age 23-26 category, being at age 20 reduces one's 
log-odds of first marriage significantly more for white than for black 
females. Being in the age 31-41 group reduces chances for marriage for 
white females, but it has no significant impact for black females.
Compared with the high school category, black females with 1-3 
years of college education have significantly higher log-odds of first 
marriage, but the white counterparts are not significantly different
Table 6-2. 1 7 7
Black and White Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
Female
Variables Black1
Logit S.E.
White2
Logit S.E.
Difference^ 
Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
OemooraDhic
Age20 -0.974** 0.318 -1.811** 0.137 0.838** 0.345
Age21 -0.672** 0.288 -0.714** 0.096 0.042 0.303
Age22 0.102 0.232 -0.096 0.085 0.197 0.247
Age23-26 ... ..... ..... --- ---
Age27-28 -0.035 0.266 -0.228** 0.099 0.193 0.283
Age29*30 •0.229 0.302 -0.475** 0.126 0.245 0.327
Age31-41 -0.142 0.225 -1.141** 0.112 1.00** 0.251
Socioeconomic 
< High School -0.315 0.232 -0.394** 0.125 0.080 0.260
High School • - - - * ..... ..... ..... ... ...
College 1-3 0.430** 0.181 0.025 0.181 0.405** 0.194
College 4+ 0.1S2 0 244 -0.214** 0.244 0.396 0.253
Enrol led -0.870** 0.230 -1.432** 0.097 0.562** 0.241
Not Enrol led ..... ..... ... ..... ...
Full-time --- ... --- --- ...
Part time 0.100 0.266 0.052 0.093 0.048 0.281
Unemployed -0.233 0.289 0.060 0.146 •0.293 0.320
Not Working 0.102 0.193 0.780** 0.096 -0.678** 0.190
Income 0.028 0.024 -0.043** 0.015 0.071** 0.026
Pubasst •2.034** 0.324 -1.225** 0.190 •0.808** 0.367
Not on Pubasst ..... ..... ..... ..... -----
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centralitv of,Marriage 
Marriage Rate 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.006** 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.003 0.002
Age of First Mar. -0.078* 0.025 -0.094** 0.042 0.016 0.049
X F. H. Households -0.054** 0.015 •0.047** 0.016 -0.007 0.022
11 legitimacy Rate -O.OOB** 0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.006 0.006
Female indeoendence 
Female in Labor F- 0.021 0.013 -0.019** 0.006 0.040** 0.014
Sex Diff. in Wage 0.147 0.224 -0.031 0.186 0.179 0.291
X on Welfare -0.082** 0.023 0.052** 0.026 -0.134** 0.034
Male Unemolovment -0.032** 0.016 0.005 0.013 -0.037* 0.020
Marriage Market 
AR Cage) 1.120** 0.208 1.541** 0.137 -0.421* 0.236
ARCage&educ) 2.977** 0.288 2.430** 0.136 0.547* 0.299
# of Eligibles6 -0.017 0.208 -0.014 0.018 -0.000 0.209
N 1595 7169 8764
Note
1. & 2. The black and white estimates are obtained by including two product terms for race in the
same pooled model. For example, to estimate separate effects of income on the log-odds of first
marriage for blacks and whites, "white*income", and >lblack*income", were tested with other variables 
adjusted. For individual variables, each set of interaction terms was tested one at a time 
controlling the main effect and other individual variables. For structural variables, each pair of 
interaction terms was tested with the adjustment of the main effect structural variables and all 
individual attributes.
3. The estimates in this coluan were obtained by testing the race interactions in the pooled model. 
Each the product terms was tested one at a time with the main effect structural and all individual 
variables controlled.
4. The general marriage rate is defined as marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate 
variables are interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
5. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
6. The logit estimate for the number of eligibles is interpreted as the change in the log-odds for 
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
7. **: P < 0.05; *: P < 0.10.
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from -the reference group. Being enrolled in school has a stronger 
negative impact for whites than for blacks.
While not-working has no impact for black females, it is 
positively related to getting married between 1977-1979 for white 
females. This reflects the fact that a substantial proportion of white 
females drop out of the labor force after they get married. Black 
females can not afford to do so, perhaps because they have to help 
support the family since their husbands bring home lower income compared 
with what white husbands can bring home. While a high level of income 
lowers white female log-odds of first marriage, it has no impact for 
black females. Although being on public assistance reduces one's 
propensity for first marriage for both blacks and whites, the impact is 
stronger for black females than for white females.
Note that several changes have occurred in the patterns of the 
race interactions from Table 6-1 to Table 6-2. The first change 
occurred in the age variables. While the effect of being in the age 29- 
30 differs for blacks and whites in the full model, it does not differ 
in the separate model for females. Also, in the full model, the effect 
of being in the age 20 group does not interact with race but it does 
among females.
Second, in the full model, having 1-3 years of college lowers 
white log-odds of marriage, but it has no impact for blacks. In the 
separate model, the meaning of this race difference has changed. Black 
females with 1-3 years of college education are more likely to marry 
than those with high school education, but the white counterparts are 
not significantly different from the reference group.
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The third change occurred in the work variables. In the full 
model, the effect of working part-time on the dependent variable differs 
by race, but in the female model, this difference no longer existB.
Also, the meaning of the race interaction has changed for the variable, 
"not in labor force", from the full to female model. In the full model, 
contrasted with full-time workers, blacks who were not in the labor 
force tend to have lower log-odds of marriage, but the white 
counterparts tend to have higher log-odds of marriage. In the female 
model, for whiteB, not working is still strongly and positively 
associated with being married, but this variable has no impact for black 
females. There is also a change in the race interaction with income.
In the full model, income has a stronger positive impact for blackB than 
for whites. In the female model, income has no effect for blacks, but
it does have a negative effect for whiteB. The higher the income is,
the lower her log-odds of marriage are for white females.
The changes discussed above revealed a clearer picture of the race 
differences in the influence of individual socioeconomic variables. In 
an indirect way these changes suggest that the race differences do vary 
with sex. In spite of these changes, the meanings of two race 
interactions remain the same from the full to the separate models. The
race differences in the effect of being enrolled in school and being on
public assistance have the same meanings in both models. The only 
difference is that the magnitude of the interaction coefficients seems 
to be larger among females than average.
Turning to contextual variables, noteworthy are changes in the 
race interactions from the full to the female models, in the full
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model, the mean age of first marriage and percent of female-headed 
households at the labor market area level have a larger negative effect 
for whiteB than for blacks.' The differences, however, are not 
significant among females.
The second change is in the race interaction with percent 
population on welfare in the labor market area. Overall, one percent 
increase in population on welfare in the labor market area reduces black 
individual log-odds of first marriage by 0.035, whereas it has no effect 
for whites. In the female model, the same variable still has a negative 
impact for black females, but it has a positive effect for white 
females. The new race interaction has substantive meaning. Although 
not all persons and families who are poor are on welfare, it is safe to 
consider those who are on welfare as poor for both races6. The 
difference is that while poor white females are strongly attached to 
marriage as an institution, poor black females are increasingly detached 
from this institution. The attachment to the centrality of marriage 
among poor whites could be reinforced by traditionalism, religiosity and 
rural residence. On the other hand, the movement away from the 
centrality of marriage among poor black females might be an involuntary 
outcome due to structural constraints: black males who are economically 
and socially eligible for marriage are becoming increasingly scarce.
There is also a change in the race interaction with the local 
marriage market, where both age and education were taken into account.
In the full model, the local availability of marriageable partners has a 
larger influence for whites than for blacks, but it reverses in the 
female model. The local marriage availability has a stronger effect for
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black females than for white femaleB. This is consistent with the
findings reported in Chapter Five (Table 5-11) that black/white
differences in the local marriage availability count for most of the 
racial differential in the propensity of marriage.
To give a better Bense of how the marriage market affects black 
and white females differently, a brief discussion of the magnitude of 
the marriage market effect is helpful. Recall that to obtain the rate 
of change in the odds of first marriage for an increase of 100 eligible 
male partners in the labor market area, one simply takes the exponential 
of the estimated logit. Thus, for a black female, for an increase of 
100 potential eligibles in the market, the rate of change in the odds of 
marriage is:
e2.977<1> = 19.63. (6.1)
For white female, the comparable rate is:
e2.430(1) _ H.36. (6.2)
Note that the above rates are for every increase of 100 potential 
partners in the market because the marriage market is measured in terms 
of ratio. To obtain a rate of change for a smaller unit of increase of 
partners in the market, e.g., an increase of 50 partners, one needs to 
multiply the logit by the unit of interest and take the exponential of 
it. For example, for blacks the rate of change is:
182
e2.977C.50) = 4 .4 3 , (6.3)
and for whites it is:
e 2.430(.50) =  3 . 3 7 .  ( 6  . 4)
Note that the racial difference in the rate of change in the odds 
for marriage decreases as the unit of change in the marriage market
becomes smaller and smaller. The distributions in Table 5-3 and Table
5-4 reveal substantial variation across labor market areas in both 
availability ratios and suggest that the unit of change in availability 
ratios across labor market areas tends to be large. Given this fact, 
the racial differential in the impact of marriage marketB on the odds 
for marriage bearB considerable importance.
The race difference in the effect of the local male unemployment 
rate remains the same across the two models. It has no impact for white 
females, whereas it does for black females. This confirms the 
hypothesis that male unemployment haB a differing impact on marriage for 
blacks and for whites.
Also, the race interaction with female labor force participation 
in the full model remains the same for the female model. Sex 
differences in earnings at the labor market area level, again, have no 
influence on individual log-odds of marriage. Thus, the findings 
pertaining to female independence do not support the argument that since 
black females are more socioeconomically independent of males than are
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white females, they perceive less gains to marriage and hence are less 
likely than white femaleB to marry.
The descriptive resultB in Chapter Five Bhowed that blacks tend to 
be high on factors that suppress individual propensity for marriage but 
they are low on resources that facilitate marriage and family formation. 
The results from Table 6-2 show that these variables also tend to have a 
larger impact for black females than whites females on the propensity 
for marriage. For instance, male unemployment, local marriage markets, 
and welfare dependence exert a stronger impact on black females than on 
white females.
I now turn to the race interactions among males (see Table 6-3).
I focus on the race interactions that are of statistical significance. 
While white males aged 29-30 have lower log-oddB of marriage than the 
reference group, there is no difference between the two groups for black 
males. Working part-time reduces the log-odds of marriage for white 
maleB, but it has no impact for black males. Not working has a stronger 
negative effect on the chances for marriage for white males than for 
black males. Income also has a larger positive impact for white males 
than for black males. These findings suggest that the propensity for 
marriage varies with socioeconomic attributes more for white than for 
black males. In other words, the male propensity for marriage is more 
sensitive to work status and income for white than for black males.
It is puzzling that socioeconomic variables have little impact on 
black males because several theoretical arguments (Wilson 1987; Murray 
1984; Cherlin 1981) imply that the recent sharp decline in marriage 
propensity among blacks has more to do with socioeconomic resources than
Table 6*3. 1 8 4
Black and White Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
Male
Variables Black1
Logit S.E.
White2
Logit S.E.
Difference^ 
Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Demoqraohic
Age2Q -1.762** 0.402 -1.727** 0.131 •0.035 0.422
Age21 -1.024** 0.292 -0.741** 0.094 -0.283 0.306
Age22 -0.468* 0.261 -0.200** 0.079 -0.268 0.272
Ago23-26 ..... ----- ..... .....
Age27-28 •0.044 0.219 -0.130 0.084 0.086 0.234
Age29-30 0.135 0.232 -0.334** 0.103 0.469* 0.254
Age31-41 -0.395** 0.201 -0.534** 0.083 0.138 0.217
Socioeconomic 
< High School -0.241 0.184 0.110 0.089 -0.352* 0.203
High School ..... ----- ----- ..... *•*••
College 1-3 0.011 0.171 -0.230** 0.068 0.241 0.182
College 6+ -0.001 0.228 -0.244** 0.069 0.242 0.235
Enrolled -0.063 0.214 -0.290** 0.083 0.228 0.223
Not Enrolled ..... ..... ..... ..... .....
Full-time ----- ..... *»**■ .....
Part-time 0.172 0.234 -0.593** 0.106 0.765** 0.255
Unemployed -0.123 0.220 -0.463** 0.106 0.340 0.242
Not Working -0.378* 0.194 -0.721** 0.108 0.343* 0.206
Income 0.086** 0.028 0.145** 0.021 -0.060* 0.033
Pubasst -0.174 0.351 -0.399* 0.229 0.225 0.414
Not on Pubasst ..... ----- -----
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centralitv of.Marriaoe 
Marriage Rate’ 0.003** 0.004 0.001** 0.000 0.002 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.005** 0.002 0.005** 0.001 0.000 0.002
Age of First Mar. -0.054 0.039 -0.192** 0.022 0.138** 0.045
% F. H. Households -0.020 0.013 -0.088** 0.014 0.068** 0.019
Illegitimacy Rate -0.002 0.002 -0.013** 0.004 0.011** 0.005
Female IndeDendence 
Female in Lab. F., 0.002 0.012 -0.017** 0.005 0.019 0.013
Sex Diff. in Wage5 -0.241 0.196 -0.237 0.162 -0.004 0.254
y. on Welfare -0.006 0.020 0.003 0.023 -0.009 0.030
Male UnemDlovment -0.020 0.014 •0.006 0.011 ■0.014 0.017
Marriage Market 
AR (age) -0.005 0.215 -0.112 0.192 0.107 0.284
AR(ageSeduc) , 1.663** 0.205 2.927** 0.167 -1.264** 0.255
# of Eligibles -0.010 0.145 -0.067** 0.018 -0.057 0.146
N 1661 9858 11519
Note
1. & 2. The black and white estimates are obtained by including two product terms for race in the 
same pooled model. For example, to estimate separate effects of income on the log-odds of first 
marriage for blacks and whites, "white*income", and "black*income", were tested with other variables 
adjusted. For individual variables, each set of interaction terms was tested one at a time 
controlling the main effect and other individual variables. For structural variables, each pair of
interaction terms was tested with the adjustment of the main effect structural variables and all 
individual attributes.
3. The estimates in this coluirt were obtained by testing the race interactions in the pooled model. 
Each the product terms was tested one at a time with the main effect structural and all individual 
variables controlled.
4. The general marriage rate is defined as marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate 
variables are interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
5. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
6. The logit estimate for the number of eligibles is interpreted as the change in the log-odds for 
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
7. **: P < 0.05; *: P < 0.10.
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with black culture. On the other hand, marriage market theory suggests 
that the decline in black marriage rates also has to do with severe sex 
ratio imbalances in the black population. The impact of sex ratio is 
independent of the effects of socioeconomic factors. Under a low sex 
ratio regime, men have a weak commitment to a permanent relationship 
because there is a great number of alternatives elsewhere (Guttentag and 
Secord 1983). Therefore, it could be that the impact of sex ratio 
imbalances is confounding the effect of socioeconomic attributes for 
black males. That is where the effect of sex ratio imbalances is not 
controlled, the effect of socioeconomic attributes is not observed. If 
black maleB, in the first place, have no interest in committing to a 
marital relationship because of many unattached black females around, 
increases in their socioeconomic resources will not increase their 
propensity to marry.
Several race interactions with contextual variables are 
noteworthy. Local marriage rates have a positive impact on the log-odds 
of first marriage for both groups. The mean age of first of marriage, 
percent of female-headed households, and illegitimacy rate in the labor 
market area have a significant negative impact on the chances for 
marriage for white males, but not for black males. A comparison between 
the full and male models suggests that the race differences in the 
impact of the local centrality of marriage observed in the full model 
mostly apply to males. On the other hand, the race differences in 
female labor force participation, the male unemployment rate, and 
welfare dependence, as observed in the full model, do not apply to 
males. Rather they apply to females (see Table 6-2).
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The local availability ratio where only age was taken into account 
haB no effect on male log-odds of marriage. This is different from the 
full and female models. However, this is no longer the case when 
looking at a different measure of local marriage markets where 
education, as an important socioeconomic factor, is introduced into the 
calculation of the local availability. The local marriage market based 
on both age and educational patterns of mate selection exerts a 
significant influence on the log-odds of marriage for males. The impact 
of the local marriage market is significantly stronger for white males 
than for black males. This mirrors the overall pattern observed in the 
full model (Table 6-1). Thus, the finding pertaining to the second 
measure of local availability suggests that social attribute is a more 
important criterion than age in partner selection.
Sex Differences
Theoretical Context
Based on the traditional division of labor by sex, micro-economic 
theory of marriage (Becker 1991) views the marital relationship 
fundamentally as an exchange between men and women. Hen and women will 
marry only if the gains to marriage are positive or if each partner 
perceives that he/she will be better off by marrying than remaining 
single. It has been the husband who specialized in market work and the 
wife who specialized in home production. The wife traded her domestic 
services to husband in exchange for part of the husband's income.
The recent economic and social changes in women's labor force 
participation and earning powers have weakened the traditional sexual
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division of labor and hence have to some degree reduced the wife's 
dependence on the husband for income. However, men remain the main 
economic providers for most married-couple families. Moreover, the 
socioeconomic status of the husband remains more important than that of 
wife's in determining the socioeconomic position of the couple {Schoen 
1989; Leslie 1982; Nock and Rossi 1978). Historically, the economic 
interests of the involved partners have played a crucial role in the 
process of mate selection in American society. Today those interests 
remain integral to the process despite the diminished importance of the 
economic criterion (Edwards 1969: 521). In sum, the economic theory of 
marriage remains powerful in explaining marriage behaviors for a large 
segment of population.
According to this theory, the influence of individual 
socioeconomic attributes on marriage will differ by Bex. On the one 
hand, males with more social and economic resources would be more likely 
to be married, perhapB because they demand marriage more and are more 
capable of realizing their preference for marriage. On the other hand, 
females with more socioeconomic resources tend to have less economic 
need for marriage, although they may be more attractive to potential 
husbands.
The assumption of Bex differences in the incentives to marry has 
been widely taken among researchers, but few have actually teBted them. 
The focus of this part of the research iB to empirically test the sex 
differences in marriage behavior. Much more importantly, the objective 
is to examine whether the sex differences exist for both black and white 
groups and if they do whether the differences operate in the same way
188
across the two groups. This inquiry is an important part of the broader 
investigation of the causes of black/white differences in marriage and 
it may shed some new light on the issue being addressed. If sex 
differences in the effect of socioeconomic attributes exist only among 
whites but not among blackB, or if these differences operate differently 
for blacks than for whites, then the emphasis on the female independence 
argument as a theoretical explanation of black/white divergence in 
marriage might have been misplaced.
The analysis of sex differences is accomplished by testing two-way 
sex interactions with each of the independent variables in a pooled 
model and then separately for blackB and whites7. Although the results 
of race interactions by sex (Bee Tables 6-2 and 6-3) allow an indirect 
comparison of sex differences between blacks and whites, they do not 
provide a direct test of female/male interactions with the independent 
variables and hence make it difficult to diBcuss sex differences by 
race. A different sub-sample was used for this analysis; about 10,000 
cases were randomly selected for each racial group. I selected a sub­
sample of an equal proportion for each group in order to control sample 
size differences for the separate two-way interaction models8.
Results
Table 6-4 showB sex differences in the impact of the independent 
variables on the first marriage for both blacks and whites. Contrasted 
with the age group of 23-26, the negative effect of being in the age 
group of 22 is significantly larger for males than for femaleB. This 
simply reflects the sex difference in the timing of first marriage;
Table 6-4.
Female and Hale Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
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All
Variables Hale Female Difference
Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Demographic
Age20 -1.820** 0.132 -1.621** 0.132 0.199 0.185
Age21 -0.904** 0.096 -0.734** 0.098 0.170 0.136
Age22 -0.325** 0.083 -0.102 0.083 0.224* 0.116
Age23-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --- ---
Age27-28 •0.043 0.084 -0.146 0.092 -0.103 0.125
Age29-30 -0.303** 0.100 -0.491** 0.114 -0.188 0.152
Age31-41 -0.335** 0.078 -0.930** 0.099 -0.595** 0.126
Black -0.365** 0.053 -0.620** 0.057 -0.254** 0.053
Socioeconomic
< High School -0.231** 0.079 -0.247** 0.098 -0.017 0.124
High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - --- .....
College 1-3 0.086 0.066 0.066 0.070 -0.020 0.093
College 4+ -0.015 0.071 -0.280** 0.077 -0.266** 0.100
Enrol led -0.529** 0.079 -0.982** 0.091 -0.453** 0.113
Not Enrolled --- . . . . . .....
Full-time --- --- --- --- ........
Part-time -0.268** 0.098 -0.003 0.093 0.265** 0.133
Unemployed -0.469** 0.096 0.100 0.120 0.569** 0.150
Not Working -0.856** 0.095 0.488** 0.0B1 1.344** 0.106
Income 0.141** 0.015 -0.080** 0.011 -0.220** 0.017
Pubasst -0.375** 0.167 -1.453** 0.140 -1.079** 0.211
Not on Pubasst 
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centralitv of.Marriage
Marriage Rate 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.005** 0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.001** 0.000
Age of First Mar. -0.100** 0.017 -0.123** 0.018 -0.023 0.023
X F. H. Households -0.033** 0.005 -0.043** 0.005 -0.010** 0.003
Illegitimacy Rate 
Female Indeoendence
-0.004** 0.001 -0.006** 0.001 -0.002** 0.001
Female in Lab. F._ -0.006 0.005 -0.021** 0.005 -0.015** 0.007
Sex Diff. in Wage -0.191** 0.080 0.060 0 083 0.252** 0.071
X on Welfare 0.005 0.009 -0.021** 0.009 -0.026** 0.008
Hale Unemployment 
Marriaqe Market
-0.003 0.006 -0.023** 0.007 -0.020** 0.008
AR (age) -0.124 0.098 1.261** 0.101 1.384** 0.156
AR(ageSeduc) , 1.025** 0.089 1.739** 0.096 0.714** 0.147
» of Eligibles -0.052** 0.022 0.009 0.021 0.061** 0.030
Local Economy 
N
0.005*
10735
0.003 0.014**
9067
0.003 0.009**
19802
0.005
Note
1. The general marriage rate is marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate variables are
interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
2. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
3. The logit estimate for the number of eligibtes is interpreted as: the change in the log-odds for
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
4. **: P < 0.05; *: P < 0.10.
190
female entry into firet marriage iB earlier than male entry. On the 
other hand, being in the older age group 31-41 reduces the odds of first 
marriage much more for females than for males. The negative effect is 
more than twice as large for females as for males. The negative effect 
of being black on entry into first marriage also differs by sex. Blacks 
have lower odds of marriage than whites and black females have the 
lowest chances for marriage of all.
While males with four or more years of college are not different 
from those with high school degrees, the female counterparts do differ 
from the reference group in that they have lower odds of marriage than 
those with only high school degree. The negative effect of being 
enrolled in school is almost twice aB large for females aB for males. 
This is consistent with the findings by Mare and Winship (1989: 18): 
although young men and women typically finish school prior to marriage, 
men are more likely than women to combine schooling with marriage.
Thus, being enrolled in school has less effect on marriage for males 
than females. While working part-time and being unemployed reduce the 
log-oddB of marriage for males, the variables have no impact for 
females. The non-working status has a negative effect on entry into 
first marriage for males, but it has no impact for females. Income has 
a positive effect on the odds of first marriage for males, but it is 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of marriage for females.
Public assistance reduces the odds of marriage more than twice as much 
for females as it does for males.
Thus far, the evidence is consistent with the expectation that the 
impact of socioeconomic resources differs by sex. While males with a
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high level of social and economic resources have higher log-odds of 
marriage, the female counterparts have lower oddB of marriage.
Pertaining to contextual variables, the local centrality of 
marriage has a larger impact for females than for males on three out of 
the five indicators. The current marriage rate has a larger positive 
effect on chances of first marriage among females than among males. 
Percent of female-headed households and illegitimacy in the labor market 
area have a larger negative impact on females than on maleB.
Female labor force participation in the labor market area has no 
effect for males but it has a negative impact for females. The sex 
differences in earnings reduce the chances for males to marry but they 
have no impact for females. It is not clear, however, why the 
relationship between the sex gap in earnings and odds of marriage is 
inverse instead of positive for males. The female independence argument 
predicts the opposite relationship. Welfare dependency and male 
unemployment in the labor market area reduce the log-odds of marriage 
for females but not for males. It could be that male unemployment 
reduces the economic ability of males to marry but it does not reduce 
their preferences for marriage.
While a favorable local marriage market of demographically 
marriageable partners strongly enhances the chances for females to 
marry, it has no effect for males. The second measure of local marriage 
markets reflects the pool of both demographically and socioeconomically 
eligible potential partners. It exerts a strong positive effect on 
marriage for both females and males, but the impact iB much larger for 
females than for males. This may suggest that single females in search
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for marriageable husbands place a greater emphasis on social and 
economic criteria than do single males in search of potential wives.
Local economy has a significantly larger effect on female than on 
male log-odds of marriage. This is inconsistent with the expectation 
that since the husband is still the main economic provider of the 
household, male marriage propensity would be more sensitive to changes 
in local economy which tends to have a more direct impact for males than 
for females in terms of employment and earnings. On the other hand, the 
positive relationship between local economy and female propensity to 
marry may be mediated by the linkage between local economy and local 
marriage market: a favorable marriage market is more likely in a booming 
economy than in a poor economy.
Overall, the results in Table 6-4 show two general patterns. 
Individual socioeconomic attributes have differing impacts on male and 
female odds of marriage, and females tend to be more sensitive to the 
changes of contextual factors. Nonetheless, a more central issue 
remains: Do these differences exist among both blacks and whites? If
so, do these differences have the same meanings for both groups?
Tables 6-5 and 6-6 show the results for sex differences in the 
effects of individual and contextual variables on marriage, specific to 
each racial group. The results for the individual variables suggest 
that the sex differences in the impact of these variables do exist for 
both groups and that these differences have the same meanings for both 
groups. For instance, controlling for public assistance, white females 
not working have higher chances for marriage than those working full­
time. On the other hand, white males who were not in the labor force
Table 6-5.
Female and Hale Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
193
Variables Female
Logit S.E.
White
Hale
Logit S.E.
Difference 
Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Demographic
Age20 -1.784** 0.177 -1.747** 0.161 -0.036 0.237
Age21 -0.689** 0.122 -0.858** 0.121 0.170 0.170
Age22 -0.172 0.109 -0.325** 0.104 0.152 0.150
Age23-26 ..... . . . . . . . . . . --- --- .....
Age27-28 -0.169 0.125 •0.084 0.110 -0.086 0.167
Age29-30 -0.671** 0.166 -0.564** 0.139 •0.107 0.217
Age31-41 -1.220** 0.148 -0.599** 0.107 -0.621** 0.182
Socioeconomic
< High School -0.214 0.160 -0.049 0.118 -0.164 0.196
High School --- . . . . . . . . . . --- --- ...
College 1-3 -0.112 0.095 -0.036 0.067 -0.076 0.126
College 4+ -0.422** 0.097 -0.001 0.087 -0.421** 0.125
Enrol led -1.043** 0.117 -0.658** 0.103 -0.385** 0.145
Hot Enrolled --- --- ---
Full-time . . . . . --- --- . . . . .
Part-time -0.032 0.11B -0.372** 0.132 0.340* 0.174
Unemployed 0.053 0.190 -0.687** 0.144 0.740** 0.235
Not Working 0.713** 0.113 -0.851** 0.138 1.564** 0.155
Income -0.104** 0.017 0.189** 0.026 -0.293** 0.028
Pubasst -1.257** 0.269 -0.691** 0.288 -0.566 0.387
Not on Pubasst 
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality of.Marriaoe
Marriage Rate' 0.002** 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.004** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 -0.000 0.001
Age of First Har. -0.104** 0.313 -0.162** 0.028 0.058 0.042
X F. H. Households -0.068** 0.021 -0.073** 0.018 0.005 0.028
11 legitimacy Rate 
Female IndeDendence
-0.010 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.009
Female in LBb. F._ -0.024** 0.008 -0.009 0.007 -0.015 0.010
Sex Diff. in Wage -0.239 0.238 -0.007 0.209 -0.232 0.316
X on Uelfare 0.058* 0.033 -0.033 0.030 -0.091** 0.044
Male UnemDlovment 
Marriaae Market
0.009 0.016 -0.005 0.014 0.013 0.021
AR (age) 1.420** 0.156 -0.227 0.246 1.647** 0.293
AR(ageEeduc) _ 1.853** 0.149 2.695** 0.215 -0.842** 0.269
U of Etigibles -0.009 0.022 -0.040* 0.023 0.031 0.031
Local Economy 
N
0.014**
4123
0.004 0.004
5712
0.004 0.010*
9835
0.006
Note
1. The general marriage rate is marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate variables are
interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
2. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
3. The logit estimate for the number of etigibles is interpreted as: the change in the log-odds for
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
4. **: P < 0.05; *: P < 0.10.
Table 6-6.
Female and Hale Differences in the Effects of Independent Variables 
on Propensity for First Marriage
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Black
Variables Female Hale Difference
Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Detnoqraohic
Age20 -1.385** 0.198 -1.964** 0.236 0.578* 0.307
Age21 -0.865** 0.171 -0.975** 0.162 0.111 0.235
Age22 -0.010 0.127 -0.331** 0.137 0.321* 0.187
Age23-26 ..... ..... ..... ..... --
Age27-28 -0.114 0.140 0.014 0.128 -0.128 0.189
Age29-30 -0.314** 0.159 0.015 0.142 -0.329 0.213
Age31-41 -0.640** 0.135 -0.018 0.114 -0.622** 0.176
Socioeconomic
< High School -0.188 0.12B -0.376** 0.108 0.187 0.166
High School ..... ..... ..... -- ..... *****
College 1-3 0.259** 0.104 0.299** 0.101 -0.040 0.140
College 4+ -0.096 0.132 0.115 0.131 -0.211 0.181
Enrolled -0.953** 0.144 -0.368** 0.125 -0.584** 0.180
Not Enrolled ..... .....
Full-time -- --
Part-time -0.036 0.153 -0.176 0.210 0.176 0.210
Unemployed 0.139 0.201 -0.372* 0.199 0.511** 0.199
Not Working 0.314* 0.170 -0.965** 0.198 1.279** 0.149
Income -0.082** 0.015 0.123** 0.019 -0.205** 0.021
Pubasst -1.372** 0.168 -0.246 0.204 -1.126** 0.25S
Not on Pubasst 
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality for Harriaoe
Marriage Rate 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Current Mar. Rate 0.007** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.003* 0.002
Age of First Har. -0.098** 0.024 -0.092** 0.022 -0.006 0.033
X F. H. Households -0.045** 0.008 -0.024** 0.007 -0.021* 0.011
Illegitimacy Rate 
Female IndeDendence
-0.007** 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.005** 0.002
Female in Lab. F. -0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.002 0.010
Sex Diff. in Wage 0.086 0.126 -0.221* 0.114 0.307* 0.169
X on Welfare -0.026** 0.013 0.004 0.012 -0.030* 0.017
Hale Unemployment 
Harriaoe Market
-0.023** 0.009 -0.012 0.008 -0.011 0.012
AR (age) 1.191** 0.140 -0.170 0.126 -1.361** 0.199
AR(age&educ) 2.852** 0.166 1.150** 0.116 1.702** 0.211
# of Eligibles -0.027 0.011 0.014 0.080 -0.042 0.142
Local Economy 
N
0.014**
4944
0.005 0.009*
5023
0.005 0.005
9967
0.007
Note
1. The general marriage rate is marriages per 1,000 population at risk. All rate variables are
interpreted as occurrence per 1,000 population in the labor market area.
2. The sex differentials in earnings are in logarithm.
3. The logit estimate for the number of eligibles is interpreted as: the change in the log-odds for
an increase of every 1,000 eligible partners in the labor market area.
4. ** : P < 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
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have significantly lower odds of marriage than those who were working 
full-time. The sex interaction works for blacks in the same way.
Several differences between the two groups are noteworthy. There 
is a sex interaction with the variable, "college 4+", among whites, but 
not among blacks, although at least the sign of the interaction is the 
same for both blacks and whites. The statistical insignificance of this 
variable for blacks could be due to the fact that very few blacks have 
college or higher degrees. The same explanation may be applied to the 
insignificance of the variable, part-time working, among blacks.
Two major differences are observed between blacks and whites in 
sex interactions with the contextual variables. First, the local taste 
for marriage has a stronger impact for black females than for black 
males. Current marriage rates in the labor market area increases the 
oddB of marriage more for black females than for black males. The 
percent of female-headed households and illegitimacy reduce the odds of 
marriage more for black females than for black males. Nonetheless, 
these differences are absent among whites.
Second, the second measure of local marriage markets has a 
stronger positive influence on the odds of marriage for white males than 
for white females, but the opposite is true among blacks. For whiteB, 
the explanation would be that males increasingly value the socioeconomic 
attributes of their female partners. Therefore, male propensity for 
marriage may be becoming more sensitive to change in the pool of females 
with comparable educational attainment, an indicator of potential 
earning power. For blacks, females face a limited pool of 
demographically and socioeconomically available partners. Hence an
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Improvement in the pool of eligibles would greatly enhance chances of 
marriage for females, much more so than it would enhance the odds of 
marriage for males. The finding (see the full model in Table 6-4) that 
the market of socioeconomically eligibles enhances the odds of marriage 
more for females than for males applies to blacks but not whites.
In Bum, the analysis suggests that at the individual level sex 
differences do exist and operate in the same way among both blacks and 
whites. At the contextual level, black females are found to be more 
responsive than black males to structural influences, such as local 
centrality of marriage and marriage markets. This sex difference is not 
observed among whites.
Summary
The argument for the importance of local centrality of marriage 
has received strong support from the present analysis. Overall, the 
local cultural climate pertaining to marriage has a significant 
influence on individual likelihood of marriage. Thus, the finding 
supportb Wilson's (1991) argument that Bocial and cultural context is 
important in understanding individual outcomes. However, there is no 
direct evidence that the influence of social context is stronger for 
blacks than for whites, although black females were found to be more 
responsive to the cultural context than black males.
The local male unemployment rate has a somewhat stronger negative 
impact on the log-odds of first marriage for blacks than for whites, 
thus lending support to the notion that a high male unemployment rate
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among black males is contributing to a shortage of economically stable 
male partners and hence a lower marriage propensity in the black 
community. The results show that the dependence on public assistance 
has a negative effect on the propensity of black females for marriage.
It could be that those who were on public assistance in 1979 also came 
from families which had been dependent on welfare and it is possible 
that blacks from the labor market areas where the percent on welfare was 
high in 1979 also grew up in the same labor market area. Therefore, the 
intergenerational recycling of poverty among the black underclass may 
also be responsible for the declining centrality of marriage. Previous 
research on the family structure and marriage propensity with survey 
data (the National Survey of Families and Households) showed that black 
respondents from families which had been on welfare while they grew up 
had substantially lower log-odds of first marriage than those who came 
from non-welfare families (Li 1991).
The findings demonstrate strong evidence for the importance of 
local availability of demographically and socioeconomically eligible 
partners. Analyses on both race and sex differences demonstrate that 
the local marriage market haB a strong influence for black females. 
Compared with white females and black males, the impact of local 
marriage markets is significantly larger for black females. Hence the 
findings support the argument that the poor marriage market black faced 
by females is an important source for a declining propensity for 
marriage among blacks.
The male unemployment rate and local marriage markets have a 
larger impact on black marriage propensity than that for whites.
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Perhaps it is not that blacks do not value marriage and family, but 
rather their values about marriage are in conflict with structural 
constraints (Staples 1985). Where structural conditions are favorable 
blacks may show a higher propensity than whites to marry.
The evidence has been weak for the argument of female 
socioeconomic independence as an explanation of the black/white 
divergence in marriage propensity. The analysis of sex differences 
shows that like white females, black females who have high income tend 
to have low log-odds of marriage. Also, both black and white females 
who could afford not to work (controlling for being on welfare) have a 
higher propensity for marriage compared with thoBe who worked full-time. 
However, the mechanism that generates this inverse relationship may be 
different for blacks and whites. While white females with high 
socioeconomic status tend to "buy out of" marriage, the black 
counterparts are restricted by the availability of black male partners 
with similar socioeconomic attributes. While white females with high 
socioeconomic resources choose not to marry, black females involuntarily 
remain unmarried. This is consistent with the observation that sex 
ratios are especially imbalanced among better-educated blacks (Goldman 
et al. 1984; Spanier and Glick 1980).
The finding that female labor force participation in the labor 
market area has no effect on the odds of marriage for blackB weakens the 
explanatory power of the female independence argument. Moreover, sex 
gaps in earnings as a stronger indicator of the extent to which women 
are economically independent of men are indeed much smaller among blacks 
than among whites (see the distribution in Table 5-2). However, the sex
differentials in earnings have no effect on individual log-odds of 
marriage for either blacks or whiteB. Thus, the female independence 
argument has proven to be a weak explanation for the racial divergence 
in marriage propensity.
200
Notes for Chapter Six
1. There are two alternative ways to test the significance of the 
separate effects for two groups. One way is to calculate the slope and 
compute the estimated standard error of the slope in the full equation 
(with both main- effect variable and interaction terms) for each group. 
A t test is accomplished by dividing the slope for a given group by its 
standard error (Jaccord et al. 1990: 46). Another way would be to run 
separate models and test statistical significance of the variables in 
question. The difference between the two methods is that in the full 
model, one imposes that variables not involved in the interactions have 
the same effects for both two groups, whereas in the separate models, 
the non-interactive variables are allowed to have different effectB for 
the two groups.
2. An indirect way to test interaction terms would be‘ to run separate 
models for blacks and whites and then compare the black and white logit 
coefficients with the adjustment of the group differences in the 
estimated standard errors. However, testing two-way interactions in the 
full model 1b a more straightforward and more efficient way to test 
group differences in the slopes (Jaccard et al. 1990: 48-49; Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 1989: 63-69; Fedhurza 1982: 458).
3. The control was accomplished by adding labor market types in the 
model which includes the size of marriage market area. The types 
include small metropolitan, medium metropolitan, and large metropolitan. 
The non-metropolitan type of labor market areas is the omitted group.
4. Since in moBt societies the structural power is in the hand of men, 
even under a high sex ratio women would have difficulty in using their 
dyadic power to gain freedom and independence, because men use their 
structural power over women to limit women's use of dyadic power. 
Therefore, sex ratio imbalances tend to have a weaker effect for men 
than for women in the likelihood of marriage (Guttentag and Secord 1983: 
167).
5. I have also consulted with several professors in the sociology and 
experimental statistics departments before I chose to run separate 
analyses.
6. The Pearson correlation coefficient between percent on welfare and 
percent below poverty in the labor market is fairly strong; it is .57 
for whites and .44 for blacks.
7. I tested two-way sex interactions separately for each group, instead 
of testing three-way interactions in the pooled model, because of the 
difficulty in interpreting the main-effect and the lower-order 
parameters in three-way interaction models.
8. With survey data one can not increase the sample size for the 
minority group, but this is possible with census data.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RACIAL DIFFERENCES BY SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL
Theoretical Context
Several theoretical arguments suggest that the recent structural 
changes, such as a rapid increase in male unemployment and the provision 
of welfare and its increased benefits, affect the marriage behavior of 
the poor black population more than that of other socioeconomic classes. 
In The Declining Significance of Race, Wilson (1978: 151) pointed out 
that the economic and political changes since World War II has led to an 
important consequence. On the one hand, these changes have been 
benefiting the newly emerged black middle-class in upgrading their 
socioeconomic status. One the other hand, these changes have been 
hurting the life chances of the black underclass more than ever before 
in the following terms:
"In other words, a consequence of the rapid growth of the 
corporate and government sectors has been the gradual creation of a 
segmented labor market that currently provides vastly different mobility 
opportunities for different segments of the black population. On the 
one hand, poorly trained and educationally limited blacks of the inner 
city, including the growing number of black teenagers and young adults, 
see their job prospects increasingly restricted to the low-wage sector, 
their unemployment rates soaring to record levels (which remain high 
despite swings in the business cycle), their labor-force participation 
rates declining, their movement out of poverty slowing, their welfare 
roles increasing. On the other hand, talented and educated blacks are 
experiencing unprecedented job opportunities in the government and 
corporate sectors, opportunities that are at leaBt comparable to those 
of whites with equivalent qualifications. The improved job situation 
for the more privileged blacks in the corporate and government sectors 
is related both to the expansion of salaried white-collar positions and 
to the pressures of state affirmative action programs" (Wilson 1978: 
151).
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In hie later work, The Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson (1987) argues 
that the decline of marriage among blacks is associated with the 
declining economic status of black men due to a structural shift in the 
U.S. economy. The argument appears to be supported by the parallel 
trends in employment of young men and marriage rates in the black 
community. Both trends declined gradually in the 1960s and rapidly in 
the 1970s, accompanied by a drop in the ratio of employed black men to 
women of the same age since the 1960s (Wilson 1987; Bennett, Bloom, and 
Craig 1989). Essentially, Wilson's argument suggests that the recent 
decline of marriage propensity is largely concentrated among the lower 
strata of the black population.
Based on their analysis of time series data sets, Bennett et al. 
(1989) found that lesB educated young black men and women appear to be 
doubly jeopardized by their race and by their educational status. Their 
relative economic circumstances are generally poor and have deteriorated 
significantly with the passage of time. Bennett et al. (1989) 
hypothesized that "an expanding underclaBS, whose members are unable to 
accumulate sufficient resources for marriage, would contribute heavily 
to the sharply declining rates of marriage among black women." Their 
data showed an association between the erosion of economic opportunity 
among less educated blacks and the sharply declining marriage rates.
The welfare thesiB more strongly suggests that a weakened 
centrality of marriage is a characteristic of black socioeconomic class 
rather than a characteristic of black culture (Murray 1982). Murray 
(1984: 155, 223) argueB that the relaxed restrictions and increasing 
benefits of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) induced poor
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black women bo forego marriage in order bo qualify for increased 
benefiba.
Cherlin (1981: 106-107) also nobiced bhab blacks moved away from 
being "currenbly married" more ofben bhan whibes, particularly moving 
boward "never having married". The movemenb is much more pronounced 
among less educabed blacks. Obher researchers, however, argue bhab 
bhere would sbill be a black/whibe divergence in marriage in bhe high 
socioeconomic groups for demographic reasons, albhough perhaps bo a 
lesser degree. Goldman eb al. (1984) and Spanier and Glick (1980) 
argued bhab educabed black females face a particularly unfavorable 
marriage market because bhere are relatively few black males with 
comparable education for them bo marry. In bhe Bennett et al. study 
(1989), bhe bebber-educabed black females were found bo have 
substantially lower marriage rates bhan similarly educabed white women 
bub higher rates bhan less educabed black women. Schoen and Kluegel 
(1988) also found bhab bhe decline of black marriage propensities was 
substantial at all educational levels. However, these authors were not 
able bo show in either of these studies why bebber-educabed black 
females have significantly lower marriage rates bhan their white 
counterparts. The authors of both studies attributed bhe racial 
differences in marriage rates among higher educational cohorts bo 
cultural differences1.
The question remains: are bhere significant differences between 
blacks and whites in marriage propensity among all socioeconomic 
classes? What are bhe factors that account for bhe differences? To 
address these questions, I first did a comparison of means in marriage
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rates by educational group between blacks and whites. Then, I estimated 
the propensity for first marriage in multi-variate models by sex and by 
educational groups. The analysis is based on a sub-sample of about 
20,000 cases which is 8 percent of the original sample. This sub-sample 
was also used for the analyses reported in Chapter Five. I use 
education as a measure of socioeconomic class because it is a good 
indicator of potential occupational status and income.
Results
Table 7-1 shows the proportion of the sample who married between 
1977-1979, by race, sex, and education. For males, there are 
substantial racial differences in marriage rates among those who dropped
out of high school and among those who completed high school. For these
groups, there are significantly fewer blacks than whites who married 
between 1977 and 1979. There is no significant difference between black 
and white maleB among those who had 1-3 years of college and among those
who had 4 and more years of college education.
For females, there are substantial differences between blacks and 
whites at all educational levels. The differences in first marriage 
rates appear to be larger at lower educational levels than at college 
levels. Among high school drop-outs, the proportion of persons who 
married during 1977-1979 is more than twice as large for whites as for 
blacks; about .23 for whites versus about .10 for blacks. Among those 
who had only high school education, the proportion for whites is also 
more than twice that for blacks; about .30 for whites and .14 for 
blacks. Several questions follow: What are the causes for these
Table 7-1. 2 06
Distributions of Proportions for First Marrfage (1977*1979) 
By Race, Sex, and Education
Hean STD D. STD E T DF
Hale
< High School
White 1074 0.2216 0.4155 0.0127
Black 439 0.1207 0.3262 0.0156
High School
White 3281 0.2545 0.4356 0.0076
Black 642 0.1854 0.3889 0.0153
College 1-3
White 2871 0.1832 0.3869 0.0072
Black 416 0.1755 0.3808 0.0187
College 4+
White 2654 0.2216 0.4154 0.0081
Black 164 0.2012 0.4021 0.0314
Female
< High School
White 521 0.2322 0.4227 0.0185
Black 309 0.1003 0.3009 0.0171
High School
White 2172 0.3020 0.4592 0.0099
Black 600 0.1417 0.3490 0.0142
College 1-3
White 2369 0.2220 0.4157 0.0085
Black 486 0.1523 0.3596 0.0163
College 4+
White 2109 0.2266 0.4188 0.0091
Black 200 0.1400 0.3479 0.0246
4.5458 1511 0.0001
3.7400 3921 0.0002
0.3816 3285 0.7028
0.6095 2816 0.5423
4.8104 828 0.0001
7.9426 2770 0.0001
3.4449 2853 0.0006
2.8348 2307 0.0046
Note
1. The T tests were performed under the assumption that the variances are equal. The F', a two- 
tailed test, shows that the null hypothesis of unequal variances between the two groups can not be 
rejected.
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differences in first marriage? To what extent are these differences due 
to black/white differentials in individual socioeconomic returns from 
education, and to what extent are these differences due to black\white 
differentials in access to structural resources and influences? To 
address these questions, X now turn to multi-variate models.
Females with less than hioh school education. The results in the 
first panel of Table 7-2 suggests that controlling for racial 
differences in age structure, blacks remain to have a lower propensity 
than whites to marry. Being black has the strongest negative impact on 
the log-odds of first marriage. Xn the second panel, the negative 
effect of being black on the dependent variable decreased by only a 
small amount (0.124), when school enrollment, work status, income, and 
public assistance were controlled in the model.
Xn the third panel, when contextual variables were introduced into 
the model, black females were no longer significantly different from 
their white counterparts in the propensity for marriage. The structural 
variables included in the model indicated racial differentials in 
exposure to contextual influence on marriage, such as the average age of 
first marriage, general marriage rates, and female labor force 
participation in the labor market area. These contextual variables also 
measured racial differentials in access to economic and demographic 
resources which facilitate marriage, such as local economy and local 
marriage markets. Local availability of potential male partners and 
local economy are the major sources for the variations observed in the 
model as suggested by the statistical significance of the variables.
A favorable marriage market and good economy in the labor market area
Table 7-2.
Race Differences In Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Female (less than high school)
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -1.057** 0.172 -0.736* 0.400 -4.703** 2.043
Demographic
Age20 -0.852** 0.362 -0.854** 0.372 -1.011** 0.381
Age21 -0.907** 0.409 -1.039** 0.420 -1.222** 0.434
Age22 0.890** 0.271 0.791** 0.285 0.610** 0.299
Age23-26 --- ..... ..... ..... --- • - - * »
Age27-30 0.056 0.275 -0.005 0.286 0.643* 0.335
Age31-41 -0.692** 0.286 -0.651** 0.296 0.386 0.381
Black -0.978** 0.221 -0.854** 0.231 -0.327 0.311
Uhite --- ..... ..... --- ---
Socioeconomic
Enrolled -2.090** 1.060 -2.029* 1.077
Not Enrolled --- ..... ... -----
Full-time ... ... --- ...
Part-time 0.604 0.370 0.669* 0.380
Unemployed 0.348 0.412 0.464 0.426
Not Working 0.516* 0.313 -0.477 0.325
Income -0.060 0.037 -0.070* 0.038
Pubasst. -1.385** 0.321 -1.165** 0.329
No Pubasst ... --- .....
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality for Marriaqe
Marriage Rate -0.001 0.001
Age of First Mar. •0.003 0.077
Female Independence
Female Labor F. participation 0.016 0.020
Local Economy 0.025* 0.014
Local Mar. Market 2.186** 0.522
(AR (age))
N 830 830 830
Model Chi-Sq 63.11 113.79 147.21
D.F. 6 12 17
-2 Log 727.23 676.56 643.14
2 0 8
Note
**: P < 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
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significantly increase individual chances for first marriage between 
1977-1979 among females who did not complete high school. Since black 
females with less than high school education are more likely than their 
white counterparts to live in labor market areas where marriage markets 
and local economy conditions are poor, they have a lower propensity than 
white females to marry.
Females with high school education. Turning to females with high 
school education, the first panel of Table 7-3 Bhows that blacks have 
significantly lower odds of marriage than whites after adjusting for the 
differences in age structure of the two groups. In the second panel, 
the negative effect for blacks decreased only a little when school 
enrollment, work status, income, and public assistance were controlled. 
Being enrolled in school and being on public assistance in 1979 have 
negative effects on the log-odds of first marriage, but those working 
part-time and those not working at all in 1979 were found to be more 
likely to be married. However, adjusting for variation in these factors 
has done little to reduce the negative effect on being black on the log- 
odds of first marriage.
In the third panel, when contextual variables were introduced into 
the model, the negative effect for blacks decreased substantially 
relative to the first and second panels; from -1.00 to -0.966 and to 
-0.354. While a high average age at first marriage and female labor 
force participation in the labor market area reduce individual log-odds 
of first marriage, a favorable pool of eligible partners in the locale 
increases the odds that an individual in that labor market area would be 
married. Nonetheless, blackB are still significantly lower than whites
Table 7-3.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Female (high school)
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAl VARIABLES 
Constant -0.471** 0.074 -0.367* 0.218 0.758 1.022
DemooraDhic
Age20 -1.620** 0.182 -1.583** 0.185 •1.720** 0.189
Age21 -0.408** 0.134 -0.425** 0.138 -0.611** 0.143
Age22 0.094 0.129 0.118 0.133 •0.009 0.136
Age23-26 -- ----- ..... ..... ..... .....
Age27-30 -0.441** 0.142 -0.428** 0.145 -0.001 0.159
Age31-41 -0.790** 0.165 -0.819** 0.169 -0.228 0.190
Black -1.001** 0.128 -0.966* 0.135 -0.354** 0.163
White ---- ..... ..... ..... -----
Socioeconomic 
Enrol led 
Not Enrolled 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Income 
Pubasst.
No Pubasst
-2.274*.
0.339**
0.073
0.900**
-0.034
-1.486**
1.028
0.156
0.196
0.158
0.022
0.262
-2.350**
0.334**
0.028
0.927**
-0.027
-1.525**
1.035
0.159
0.202
0.161
0.023
0.265
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar.
Female Independence 
Female labor F. Participation 
Local Economy 
Local Mar. Market 
( AR (age))
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
2771
197.82
6
3020.25
2771
318.27
12
2899.79
-0.002*
-0.088**
-0.020**
0.005
1.503**
2772
395.32
17
2822.74
0.001
0.039
0.010
0.007
0.223
Note
** : PS 0.05; * : PS 0.10.
2 1 0
2 1 1
on the propensity for first marriage. This suggests that other forces 
are operating to generate a significant difference between blacks and 
whites in marriage.
Females with 1-3 years of college . Consistent with the results 
for the previous two groups, the findings in Table 7-4 show that 
controlling for the differentials in age and socioeconomic attributes 
has reduced the negative effect of being black very little. However, 
when the structural variables were added to the model, black females 
were no longer different from their white counterparts in the log-odds 
of marriage. The local marriage market is the single most important 
contextual factor among all included in the model. Local centrality of 
marriage, female labor force participation, and local economy, on the 
other hand, have little impact for females with 1-3 years of college 
education.
Females with college or higher education. For females with 
college or higher education (see Table 7-5), the dummy variables for age 
have been reduced to four categories. Since very few persons at age 20 
or 21 have completed college education, I combined age 20 and age 21 
with age 22 to make a single dummy variable. From the first to the 
second panels, the negative effect of being black decreased very little. 
From the second panel to the third panel, however, the reduction is 
substantial. When racial differences in exposure to contextual 
influences were controlled in the model, blacks were no longer different 
from whites. While local marriage rates and local availability of 
marital partners increase individual odds of first marriage, female 
labor force participation decreases individual chances for marriage.
Table 7-4.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Female (college 1-3)
Variable logit S.E.____________Logit________S.E. Logi t S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -0.575** 0.080 -0.433* 0.250 -0.258 1.140
DemooraDhic 
Age20 -2.463** 0.205 -1.915** 0.218 -2.097** 0.224
Age21 -0.981** 0.143 -0.735** 0.151 -0.890** 0.155
Age22 •0.148 0.135 -0.046 0.141 -0.148 0.143
Age23-26 ..... ..... ..... ..... -- --
Age27-30 -0.330** 0.147 -0.354** 0.152 -0.033 0.166
Age31-41 -1.216** 0.225 -1.318** 0.229 -0.844** 0.245
Black -0.592** 0.140 -0.539** 0.146 -0.033 0.179
White ..... ..... ..... .....
Socioeconomic
Enrolled -1.437** 0.137 -1.414** 0.138
Not Enrolled ---- *------ ----- ----- -----
Full-time ..... ..... ..... .....
Part-time -0.224 0.165 -0.229 0.166
Unemployed 0.043 0.249 -0.022 0.253
Not Working 0.746** 0.167 0.752** 0.169
Income 0.007 0.026 0.011 0.026
Pubasst. -1.365** 0.362 -1.279** 0.364
No Pubasst — --...... .....  ..... .....
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar.
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation
Local Economy
Local Harriaoe Market
(AR (age))
0.000
-0.060
0.001
0.042
- 0 .0 1 1  0 .0 1 1
0.005 0.006
1.287** 0.248
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
2855
281.61
6
2654.27
2855
437.63
12
2498.25
2855
477.85
17
2458.04
2 1 2
Note
** : P £ 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
Table 7-5.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Female (college 4 +)
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20-22
Age23-26
Age27-30
Age31-41
Black
White
Socioeconomic
Enrolled
Not Enrolled
Full-time
Part-time
Unemployed
Not Working
Income
Pubasst
No Pubasst
-0.834** 0.074
-1.277** 0.158
-0.197 0.125
-0.857** 0.171 
-0.610** 0.213
-0.285
-1.081**
-0.231*
-0.926**
-0.583**
0.022
- 0 .121
0.484**
-0.045
-1.463*
0.299
0.172
0.12B 
0.174 
0.216
-0.923** 0.141
0.158
0.339
0.194
0.032
0.751
-0.770
-1.169**
0.112
■0.468**
-0.252
0.031
-0.238
0.450**
-0.040
-1.456*
1.228
0.175
0.144
0.197
0.239
-0.938** 0.144
0.160
0.349
0.197
0.032
0.754
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar.
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation
Local Economy
Local Marriage Market
( AR (age))
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
2308
100.24
4
2327.50
2308
159.94
10
2267.81
0.003**
0.021
-0.035**
- 0.002
1.240**
2308
210.53
15
2217.22
0.001
0.047
0.012
0.007
0.235
213
Note
** : P < 0.05; * : P < 0.10.
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These variables explain the racial difference in the propensity for 
marriage.
Overall, the findings for females of all educational groups are 
strong and generally consistent. Structural resources and contextual 
influences are two important mechanisms that generate black/white 
differentials in the likelihood of marriage.
Males with less than high school education. Turning to males, the 
results from Table 7-6 demonstrate that the black effect decreased 
substantially when school enrollment, work status, and income were 
controlled among males with the lowest level of education. Essentially, 
the differences between black and white males in labor force 
participation and income explain a fair amount of racial differences in 
marriage propensity. While the detachment from the labor force 
decreases the odds for marriage, a high level of income increases the 
odds of first marriage. In the third panel, when racial differentials 
in exposure to contextual influences were adjusted for, the black effect 
further decreased by 0.217. The reduction of the black effect is mostly 
attributable to racial differences in exposure to the influence of the 
local centrality of marriage which is indicated by the general marriage 
rates and the average age of first marriage. Local economy has no 
significant effect on the propensity for first marriage for males who 
did not complete high school.
Nonetheless, black males who did not finish high school are still 
found to have a somewhat lower level of propensity for first marriage 
than their white counterparts. The difference is significant at 0.10 
level. In the laBt panel where local marriage market was added to the
Table 7-6.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Male (less than high school)
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20
Age21
Age22
Age23-26
Age27-30
Age31-41
Black
White
Socioeconomic 
Enrolled 
Not Enrolled 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Income
-0.983** 0.121 ■1.343** 0.340
-1.902**
-0.558**
0.235
0.361
0.225
0.195
0.062 0.196
-0.556** 0.211 
-0.781** 0.167
-1.954**
-0.521**
0.189
0.121
-0.426*
-0.582**
0.364
0.230
0.200
0.203
0.218
0.173
-1.227* 0.748
-0.182
•0.269
-1.070**
0.079**
0.281
0.210
0.229
0.035
1.437
-1.959**
-0.544**
0.157
0.137
-0.431**
-0.339*
-1.138
-0.237
-0.292
-1.078**
0.080**
1.350
0.365
0.232
0.202
0.204
0.220
0.203
0.751
0.284
0.213
0.231
0.036
1.195
-1.954**
-0.562**
0.145
0.116
-0.517**
-0.590**
-1.127
-0.224
-0.306
-1.077**
0.079**
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Mar.
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation
Local Economy
Local Marriage Harket
(AR (age))
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D.F.
-2 Log
1513
84.07
6
1397.43
1513
154.74
11
1326.76
0.003**
-0.096*
-0.013
-0.005
1535
165.22
15
1316.28
0.001
0.055
0.014
0.009
0.003**
-0.113**
-0.013
-0.003
0.598*
1535
168.19
16
1313.31
Note
** : P < 0.05; * : p < 0.10.
S.E.
1.366
0.365
0.233
0.203
0.205
0.226
0.255
0.752
0.284
0.213
0.231
0.036
0.001
0.056
0.014
0.010
0.348
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model, the racial difference in the outcome variable increased. Black 
males have a more favorable marriage market than white males and when 
this differential is adjusted, the negative effect for blacks on 
marriage becomes more apparent. This suggests that for males the 
black/white difference in the propensity for marriage is suppressed when 
the corresponding difference in marriage market conditions is not 
controlled in the model.
Males with high school education. For males with high school
education, a fair amount of reduction in the black effect is observed
from the firBt to the second panels where socioeconomic characteristics 
are controlled. The effect for blacks decreased by 0.208. Being 
enrolled in school, working part-time, being unemployed, and not in the
labor force all have strong negative effects on the log-odds of first
marriage. Income has a strong positive impact on the log-odds of first 
marriage.
In the third panel, the significance of the black effect 
disappeared when the age of first marriage was controlled. This 
suggests that the black/white differential in exposure to contextual 
influences on marriage is an important source of the black/white 
differences in the outcome of marriage among males. This finding 
further suggests that regardleBB of educational level, black males are 
more likely than their white counterparts to live and work in the labor 
market areas where people marry less and marry late. As a result, this 
frequent exposure to a reduced centrality of marriage in the locale 
reduces the propensity of black males to marry.
Table 7-7.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Hale ( high school)
Variable Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -0.714** 0.060 -2.117** 0.311 1.042 0.864 0.960 0.868
DemooraDhic
Age20 -1.539** 0.158 -1.445** 0.160 -1.473** 0.160 -1.477** 0.160
Age21 -0.810** 0.130 -0.746** 0.131 -0.774** 0.132 -0.776** 0.132
Age22
1/ib7T.?A
-0.246** 0.112 0.206* 0.114 -0.215* 0.114 0.216* 0.115
Agccj*cO
Age27-30 -0.094 0.114 0.100 0.116 -0.087 0.116 -0.091 0.117
Age31-41 -0.458** 0.135 -0.476** 0.137 -0.428** 0.137 -0.472** 0.140
Black -0.444** 0.111 -0.236** 0.115 -0.009 0.128 -0.145 0.151
w m  re *****
Socioeconomic
Enrolled -1.291* 0.739 -1.300* 0.744 -1.291* 0.745
Not Enrolled -- --- ..... ..... --- ....
Full-time --- --- ..... .....
Part-time -0.557** 0.196 -0.552** 0.196 -0.560** 0.196
Unemployed -0.445** 0.143 -0.448** 0.143 -0.458** 0.143
Not Uorking -0.385** 0.175 -0.386** 0.175 -0.395** 0.175
Income 0.167** 0.033 0.169** 0.033 0.167** 0.033
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality of Marriage
Marriage Rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age of First Mar. -0.138** 0.034** -0.152** 0.035
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008
Local Economy -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.005
Marriage Market 0.405* 0.231
(AR (age))
N 3915 3915 3915 3915
Model Chi-Sq 164.80 265.47 288.77 291.89
D.F. 6 11 15 16
-2 Log 4180.80 4080.12 4056.82 4053.71
Note
** : P < 0.05; * : p < 0.10.
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In the fourth panel where local marriage markets in terms of age 
was added into the model, the effect of being black increased somewhat.
Although the logit coefficient for race is not statistically
significant, the increase in its magnitude from the third to the forth 
panel indicates a tendency for suppression effects of race among males.
Males with 1-3 years of college. Among males with 1-3 years of
college education, a somewhat different pattern is observed. Note that
the negative effect of being black became positive when individual 
socioeconomic attributes were controlled. Moreover, when contextual 
variables were added into the model, the effect of being black became 
positive and significant. Specifically, when mean age of first marriage 
at labor market area level was controlled, black males with 1-3 years of 
college displayed higher, instead of lower, odds for marriage than do 
their white counterparts. In substantive terms, this also suggests that 
black males with 1-3 years of college education are more likely than 
their white counterparts to reside or work in labor market areas where 
the average age at which people first marry is high. However, net of 
this difference, black males are more likely than whites to marry. This 
is, however, hidden when the average age of marriage is not controlled 
in the model.
In the fourth panel, when the local marriage market was included 
in the model, the positive effect of being black on marriage decreased. 
This is so because the higher availability ratio for black males offsets 
the negative effect of being black. On the one hand, black males tend 
to have a low propensity for marriage because they have high exposure to 
the negative influence of a low rate of marriage in the community. On
Table 7-8.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
Individual and Contextual Influences
Hale ( college 1-3)
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -0.946** 0.072 -1.994** 0.398 4.243** 1.113 4.166** 1.119
Demoaranhic
Age20 -2.646** 0.256 -1.973** 0.265 -2.059** 0.266 -2.063** 0.266
Age21 -1.132** 0.161 -0.721** 0.169 -0.785** 0.170 -0.793** 0.170
Age22 -0.378** 0.150 -0.231 0.154 -0.262* 0.155 -0.265* 0.155
Age27-30 -0.147 0.128 -0.247* 0.131 -0.199 0.132 -0.204 0.132
Age31-41 -0.509** 0.170 -0.668** 0.173 -0.598** 0.174 -0.631** 0.180
Black -0.219 0.141 0.024 0.146 0.467** 0.165 0.381* 0.201
White --- --
Socioeconomic
Enrolled -0.479** 0.125 -0.468** 0.127 -0.470** 0.127
Not Enrolled ..... ..... ..... .... ....
Full-time .... ..... --- ..... ..... ---
Part-time -0.569** 0.192 -0.526** 0.193 -0.527** 0.193
Unemployed -0.362* 0.197 -0.389** 0.198 -0.399** 0.198
Not Uorking -0.795** 0.208 -0.800** 0.208 -0.801** 0.208
Income 0.144** 0.042 0.143** 0.043 0.143** 0.043
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centralitv of Harriaae
Marriage Rate 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Age of First Mar. -0.219** 0.043** -0.228** 0.044
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation -0.020* 0.010 -0.021* 0.011
Local Economy -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.006
Marriage Market 0.252 0.329
(AR (age))
N 3277 3277 3277 3277
Model Chi-Sq 240.63 358.92 396.96 397.55
D.F. 6 11 15 16
-2 Log 2867.43 2749.14 2711.09 2710.51
Note
** : P < 0.05; * : p <  0.10.
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the other hand, black males have a favorable marriage market which tends 
to increase their propensity for marriage. Adjusting for the exposure 
effect, one observes that black males exhibit a higher tendency than 
white males for marriage. But controlling for the marriage market 
effect, one observes that black males exhibit a lower propensity than 
white males to marry. When the latter effect offsets the former, black 
males with 1-3 years of college education are not different from their 
white counterparts.
Males with college or higher education. The pattern of 
black/white differences in marriage is less pronounced for males with 4 
or more years of college than for other educational groups. Changes in 
the black parameter from the first to the second and from the second to 
the third panel seem to be consistent with what has been observed for 
males with 1-3 years of college. The logit coefficient for race became 
positive as individual socioeconomic characteristics and the exposure 
effect were introduced into the model. However, the results in the 
fourth panel are inconsistent with the results for the other educational 
groups in that the adjustment of marriage markets did not decrease the 
positive effect for black in the third panel. Instead the adjustment 
increased that effect. However, Bince none of these changes are 
statistically significant, they do not warrant further discussion.
Summary
The analysis by educational level demonstrates that racial 
differences exist at all educational levels among females. Among males,
Table 7-9.
Race Differences in Propensity for First Marriage (1977-79):
individual and Contextual Influences
Hale ( college 4 + )
Variables Logit S.E. logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -1.021** 0.068
Demographic
AgeHO-22 -1.098** 0.163
Age23-26 ----- -----
Age27-30 -0.142 0.114
Age31-41 -0.280** 0.126
Black -0.154 0.202
White ..... -----
Socioeconomic 
Enrolled 
Not Enrolled 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
Not Working 
Income
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality of Marriage
Marriage rate
Age of first marriage
Female Independence
Female labor force participation
Local Economy
Marriage Market
(AR (age))
N 2814
Model Chi-Sq 55.88
D.F. 4
-2 Log 2914.41
-1.656**
-0.815**
-0.232**
-0.402**
0.028
0.353
0.173
0.117
0.131
0.206
0.076
-0.519**
-0.888**
-0.671**
0.090**
0.121
0.162
0.330
0.192
0.037
2814
113.33
9
2856.96
1.486
-0.830**
-0.210*
-0.383**
0.187
0.071
-0.503**
-0.887**
-0.667**
0.093**
- 0 .001
-0.124**
-0.005
0.004
2814
124.61
13
2845.68
1.094
0.173
0.118
0.131
0.217
0.121
0.163
0.330
0.192
0.037
0.001
0.043
0.010
0.006
1.666
-0.825**
-0.215*
-0.342**
0.365
0.076
-0.498**
-0.894**
-0.669**
0.093**
- 0 .001
-0.111**
-0.005*
0.002
-0.477
2814
126.30
14
2843.99
Note
** : P < 0.05; * : p < 0.10.
S.E.
1.101
0.173
0.118
0.135
0.255
0.122
0.163 
.0.330 
0.192 
0.037
0.001
0.044
0.010
0.006
0.367
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the differences are observed at. the two lower educational strata; high 
school drop-outs and those who had only high school education.
The multi-variate analysis shows that for females of all 
educational levels, by adjusting for racial differences in individual 
socioeconomic attributes of age, school enrollment, work status, income, 
and welfare status one observes little change in the racial differential 
in the propensity for marriage. However, after adjusting for the 
contextual variables, such as local centrality of marriage and local 
marriage markets, the racial difference in marriage has diminished to a 
nonsignificant level for three educational groups; those with less than 
high school, those with 1-3 years of college, and those with college or 
higher education. Nevertheless, a black/white difference in the odds of 
first marriage remains among females with high school education after 
both individual and contextual factors are controlled. Further efforts 
are needed to identify the sources of this differential.
The multi-variate results for males reveal two offsetting 
mechanisms that generate or suppress black/white differences in the 
likelihood of marriage. On the one hand, adjusting for racial 
differentials in individual socioeconomic attributes and the mean age of 
first marriage at the contextual level, black maleB showed convergence 
with white males. For males with 1-3 years of college education, the 
change in the racial differential is most striking. When these 
variables are controlled in the model, black males become more likely 
than white males to marry.
On the other hand, adjusting for marriage markets, black males 
display lower chances than white males to marry. This is particularly
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true for males who dropped out of high school. The low rates of 
marriage in the black population has a negative effect for all blacks, 
but this effect iB offset by the positive effect of a favorable marriage 
market for black males. Without adjusting for the race differential in 
marriage markets, the negative effect of being black is suppressed for 
black males to a considerable degree.
Overall, the results for both females and males support the notion 
that the structural factors have important influences on individual life 
chance. Group differentials in exposure to contextual influence, either 
positive or negative, play a significant role in explaining group 
differences in marriage behavior. The results for females once again 
demonstrate that the racial differences in access to structural 
resources such as marital availability are an important cause of racial 
differentials in marriage propensity for three out of the four 
educational groups.
That the marriage market effect is offsetting the negative effect 
of low rates of marriage among the black population implies that sex 
ratio imbalances in favor of black males do have a positive effect on 
the propensity for marriage for maleB. This implication is inconsistent 
with the argument that an over-supply of female partners in the marriage 
market would reduce the willingness of the males to commit to permanent 
relationships, and hence would reduce their propensity for marriage 
(Guttentag and Secord 1983).
In sum, the findings once again clearly demonstrate that 
structural factors play a critical role in the dynamic processes of 
racial differentials in marital behavior. However, as the findings from
this chapter clearly demonstrate, these processes differ by educational 
groups. For females, the extent to which the contextual factors explain 
why blacks marry leBS than whiteB is different for the four educational 
groups. While local centrality of marriage and local marriage markets 
fully account for black/white differences in the propensity for marriage 
for three of the four educational groupB, race differences remain for 
those who have high school education. The future challenge remains to 
identify sources of the racial differences for this group. However, one 
would have missed this finding by treating all individuals as a 
homogenous group. For instance, by looking at the findings for all 
females alone (Table 5-12, Chapter Five), one would have concluded that 
racial differences in local marriage markets fully account for racial 
differences in the propensity for marriage for all females. That is 
certainly incorrect. For males, the processes of racial differences in 
marriage patterns are even more complex at disaggregated levels of 
education. Among high school drop-outs, by controlling individual 
socioeconomic attributes and local centrality of marriage one sees a 
narrowing of the racial gap in the propensity for marriage. By 
adjusting local marriage markets one observes a widening of the gap.
For those who have some college education, the process is different. By 
controlling these contextual factors, one observes that black males are 
more likely than white males to marry. Thus, as the findings in this 
chapter demonstrate, one can not treat all educational groups as 
homogenous when examining how social processes create racial differences 
in the likelihood of marriage.
Notes for Chapter Seven
1. In the Bennett et al. study (1989), the explanation was that the 
negative cultural influences of extended families and out-of-wedlock 
childbearing on marriage are alBo more prevalent among middle-class 
black women than among white middle-class women. In Schoen and 
Kluegel's study (1988), the authors argued that dissonant beliefs about 
male and female roles may have led to a greater decline in black 
marriage propensities at all educational levels.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this study was on the causes of the black and white 
divergence in marriage propensity. I have addressed three issues, using 
a cross-sectional data Bet with both individual and contextual level 
variables1.
The first issue I have addressed is the integration of both 
individual and structural variables in the model and how thiB linkage 
enhances the understanding of the black and white difference in 
propensity for marriage. The integration is critical because racial 
differences in access to structural resources and influences play an 
important role in shaping the outcomes of individual life chances, in 
addition to racial differences in individual socioeconomic attributes.
The second issue I have addressed is: do blacks differ from whites 
and do females differ from males in the impact of individual attributes 
and structural variables on marriage propensity? The concern with race 
and sex differences arises from the theoretical arguments that recent 
structural developments in American society have altered individual 
perceptions of the importance of marriage and have worsened social and 
economic conditions which constrain individuals' opportunity to marry 
and establish families. The impact of these developments on marriage 
behavior is significantly stronger among blacks and females than among 
other demographic groups. This differential has led to a substantial 
racial divergence in the propensity to ever marry, especially among
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females. The process of testing race and sex differences provides an 
empirical evaluation of each of the proposed theories and hence has shed 
a new light on the question: what are the important sources of a low 
propensity for black Americans to ever marry?
Third, as a further inquiry, I differentiated the analysis by 
educational groupB in order to see in what social strata racial 
differences exist and what account for these differences. The analysis 
has provided evidence that Bocial processes of racial differences in 
marriage behavior differ by socioeconomic class.
Integration of Individual and Contextual Factors
The findings demonstrate that both individual demographic and 
socioeconomic attributes and contextual factors have significant 
influences on individual propensity for marriage and the integration of 
both levels of factors have significantly improved the prediction power 
of the model. The findings show a strong linkage between the social 
context in which a person lives or works and the marriage behavior of 
that person. Furthermore, this linkage provides a new angle from which 
racial differences in marriage behavior are better understood. While 
local cultural climate pertaining to marriage influences individual 
preferences for marriage, economic and marriage market conditions either 
constrain or favor individual chances for marriage.
For females, significant differences in marriage propensity have 
been observed at all educational levels. For three out of the four 
educational groups, these differences are due to racial differentials in 
access to structural resources and influences. The findings clearly and
consistently demonstrate that racial differences in local marital 
availability are a very important cause of black and white divergence in 
marriage propensity. Once controlling for racial differences in local 
marriage markets, black femaleB are no longer different from their white 
counterparts in the propensity for marriage, except for black females 
with high school education. Thus, the worsening pool of demographically 
and socioeconomically eligible black male partners has been constraining 
the opportunities of black females to marry and establish families as 
white females do. Racial differentials in exposure to local climate 
pertaining to marriage are also an important source of corresponding 
differences in individual propensity for marriage. The adjustment for 
these differences has contributed to a narrowing of the black/white 
divergence in propensity for marriage among females with high school 
education and females with college or higher education.
For males, a significant racial divergence in marriage is observed 
in the lower strata. Unlike females, the divergence is, to a 
considerable degree, due to racial differences in labor force 
participation and income at the individual level. In addition, the 
divergence is due to black/white differences in exposure to the 
influence of the local centrality of marriage. Individuals who live in 
labor market areas where marriage rates are low tend to be less likely 
to marry. This suggests that since blacks are more likely than whites 
to live and work in labor market areas where marriage and remarriage 
rates are low and the occurrence of female-headed households and 
illegitimacy are frequent, their preference for marriage is weaker than 
that of white males2. Once this differential is taken into account,
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black males with high school education are no longer different from 
their white counterparts in marriage propensity. For males with less 
than high school education, racial differentials in exposure to 
contextual influences account for a substantial amount of the racial 
difference in marriage propensity.
For males with 1-3 years of college education, initially no 
significant black/white difference is observed in propensity for 
marriage. However, after adjusting for the fact that blacks tend to 
live in social contexts with low marriage rates and late marriages, 
black males are found to be more likely than white males to marry. This 
greater propensity for black males to marry is hidden when the influence 
of social context is not controlled. On the other hand, the more 
favorable marriage market for black males tends to offset the negative 
effect of more frequent exposure to a social context with low marriage 
rates. However, without taking into account the fact that black males 
have a more conducive marriage market than white males, the lower 
chances for black males to marry is masked.
Generally, both cultural climate pertaining to marriage and local 
availability for marriage are important variables that operate in the 
dynamic processes of the racial divergence in marriage patterns.
However, the way in which the two structural factors operate in the 
process is different for males and females.
For females, substantial black/white differences in marriage come 
from two sources. First, black females more often than white females 
live in social contexts with a low centrality of marriage. Second, 
black females face a more restricted marriage market than white females.
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As a result, black females are less likely than white females to ever 
marry. For black males, exposure to a social context with a reduced 
centrality of marriage also tends to reduce their chances of marriage. 
However, a more conducive marriage market for black males offsets the 
negative effect of the first factor.
Thus, by adjusting for both factors, one observes a racial 
convergence in likelihood of marriage for females. By controlling for 
the same factors, however, one observes a mixed picture among males 
because the two factors counter balance each other. In some instances, 
by controlling for marriage markets, one observes that chances for black 
males to marry are even lower than for white males (see Table 5-13). 
Given such complex interrelationships among race, sex, social context, 
and individual marriage behavior, it becomes all the more important for 
researchers to not only look at individual attributes but also at the 
influence that social structure exerts upon individuals. The omission 
of relevant contextual factors in the analysis would result in an 
erroneously specified model and hence misleading results. The findings 
from this study clearly demonstrate that the racial divergence in the 
likelihood of marriage can not be correctly understood without taking 
into account the social context. In addition, the omission of 
individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics will also lead 
to another erroneous assumption that social structure has a uniform 
influence upon all socio-demographic groups. The finding that 
individual socioeconomic attributes explained a substantial amount of 
racial differences in marriage propensity among males proves this point.
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Furthermore, as the analysis by educational group clearly 
demonstrates, racial differences in marriage behavior vary by 
educational groups. Thus, one can not treat all individuals as a 
homogenous group when examining social processes which create racial 
differences in individual outcomes of marriage.
The findings from the present research perhaps provide a answer to 
the "puzzle" raised by Michael and Tuma (1985: 540): why does the racial 
divergence in marriage propensity persist after family background and 
individual socioeconomic status were controlled? The answer is: racial 
differences in access to structural resources and influences are 
important sources of racial differences in marriage propensity.
Race and Sex Differences
The analysis of race differences demonstrates that the male 
unemployment rate, welfare dependence, and marital availability in the 
labor market area exert a larger impact in marriage propensity for black 
females than white females. A high rate of male unemployment and a high 
percentage of people dependent on welfare in the labor market area 
decrease the chances for marriage more for black females than for white 
females. An improvement in local marriage markets would enhance chances 
for marriage more for black females than for their white counterparts.
For males, the analysis of race differences overall shows mixed 
results. Work status and income at the individual level have stronger 
effects for white males than for black males. If observed differences 
in marriage propensity between blackB and whites mainly result from 
racial differentials in socioeconomic resources, black marriage would be
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more sensitive to variables that reflect these resources. However, this 
is not supported by the findings. Moreover, three of the five 
indicators of local centrality of marriage, age of first marriage, 
percent of female-headed households, and illegitimacy, have a 
significantly larger impact for white males than for black males. 
Theoretical arguments predicted the reverse.
This inconsistency could result from the aggregation of all 
socioeconomic groups into one homogeneous category. It could be that at 
the aggregate level the odds of marriage vary more for whites than for 
blacks with individual socioeconomic attributes and local climate for 
marriage, but at the disaggregate level the pattern could be reversed. 
Although direct tests were not conducted for thiB hypothesis, the 
analysis for males by educational level shows consistency with the 
speculation. Among males with below post-secondary schooling, 
individual socioeconomic attributes and the average age of first 
marriage in the labor market area (as an indicator of local centrality 
of marriage) explain a substantial amount of the black/white difference 
in the propensity for marriage.
Based on all the evidence provided b o  far, I draw a connection 
among several causal factors for a recent declining centrality of 
marriage among the black population in American society. Figure 8-1 
illustrates this linkage: the structural rise in the number of
unemployed black males leads to a high poverty rate which increases the 
dependence of blacks on welfare. In the meantime, the weakening 
attachment of black males to the labor force leads to a shortage of 
economically eligible marital partners and an increase in the proportion
D e t e r io r a t io n  o f  Male 
E c o n o m ic  P o s i t io n  in  
Labor M ark et
I n c r e a s e s  in  
S o c ia l ly  D is lo c a te d  
B la c k  M ales:  
A lc o h o l ic s ,  D r u g - A d d ic t s  
a n d  in  P r is o nW elfare
P o v e r ty
A P o o r  M arita l P o o lS e x  R atio  
I m b a la n c e s
Low Marriage Propensity
S h o r ta g e  o f  
E c o n o m ic a l ly  
S ta b le  M ales
W ea k en ed  C e n tr a l i ty  o f  M arriage  
in  t h e  S o c ia l  C o n te x t
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of black male population at risk of becoming socially dislocated: 
homeless, drug addicts, alcoholics, and prisoners. Both of these 
factors then lead to a poor marriage market for black females. Welfare 
dependency and the difficulties in finding suitable partners ultimately 
lead to a lower marriage propensity in the black population. A 
demographic factor, namely sex ratio imbalances, further reduces the 
number of eligible marital partners and it has an independent effect on 
the propensity of marriage among black population. A recycling of this 
entire causal linkage for generations creates another factor, called a 
weakened centrality of marriage in the social environment. This factor 
reinforces the outcome that blacks have low odds of marriage in their 
life time because of their more frequent exposure to a social context 
where marriage rates are low and female-headed families and illegitimacy 
occur often.
From the point view of black males, a continued detachment from 
the labor force leads to two consequences. One is a reduced ability of 
black males to marry and establish families. The other would be a 
reduced desirability for marriage as the continued absence of regular 
employment moves black males further and further away from the main 
stream of the society in terms of general expectations and goals for 
one's life. "Regular employment provides the anchor for the temporal 
and spatial aspects of daily life. In the absence of regular 
employment, life, including family life, becomes more incoherent"
(Wilson 1991: 10).
The analysis of sex differences shows that females differ from 
males in the influences of their socioeconomic attributes among both
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blacks and whites. That is, females with more socioeconomic resources 
tend to be less likely to be married than females with less resources.
On the other hand, males with a high level of socioeconomic resources 
tend to be more likely to marry. Since the female independence argument 
is based on sex differences in perceived gains to marriage, the findings 
show consistency with the reasoning of this argument. However, 
indicators of female independence proved insufficient in explaining why 
marriage rates are substantially lower for blacks than for whites. One 
consistent finding is that female labor force participation at the labor 
market area level reduces marriage propensity for white females and 
males but it has no impact whatsoever for blacks. Labor force 
participation has been higher among black females than among white 
females and the recent increase in female labor force participation 
largely applies to whites. Therefore, it does not seem logical to 
attribute the recent racial divergence in marriage propensity to the 
change in female labor force participation.
A stronger measure of the female independence argument is racial 
differences in wage structure by sex, namely the differences between 
males and female earnings from market work. Farley (1988) shows that 
the sex gap in wageB has been narrowed more among blacks than among 
whites. Hence it would seem logical to speculate that the economic need 
or desire for marriage should also have declined more for black females 
than for whites females because the gains to marriage are lower for 
black females than for white females. However, the findings demonstrate 
that racial differentials in this factor have no significant impact for
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either group. Thus, this study provides little evidence for the female 
independent argument.
Implications for Future Trends
It is evident from the present study that demographic and economic 
factors are important sources of the racial divergence in marriage 
propensity. Various resources of data showed that this trend started in 
the 1950s and has continued itB momentum since then. However, the 
question remains: will the racial divergence decline or increase in the 
foreseeable future? There are some indications that marriage market 
imbalances have begun to improve for both blacks and whites in the 
middle and late 1980s (Farley and Bianchi 1987; Bennett et al. 1989). 
Thus, female marriage will be likely to increase and the racial gap in 
female marriage propensity will be also narrowed.
Some suggest that the U.S. economy is beginning to undergo a major 
transition from being a labor-surplus economy to being a labor-shortage 
economy and that as labor markets improve during the rest of the 
century, unemployment rates should decline, and workers' earnings will 
increase (Bennett et al. 1989: 717). Hence, as the economic prospect 
improves for men and women, marriage rates would be expected to rise. 
However, whether or not a general improvement in the national economy 
will help narrow the racial gap in marriage patterns depends on whether 
lower social strata among the black population will benefit 
substantially enough from the economic change so that their chances for 
marriage would also improve correspondingly. Without improving 
educational attainment and job skills of the less educated and
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disadvantaged poor blacks, little can they benefit from the broader 
change in economy. Thus, economic barriers to marriage for this group 
would be still unlikely to be removed.
Suppose that both marriage markets and economic prospects have 
improved for all and particularly for the most disadvantaged blacks, 
there is still an offsetting factor whose influence may be independent 
of demographic and economic variables. This factor is what many have 
called, the "cultural factor". Structural changes in economic, 
demographic, and social aspects over the last few decades have led to a 
weakened centrality of marriage, especially in the black community.
This trend has been manifesting itself in several ways: an increasingly 
smaller proportion of blacks who will ever marry, a large proportion of 
families and households headed by never-married mothers, and a high rate 
of out-of-wedlock birth. Over generations the negative influence of low 
marriage propensity in the social environment where individual persons 
are socialized will form a cultural context whose effect may linger for 
some yearB to come. This issue has a connection with racial 
segregation. If blacks continue to be concentrated in areas where 
overall marriage propensity is low, the negative effect of living in 
social contexts with low marriage rates will offset the positive effects 
of possible improvements in demographic and economic aspects.
Finally, despite the finding that welfare dependency has a strong 
negative effect on marriage for black females, it seems that by 
abolishing public assistance for poor blacks little can be done to 
reduce racial differences in marriage propensity without improving the 
other conditions.
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Suggestions for Future Research
One limitation of the present study is lack of the information on 
family background in the data set. Due to this fact I was not able to 
analyze a full model in which family structure, individual current 
socioeconomic characteristics, structural factors, jointly influence the 
propensity for marriage. Experiences of family structure change during 
childhood and early adolescence has an important impact on marriage 
behavior because values about marriage are, to a significant degree, 
transmitted through early socialization in the family of orientation. 
Although the overall marriage climate in a social environment is 
influential for individuals' chances for marriage, the influence of the 
family of origin may be even stronger on individual choices about 
marriage and family formation. Therefore, a three-level analysis would 
allow researchers to better understand the process of entry into 
marriage. To what extent variation in marriage propensity would be due 
to personal experiences of family structure, to individual socioeconomic 
attributes, and to structural forces which are beyond individual 
control. To take into account variation in family structure experiences 
would alBO provide a stronger control of cultural differences between 
blacks and whites. One finding shows that black females with high 
school education continue to have significantly lower chances for 
marriage than their white counterparts even after controlling individual 
socioeconomic attributes and contextual factors. This could be due to a 
lack of control of black/white differences in family experiences and 
other aspects of cultural differences in values and attitudes about the 
importance of marriage3.
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Much of the emphasis has been placed on racial differences in 
perceived gains to marriage in the literature, but I was not able to 
directly measure these differences due to data limitations. Although X 
used individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics to control 
for possible variation in perceptions about marriage, I have no direct 
measures for perceived gains to marriage. It would be fruitful to see 
if blacks do have a different attitude toward marriage than whites. A 
Btudy in this direction will also provide an empirical basis for 
"cultural differences" which many have speculated as responsible for the 
residuals from what their models could explain.
Findings for males show that racial differences in marriage 
propensity increased or emerged when the contextual variables were 
controlled. This indicates that other social mechanisms may be 
operating to create the observed differential between blacks and whites 
in the likelihood to marry. Black maleB may have different attitudes 
toward marriage than white males. A study on racial differences in 
perceptions about marriage may shed some light on the issue. What makes 
black males different from white males in marriage patterns? Do black 
males desire marriage less than white maleB? If so, why do black males 
desire marriage less? Would black/white differences in childhood family 
experiences also play a role in creating race differences in marriage 
behavior for males?
Several researchers have suggested that black/white differences in 
the strength of kinship and social networks would be another resource of 
racial differences in marriage propensity (Aschenbrenner 1973; Stack 
1974; Martin and Martin 1978; Cherlin 1981; Bennett et al. 1989).
Black females seeking a stable form of family organization may find 
exchanges of economic resources based on kinship network more gainful 
since many male partners are unable to provide for families 
(Aschenbrenner 1973; Stack 1974). Nevertheless, I think the strength of 
kinship network is a result rather than a cause of the decline in 
marriage in the black community. The increased reliance of blacks on 
their kinship network for support and help is perhaps a strategy that 
the "truly disadvantaged" blacks use for survival in a society where 
they face limited resources and opportunities to improve their life 
chances.
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NoteB for Chapter Eight
1. A time-series or longitudinal data set would be an ideal source for 
the investigation as it contains information on changes for both 
individual and structural level variables. Hence, it would allow 
researchers to see if indeed structural changes have led to 
corresponding changes in individual behaviors. However, cross-sectional 
data sets allow for an examination of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables at a given point of time, which is 
still useful.
2. Although at the aggregate level no direct evidence was found that 
the influence of local centrality of marriage is stronger for blacks 
than for whites, this should not contradict the finding that, at the 
disaggregate level by education, racial differences in exposure to a 
weakened centrality of marriage account for a substantial amount of the 
racial variation in the outcome of marriage.
3. There are more blacks in this than the other educational groups and 
the proportion of blacks who experienced non-family structure may also 
be larger for this group than for others. Black/white differences in 
childhood experiences in family structure, when measured adequately, 
could be an important source of racial differences in the outcome of 
marriage.
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Appendix A. 255
Sex Ratio for U.S. Unmarried Population 
by Year and Race
All
Age 1975 1976 1977 1978 Age 1980
14-17 1.049988 1.053879 1.049856 1.055135 15-17 1.057371
18-19 1.129143 1.108240 1.115808 1.096350 18-19 1.090441
20-24 1.325935 1.405703 1.291099 1.261428 20-24 1.241112
25-29 1.236857 1.243557 1.261316 1.218554 25-29 1.237013
30-34 1.013889 1.048635 1.009245 0.978641 30-34 1.050375
35-39 0.885714 0.758299 0.748039 0.739844 35-39 0.809098
40-44 0.772676 0.8060B8 0.794742 0.760386 40-44 0.782569
45-54 0.597228 0.609670 0.626491 0.681740 45-54 0.659992
55-64 0.436433 0.429036 0.431639 0.432254 55-64 0.438723
Total 0.981103 1.003332 0.985721 0.982471 Total 0.983493
Age 1975 1976 1977
White
1978 Age 1980
14-17 1.055883 1.061703 1.059016 1.063480 15-17 1.065204
18-19 1.152134 1.125362 1.146996 1.117915 18-19 1.116776
20-24 1.393645 1.395862 1.353715 1.337308 20-24 1.30B661
25-29 1.325547 1.347231 1.320093 1.298067 25-29 1.339310
30-34 1.086698 1.109409 1.095945 1.070892 30-34 1.117486
35-39 0.980031 0.863188 0.828309 0.793615 35-39 0.840844
40-44 0.857542 0.819346 0.835651 0.803593 40-44 0.796275
45-54 0.584737 0.605348 0.623958 0.679570 45-54 0.663930
55-64 0.437024 0.425373 0.425695 0.436681 55-64 0.437233
Total 1.006689 1.015229 1.012146 1.012B37 Totat 1.016007
Black
Age 1975 1976 1977 1978 Age 1980
14-17 1.014260 1.013158 0.999135 1.008696 15-17 1.015240
18-19 0.975556 0.99171B 0.946108 0.964215 18-19 0.940613
20-24 0.964392 0.948229 0.968905 0.910966 20-24 0.922118
25-29 0.819572 0.787879 0.957672 0.853862 25-29 0.815094
30-34 0.662100 0.798206 0.667969 0.617089 30-34 0.762943
35-39 0.660099 0.444444 0.512931 0.560606 35-39 0.729008
40-44 0.427673 0.737430 0.616216 0.712418 40-44 0.750000
45-54 0.645477 0.614362 0.662404 0.701205 45-54 0.629464
55-64 0.449086 0.463483 0.477723 0.399015 55-64 0.442348
Total 0.830715 0.837661 0.841885 0.824398 Total 0.820026
Source: Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics: 
285-300 C3.186: P-20/285-300, Table 1 
301-313 C3.186: P-20/301-313, Table 1 
314-324 C3.186: P-20/314-324, Table 1 
335-344 C3.186: P-20/335-344, Table 1 
359-368 C3.186: P-20/359-368, Table 1 
(Data not available for 1979)
Unmarried Population: never-marrefd, divorced and widowed.
Appendix A. (Continued)
Sex Ratio in 1980 by Race
2 5 6
All White Black
Age Sexratio Sexratio SexrBtio
15-19 1.095062 1.105993 1.020923
20-24 1.262322 1.311743 0.9997
25-29 1.255091 1.362649 0.854868
30-34 1.003267 1.100178 0.657253
35-39 0.613628 0.875988 0.59276
40-44 0.725053 0.778496 0.55196
45-49 0.664911 0.701560 0.538387
50-54 0.561175 0.599713 0.524662
55-59 0.473914 0.479116 0.456255
60-64 0.351016 0.345279 0.389565
Total 0.965555 1.016574 0.819473
Source: PUHS-D 1980
Appendix B. 2 5 7
Distributions of individual Variables for the Original Sample 
by Sex and Race
Variables All
Mean STD
Male
Mean STD
Female
Mean STD
Uhite
Mean STD
Black
Mean STD
Demooraohic
First Marriage 
(1977-1979)
22.19 0.415 21.53 0.411 23.05 0.421 23.40 0.423 15.81 0.365
Age 24.82 4.411 24.90 4.397 24.71 4.427 24.73 4.356 25.29 4.666
Age20-24 58.40 0.493 57.00 0.495 60.24 0.489 59.25 0.491 53.96 0.498
Age25-Z9 26.61 0.442 27.77 0.448 25.08 0.433 26.38 0.441 27.81 0.448
Age30-34 10.37 0.305 10.67 0.309 9.97 0.300 10.00 0.300 12.30 0.328
Age35-41 4.62 0.210 4.55 0.208 4.71 0.212 4.34 0.204 5.92 0.236
Uhite 84.00 0.367 85.89 0.348 81.51 0.388 ------- ------- ------- . . . . .
Black 16.00 0.367 14.11 0.348 18.49 0.388 . . . . . • • > .  . ..... - - - - -
Mole 56.82 0.495 --- --- --- . . . . . 58.11 0.493 50.09 0.500
Female 43.18 0.495 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --- 41.90 0.493 49.91 0.500
Socioeconomic
Years of school 15.41 2.860 15.31 2.924 15.54 2.769 15.60 2.849 14.41 2.705
< High school 11.51 0.319 13.03 0.337 9.52 0.293 9.26 0.290 23.33 0.423
High school 32.98 0.470 34.00 0.474 31.64 0.465 31.98 0.466 38.22 0.486
College 1-3 30.00 0.458 28.51 0.451 31.98 0.466 30.73 0.461 26.22 0.440
Cot lege 4+ 25.50 0.436 24.46 0.430 26.86 0.443 28.02 0.449 12.23 0.328
Enrol led 
OccO1
22.37 0.417 21.50 0.411 23.51 0.424 23.34 0.423 17.25 0.378
9.11 0.288 9.04 0.287 9.18 0.289 6.97 0.255 20.31 0.402
0cc1 18.49 0.388 16.75 0.373 20.77 0.406 20.16 0.401 9.70 0.296
Occ2 41.66 0.493 28.91 0.453 58.44 0.493 41.97 0.494 40.05 0 490
Occ3 30.74 0.461 45.29 0.498 11.61 0.320 30.90 0.462 29.92 0.458
Full-time 60.29 0.489 63.82 0.481 55.65 0.497 62.91 0.483 46.55 0.499
Part-time 11.58 0.320 9.63 0.295 14.13 0.348 12.11 0.326 8.77 0.283
Unemployed 7.01 0.255 8.34 0.276 5.25 0.233 6.18 0.241 11.33 0 317
Not Uorking 21.12 0.408 18.20 0.386 24.96 0.433 18.79 0.391 33.35 0.471
Uorked 75-80 93.24 0.251 94.64 0.225 91.54 0.280 95.21 0.214 82.93 0.376
Income(log) 8.07 2.479 8.26 2.390 7.81 2.570 8.24 2.276 7.14 3.194
Pubasst
N2
4.25
252790
0.202 2.23
143627
0.148 6.89
109163
0.253 2.61
212345
0.159 12.83
40445
0.334
Note
1. OccO: not in the labor force and unemployed since 1975; 0ec1: professionals and managerial and 
administrative; 0cc2: technical, sales, Bnd services; 0cc3: agricultural and blue collar jobs.
2. Persons with negative incomes in 1979 were excluded from the sample.
Appendix C.
Correlation Matrix for Continuous Variables (full sample)
All
VI VZ V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V H  V15 V16 V17
VI 1.00 .05 .141 -.018 -.074 .106 .063 .051 .044 -.025 .047 .019 -.012 -.006 .028 -.219 -.146
V2 1.00 .144 -.024 .095 -.011 -.140 -.158 .039 .154 -.156 -.119 .007 .021 .082 -.020 .027
V3 1.00 . 002 .141 -.064 -.159 -.163 .028 .169 -.168 -.115 . 015 . 025 ..043 -.088 -.033
V4 1.00 .110 -.221 -.055 -.026 .049 .001 -.059 -.034 .332 -.015 -.186 -.004 -.012
V5 1.00 -.636 -.943 -.883 -.356 .768 -.838 -.590 .129 .048 -.048 -.102 -.009
V6 1.00 .539 .468 .223 -.309 .436 .255 -.236 -.064 .416 .079 .044
V7 1.00 .961 .264 -.833 .913 .657 -.105 -.099 -.113 .107 -.012
V8 1.00 .213 -.855 .910 .640 -.081 -.100 -.190 .101 -.025
V9 1.00 -.124 .029 -.139 .168 -.058 .071 .057 .057
V10 1.00 -.819 -.516 .076 .061 .300 -.075 .044
VII 1.00 .721 -.113 -.052 -.149 .092 -.030
V12 1.00 -.189 .107 -.181 .062 -.026
V13 1.00 .189 -.167 -.001 .006
V14 1.00 -.034 -.009 .012
V15 1.00 .083 .152
V16 1.00 .880
V17 1.00
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Appendix C. (Continued)
Correlation Hatrix for Continuous Variables
Uhite
VI V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 VS V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17
VI 1.00 .088 .150 -.015 -.075 .103 .084 .022 .040 .044 -.072 1 O ■T- ro -.003 -.008 .068 -.167 -.092
V2 1.00 .120 -.028 -.107 .082 .043 -.053 .088 .041 -.062 -.048 -.006 .002 .053 .006 .041
V3 1.00 -.001 -.020 .020 .003 -.011 .073 .065 -.059 -.022 .001 .006 .008 -.100 -.054
V4 1.00 .202 -.246 -.156 -.071 .047 -.036 -.076 -.007 .331 -.014 -.194 -.001 -.018
V5 1.00 -.701 -.732 -.144 -.364 -.061 -.133 .012 .141 -.113 -.604 -.038 -.093
V6 1.00 .598 .094 .192 .215 .032 -.118 -.227 -.025 .690 .054 .092
V7 1.00 .305 .159 -.009 .365 .073 -.116 .034 .585 .058 .066
V8 1.00 -.168 -.140 .457 .349 -.041 .127 .228 .024 -.004
V9 1.00 .292 -.388 -.429 .168 -.037 .163 .049 .080
V10 1.00 -.458 -.220 .072 -.118 .294 .041 .052
VII 1.00 .433 -.002 .145 .147 -.007 -.033
V12 1.00 -.135 .302 -.104 -.007 -.026
V13 1.00 .193 -.179 .015 .005
V14 1.00 -.060 .004 .011
V15 1.00 . 1 2 2 .170
V16
V17
1.00 .870
1.00
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Appendix C. (Continued)
Correlation Matrix for Continuous Variables
Black
VI V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17
V1 1.00 -.055 .159 -.042 -.058 .076 .065 .043 .006 .008 .030 .020 -.041 .003 .075 -.035 -.020
V2 1.00 .134 -.018 -.021 .001 .007 • • o U1 'O .065 .066 -.034 -.002 .032 .038 .034 -.037 -.028
V3 1.00 .002 .010 -.018 -.010 -.032 .083 .029 -.040 -.013 -.032 .024 -.002 -.026 -.002
V4 1.00 .309 -.283 -.241 -.016 .128 -.027 -.230 -.182 .358 -.070 -.283 -.007 .005
V5 1.00 -.371 -.836 -.289 .073 -.019 -.444 -.455 .451 -.069 -.446 -.021 -.008
V6 1.00 .414 .312 -.048 .083 .217 .122 -.308 .011 .384 .019 .002
V7 1.00 .482 -.124 .077 .520 .502 1 4* 00 -.039 .433 .038 .028
V8 1.00 -.234 -.143 .444 .192 -.302 -.211 .129 .024 -.007
V9 1.00 .088 -.667 -.371 .407 .009 -.071 -.001 .034
V10 1.00 -.104 .328 .050 .132 .100 -.003 .033
V11 1.00 .532 -.490 .045 .251 .023 -.002
V12 1.00- .427 .053 .208 .012 .003
V13 1.00 .112 -.422 -.028 .003
V14 1.00 -.038 -.012 .003
V15 1.00 .205 .206
V16 1.00 .918
VI7 1.00
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Appendix C. (Continued)
Variable Labels
V1: Age (individual level)
V2: Education (individual level)
V3: Log of income (individual)
V4: General marriage rate 1980 (labor market area level)
V5: Current marriage rate (labor market area level)
V6: Average age of first marriage (labor market area level)
V7: Percent female-headed households (labor market area level)
V8: Illegitimacy rate (labor market level)
V9: Percent of female population in the labor force (labor market level)
V10: Sex differences in earnings in log (labor market level)
V11; Percent population on welfare (labor market level)
V12: Male unemployment rate (labor market level)
V13: Change in employment rate 1975-1979 (labor market level)
V14: Population density (labor market level)
V15: The number of eligibles (labor market level)
V16: Availability ratio in terms of age (labor market level)
V17: Availability ratio in terms of age and education (labor market area level)
Appendix D.
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Replicate Results Table 5*14 Based on the 216 Labor Market Areas
Log-odds of First Marriage (1977-79): 
influence of Individual Attributes and Contextual Variables
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant
Demographic
Age20
Age21
Age22
Ago23-26
Age27-28
Age29-30
Age31-41
Female
Male
Black
Uhite
-0.880** 0.034
-1.874**
-0.834**
-0.231**
-0.096
-0.275**
-0.582**
0.127**
0.095
0.067
0.058
0.063
0.077
0.063
0.038
-0.542** 0.053
-0.838** 0.107
-1.738**
-0.714**
-0.169**
-0.114*
-0.296**
-0.635**
0.182**
0.098
0.069
0.060
0.064
0.078
0.064
0.039
-0.493** 0.056
1.707** 0.519
-1.807** 0.100 
-0.818** 0.072 
-0.214** 0.062
0.011 0.065
-0.179** 0.079
•0.519** 0.065 
-0.005 0.042
-0.321** 0.075
Socioeconomic 
< High School 
High School 
College 1-3 
Col lege 4 + 
Enrolled 
Not Enrolled 
Full-Time 
Part-Time 
Unemployed 
Not Uorking 
Income (log) 
Pubasst.
No Pubasst.
-0.151** 0.069
-0.074
-0.218**
-0.810**
-0.281**
■0.312**
0.102
0.025**
-1.205**
0.051
0.053
0.064
0.070
0.086
0.070
0.010
0.142
0.069
0.061
-0.063
0.072
0.053
0.055
-0.790** 0.065
-0.327** 0.072
-0.357** 0.088
0.038 0.072
0.025** 0.011 
-1.032** 0.144
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Centrality of Marriage 
Marriage Rate 
Age of First Har.
Female Independence
Female Labor F. Participation
Marriage Market
Density
# of Eligibles
Availability Ratio
(age&education)
Local Economy 
Employment 75-79
0.001* 0.000 
-0.154** 0.021
-0.018** 0.004
-0.042* 0.023
0.017 0.017
1.718** 0.074
0.004 0.003
N
Model Chi-Sq 
D. F.
- 2 Log
17384
80B.35
8
17341.41
17384
1226.65
17
16923.12
17384
1932.31
24
16217.45
Note
1. ** : P S 0.05; * : p S 0.10.
2. The effects for population density and # of eligibles are interpreted as: the change in log-odds for 
an increase of 1,000 population per square mile or an increase of 1,000 suitable persons in the labor 
market area.
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Replicate Results for Table 5-14 Based on the Original Sample
Log*odds of First Marriage (1977-79):
Influence of Individual Attributes and Contextual Variables
Variables Logit S.E. Logit S.E. Logit S.E
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Constant -0.854** 0.009 -0.900** 0.026 0.977** 0.131
Demooraohic
Age20 -2.005** 0.025 -1.882** 0.026 •1.954** 0.026
AgeZI -0.828** 0.017 -0.725** 0.018 -0.808** 0.018
Age22 -0.194** 0.015 -0.139** 0.015 -0.214** 0.016
Age23-26 - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................
Age27-28 -0.108** 0.017 -0.131** 0.017 0.006 0.017
Age29-30 •0.261** 0.020 -0.296** 0.020 -0.178** 0 . 0 2 0
Age31-41 -0.631** 0.017 -0.695** 0.017 •0.556** 0.017
Female
U  I
0.134** 0.001 0.191** 0.010 - 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 1 1
n a  l  O
Black -0.59** 0.015 -0.469** 0.015 -0.343** 0 . 0 2 0
Whi te ------------- ----- . . . . . . . . . . -----
Soc i oeconomi c
< High School -0.053** 0.018 0.196** 0.019
High School ------------- ... ... ...
Col lege 1-3 - 0.000 0.013 0.134** 0.014
Col lege 4 + -0.195** 0.014 •0.052** 0.014
Enrol led -0.832** 0.017 •0.817** 0.017
Not Enrolled ------------- ... ... ...
FulI-Time . . . . . . . . . .
Part-Time -0.266** 0.018 -0.311** 0.019
Unemployed -0.278** 0 . 0 2 1 -0.299** 0 . 0 2 2
Not Working 0.083** 0.018 0.029 0.018
Income (log) 0.032** 0.003 0.037** 0.003
Pubasst -1.012** 0.034 -0.865** 0.035
No Pubasst ------- ------
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Centrality of Marriage
Marriage Rate 0.087 0.098
Age of First Mar. -0.132** 0.005
Female Independence
Female Labob F. Participation -0.014** 0.001
Marriaqe Market
Density -0.037** 0.006
# of Eligibles -0.032** 0.005
Availability Ratio
(age&edue) 1 . 6 8 8 * * 0.019
Local Economy
Employment 75-79 0.003** 0.001
N 252790 252790 252790
Model Chi-Sq 12934.42 18921.17 28603.83
D. F. 8 17 24
- 2 Log 254667 248681 238998
Note
1. ** : P < 0.05; * : p £ 0.10.
2. The effects for population density and # of eligibles are interpreted as: the change in log-odds for 
an increase of 1,000 population per square mile or an increase of 1,000 suitable persons in the labor 
market area.
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A ppendix  F.
Distributions of Individual Variables for Sub-Sample 21 
by Race
Variables White Black
Mean STD Mean STD
DemoqraDhic
First Marriage 23.772 0.426 15.260 0.360
(1977-1979)
Age 24.706 4,346 25.282 4.684
Age20-24 59.675 0.491 54.169 0.498
Age25-29 26.162 0.440 27.802 0.448
Age30-34 10.015 0.300 11.869 0.323
Age35-41 4.148 0.199 6.160 0.240
Male 58.078 0.493 50.396 0.500
Female 41.921 0.493 49.604 0.500
Socioeconomic
Years of school 15.614 2.861 14.400 2.725
< High school 9.029 0.287 23.237 0.422
High school 31.916 0.466 38.427 0.486
College 1-3 30.808 0.462 26.347 0.441
College 4+ 28.246 0.450 11.990 0.325
Enrol led 23.242 0.422 17.317 0.378
OccO2 6.853 0.253 20.488 0.404
0cc1 20.102 0.401 9.541 0.294
0cc2 42.206 0 494 39.400 0.489
0cc3 30.839 0.462 30.571 0.461
Full-time 63.142 0.482 47.276 0.499
Part-time 12.059 0.326 8.639 0.281
Unemployed 6.152 0.240 10.896 0.312
Not Working 18.648 0.390 33.190 0.471
Worked 75-80 95.312 0.211 82.663 0.379
Income(log) 8.238 2.281 7.143 3.202
Pubasst 2.694 0.162 12.602 0.332
N3 9835 9967
Note
1. Sub-sanple 2 has an equal proportion for blacks and whites. Analysis on sex interaction uas based 
this sample.
2. OccO: not in the labor force and unemployed since 1975; 0cc1: professionals and managerial and 
administrative; 0cc2: technical, sales, and services; 0cc3: agricultural and blue collar jobs.
3. Persons with negative incomes in 1979 were excluded from the sample, but people with 0 income were 
included in the data.
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